



Monitoring the media
coverage of the March 2000
presidential elections in
Russia

Final Report
August 2000

 THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTE FOR THE MEDIA
INSTITUT EUROPÉEN DE LA COMMUNICATION
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1 Introduction

The European Institute for the Media (EIM), a non-profit, non-government, policy-oriented research institution, has carried out a mission to monitor media coverage of the Russian presidential elections. The mission was funded by the European Commission through the Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. Since 1992, the EIM has carried out more than 40 media monitoring missions during parliamentary and presidential elections in countries of east and central Europe and the former Soviet Union. This is the fifth EIM media monitoring mission in Russia. This report remains the sole responsibility of the EIM and reflects only the views of the Institute.

The mission sought to evaluate whether the media provided impartial and balanced coverage of the issues to be addressed and the political choices facing the electorate. Monitoring was carried out from 3 to 26 March 2000 and included observation of adherence of the authorities and the candidates to the recognised democratic norms concerning the media.

Monitoring was conducted using qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. Quantitative analysis measured the amount of time and space devoted to political candidates on five national television channels and twelve national newspapers. The Moscow-based company Russian Research carried out the quantitative analysis under EIM supervision. The National Press Institute provided reports on the political and media situation in St. Petersburg, Samara, Novosibirsk, Vladivostok and Yekaterinburg. Qualitative analysis consisted of a series of interviews with representatives and employees of media organisations, regulatory bodies, presidential candidates and their campaign staff.

The EIM team consisted of the following members:

- Professor Jo Groebel (DE), Director-General of the EIM,
- Benedicte Berner (Sweden), EIM Director of International Relations
- Dušan Reljic (FRY), Head of the Media and Democracy Programme at the EIM,
- Gillian McCormack (UK), EIM Project Manager for the Russian monitoring,
- Dmitrii Kortunov (RU), EIM Coordinator for the Russian Federation,
- Dr Ase Grodeland (N), media and politics expert,
- Professor Margot Light (UK), expert in international relations at the London School of Economics,
- Michel Tatu (FR), former Moscow correspondent for Le Monde newspaper.
- Professor Stephen White (EI), expert in post-Soviet politics at Glasgow University.

The EIM would like to express its particular gratitude to Tatyana Burchakova, Andrei Nevskii and Tatyana Kasai at Russian Research for their work on this project. This report was written by the above international experts and edited by Gillian McCormack. Finally, the EIM thanks all those who assisted and contributed to this report, including those media professionals and political campaign staff who consented to be interviewed.

Summary of Preliminary Findings

Vladimir Putin overwhelmingly dominated the media coverage during the presidential campaign. In general, coverage in March 2000 was less confrontational than coverage of the State Duma campaign last December or the previous presidential elections in 1996. Nevertheless, it still did not live up to the standards and regulations existing in the laws of the Russian Federation and international agreements to which the Russian Federation is signatory.

Large segments of the public, including many people working in the media, appeared to have accepted the outcome to be a foregone conclusion because of the popularity of the acting president and the overwhelming advantages enjoyed by him. Nevertheless, during the final week of the campaign, state-controlled ORT TV channel once again resorted to "black PR", denigrating opponents of the acting president. The methods used fundamentally contradict ethical principles of the journalistic profession as well as international standards that Russia has endorsed. This reversal to past practices and some signs that Vladimir Putin's administration intends to approach media-related questions in a more assertive way, could indicate that freedom of expression and the autonomy of the media in Russia may encounter new tests in the future.

- Vladimir Putin overwhelmingly dominated the media coverage during the presidential campaign. Despite declining free time and refusing to participate in pre-election debates, Putin received over a third of all coverage devoted to the candidates on all television channels taken together, as much as Zyuganov (12%), Yavlinsky (11%) and Zhirinovskiy (11%) received together.
- In news and current affairs programmes, which are of particular importance, Putin received the lion's share of coverage -- close to 50% of the total for all national television channels together. Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov were well behind with 12% and 11% respectively. Yavlinsky followed with 8% and Titov with 4.5%.
- The election coverage provided by the state-controlled TV organisations, first channel ORT and second channel RTR, was biased in favour of the incumbent, as consistently as in every other election monitored by the EIM in Russia. Neither channel (particularly ORT) lived up to their particular responsibility to provide "full, free and fair" information about the political choice on offer, as outlined in Council of Europe recommendations to which Russia is a signatory.
- Commercial channels were more balanced in their coverage. NTV, TV 6 and the Moscow administration owned TV Centre also devoted approximately half their news coverage during the campaign to the activities of Vladimir Putin. However their analytical programmes gave a broader perspective of the election debate. NTV was particularly generous in the amount of time assigned to Yavlinsky, devoting nearly 20% of all analytical programmes to this topic.
- In the national newspapers taken together, Putin received over a third of the space devoted to all candidates, compared to 14% for Zyuganov and 12% for Yavlinsky. Indeed, Putin received the greatest amount of coverage in each national newspaper monitored, including opposition newspapers like Pravda and Zavtra. The press in general continued to provide a more pluralistic source of

information than that provided by national television. However, the widespread practice of hidden advertising, demanded by political candidates and facilitated by willing editors, once again cast serious doubts on the ethics of the print media profession.

- Reports from St. Petersburg, Samara, Novosibirsk, Vladivostok and Yekaterinburg indicated that the media coverage of the campaign in the regions was lacklustre, hardly making an impact on the local press and broadcasters. In Samara, local governor and presidential candidate Konstantin Titov was the subject of local media debate. Several regions reported that Yavlinsky was the most active advertiser in the local media, although Putin's coverage in information programmes was more noticeable.

Professor Dr. Jo Groebel

Düsseldorf July, 2000

2 Political background

Margot Light
Stephen White

2.1 The context of the elections

President Boris Yeltsin's premature resignation on 31 December 1999 brought the presidential elections forward from the scheduled date in June to 26 March 2000. Yeltsin's early retirement was precipitated by the outcome of the elections to the State Duma on 19 December 1999. 'Unity' (Yedinstvo or Medved), an electoral bloc which had been established on 27 September 1999, less than three months before the elections and which campaigned without a political programme and on the sole basis of promising unconditional support for the government, won 23.3 per cent of the party list vote. It came a close second to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (24.3 per cent) and seriously damaged Fatherland-All Russia, a centrist party led by former Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, which had been odds-on favourite to become the second largest party in the Duma but which polled only 13.2 per cent of the vote.

Unity's success in the Duma elections was assisted by the open support it was given by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. He, in turn, benefited from its electoral performance. Putin had been appointed Prime Minister in August and President Yeltsin had also named him as his chosen successor as president. Fatherland-All Russia's disappointing electoral results undermined the standing of Primakov (who, shortly before the Duma election, had declared his intention of standing for president) and of Luzhkov, who had also seemed a likely presidential candidate. Putin's poll ratings, on the other hand, rose from two per cent in August to 42 per cent in November to 62 per cent after the Duma elections, according to the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre, VTsIOM. This contrasted strongly with Yeltsin, who, just before the Duma elections, had the support of only eight per cent of Russians, with 91 per cent against. His premature retirement seemed, therefore, to offer him the best possible chance of winning an early presidential election.

Since his re-election in July 1996 (in a second round run-off against Communist Party leader, Gennadii Zyuganov), Yeltsin had frequently been 'president in absentia' due to ill health. Indeed, he suffered a heart attack between the first and second rounds of the 1996 elections which was kept secret from electors lest it affect their voting intentions. On his return to politics after each bout of illness, he frequently dismissed members of his administration or of the government. Between March 1998 and August 1999 he had appointed five different prime ministers, three of them only after prolonged conflict with the Duma. Yeltsin's behaviour was often unpredictable, particularly during his trips abroad. Vladimir Putin seemed, by contrast, to be young, vigorous, and healthy, someone who could offer stability at home, and reverse Russia's decline in the international political system. This was one reason for his high standing in the polls.

Putin also benefited from continuing popular support for the war in Chechnya. He had launched the war in September, following an incursion by armed guerrillas into Dagestan in

August (which was beaten back by local Dagestani and Russian forces, but with heavy loss of life), the bombing of an apartment building housing Russian servicemen in Buinaksk in Dagestan on September 4 and of two apartment buildings in Moscow a few days later. Putin took a very tough line against Chechen 'terrorists', declaring that the war would continue until the last terrorist had been wiped out. Unlike in 1996 when popular sentiment against the first Chechen war was very strong, Putin's prosecution of the second war was strongly supported. According to a survey by the social research organisation VTsIOM, commissioned by the authors, support for his conduct of the war stood at 71 per cent in January 2000. But Putin was also assisted by an improvement in the domestic economy. Money flowed into the Russian budget as a result of high world prices for oil. Domestic production rose following the August 1998 financial crisis, which made imported goods too expensive for many consumers. Russia registered a 3.2 per cent growth of GDP in 1999. Industrial output rose by 8.1 per cent and the total amount of wage, tax and inter-enterprise arrears was 45.6 billion roubles (US\$1.7 billion), compared to 78.6 billion roubles (US\$3.7 billion) at the end of 1998. The firm stance Putin took in relation to the rest of the world (including his dismissal of the concern expressed by Western leaders that the Russian army was infringing human rights in Chechnya) resonated with a public that had felt humiliated by Russia's declining status in the international system.

In three different polls taken at the end of February by three leading Russian public opinion research organisations Putin had more than double the support of Gennadii Zyuganov (Putin's support was 58.5, 56, and 54 percent respectively, compared to Zyuganov's 22, 21 and 19 percent). Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinsky came third with 7, 6 and 5 percent. There was considerable bandwagoning in the last few weeks before the election as regional governors and former opponents vied to express their support for Putin's candidacy. Many of the young economic liberals in the Union of Right Wing Forces abandoned Konstantin Titov, their own candidate, for example, in favour of Putin, while both Primakov and Luzhkov also declared their support for him. On the eve of the election, it seemed very likely that Putin would win in the first round as long as the turnout was above the 50 per cent required for the election to be valid.

2.2 The election law

A new federal law 'On the election of the president of the Russian Federation' was adopted by the Duma on 1 December and approved by the Council of the Federation on 23 December 1999. It aimed to tighten existing legislation, provide voters with greater information on candidates, and create a more level playing field between candidates, and also to make it more difficult for individuals with criminal backgrounds to gain office. In particular, it increased control over campaign spending, demanded more extensive income and property disclosures from prospective candidates, increased accountability for violations of electoral legislation, and clarified the status of observers. As a result, the registration process became more complex.

As far as campaign spending was concerned, the law specified that all expenses in relation to a candidate's election campaign had to be paid for out of a single official campaign fund, and all income received by a candidate for his or her campaign had to be paid into the fund. A ceiling was set on the amount that candidates could spend on their campaigns: in the first round it could not exceed 25.047million roubles (300,000 times the official minimum monthly wage on the day on which the elections were formally called). Should the elections proceed to a second round, the two remaining candidates could spend a further 8.349 million

roubles. The law also set an upper limit to the size of contributions to the campaign fund. The candidate was permitted to contribute a maximum of 166,980 roubles of personal funds (that is, a maximum of 2,000 times the official minimum monthly wage). The organisation that nominated the candidate could contribute a maximum of 16.698 million roubles; any single individuals could contribute a maximum of 33,396 roubles; and any single legal entity could contribute a maximum of 3.3396 million roubles.

Because of the early election and the reduction in the length of time this gave to candidates to prepare for the election, the Central Election Commission (CEC) reduced the number of supporting signatures each candidate had to collect in order to be registered from 1 million to 500,000.

2.3 The candidates and their programmes

Calling an early presidential election reduced the preparation time available for putative candidates and their opportunity to develop a national profile. Nevertheless, 11 candidates managed to fulfil the criteria for registration: Acting President Vladimir Putin; CPRF leader Gennadii Zyuganov; Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinsky; Samara Governor Konstantin Titov; Kemerovo Governor Aman Tuleyev; former chief prosecutor Yuri Skuratov; a wealthy Moscow businessman Umar Dzhabrailov; the first woman to run for the presidency and head of 'For Civic Dignity' Ella Pamfilova; popular film director Stanislav Govorukhin; leader of the Spiritual Heritage movement Alexei Podberezkin; and former head of the Moscow FSB and member of the Kremlin administration Yevgeny Savostyanov. LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy successfully appealed against the decision by the CEC to disqualify him because of an irregularity in his property declaration and he was registered as the twelfth candidate. On the night of 21 March, however, at the very last possible moment, Savostyanov withdrew his candidacy, calling on his supporters to vote for Yavlinsky. This left voters with a choice between eleven candidates (or against all), the same number as in the 1996 presidential elections.

According to the polls and the opinion of most expert analysts, as well as the candidates themselves, only Vladimir Putin, Gennadii Zyuganov, and Grigorii Yavlinsky could be considered serious contenders. Aman Tuleyev, Konstantin Titov, and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy might, it was thought, gain three per cent or slightly more of the vote, while the remaining candidates would not and, as a result, they could find themselves in difficult financial circumstances: according to Article 59.4 of the law on the election of the President, those who polled less than 3 per cent of the vote would have to refund the 400,000 roubles granted to them by the CEC for their campaign.

Vladimir Putin established an institute, the Centre for Strategic Research, under the directorship of first deputy property minister, German Gref (a St Petersburg economist) to work on an economic programme for Russia. It soon became clear that this programme was not intended as an election manifesto since it would not be completed before the election. Putin, in fact, declared that he would not campaign, and he did not publish a pre-election programme. However, a broad overview of his political and economic plans could be deduced from an article that he published on the government website on the first day of the new millennium ('Russia on the threshold of the millennium'), as well as from the 'Open letter' to voters that he published in the national press on February 25, and an extended set of interviews he gave to three journalists, which were published shortly before the election as a book entitled *Ot pervogo litsa: razgovory s Vladimirom Putinyom* ('First Person:

Conversations with Vladimir Putin'). Two themes in particular were reiterated in these writings and they featured strongly in statements that Putin made about Russia's political and economic predicament: the need for a strong state, and his intention to proceed with establishing a properly functioning market economy. He claimed that the state should not only enforce the law, but should itself comply with it and saw no danger to democracy in a strong state, since 'the stronger the state, the freer the individual'. He promised that Russia's super-rich oligarchs (that is, the few people who had made huge fortunes from privatisation, often in deals that fell far short of the transparency which would reveal whether or not the process had been honest, and who wielded considerable political power) would be subject to the same rules as everyone else in Russia. Nor did Putin see a conflict between a strong state and a market economy. The role of the state, according to Putin, would be to regulate the economy, but without strangling the market. The state should also protect the market against illegal invasion, ensure property rights, protect the entrepreneur, lower the tax rate, and make a better job of collecting taxes. His priority, he said, would be to overcome poverty in Russia, 'a rich country of poor people'. He promised to be tough on crime (calling the attack on Chechnya 'the first step in the battle against crime') and to ensure that honest work brought people more benefit than stealing. As far as Russian foreign policy was concerned, he believed that Russia had not lost its great power potential and promised to ensure that other countries took its legitimate interests into account. Nevertheless he emphasised that Russia's place in the world would depend on the success of Russians themselves in resolving their economic difficulties.

Gennadii Zyuganov fought the presidential campaign on the electoral programme that the CPRF had produced for the December Duma elections. The CPRF's economic programme was remarkably similar to those of Fatherland-All Russia and Yabloko. Unlike in 1995, it did not propose the wholesale re-nationalisation of the economy, although it did want state ownership of the natural monopolies. The CPRF showed a similar wariness of inflation as the centrist and right wing political parties and it opposed the large-scale printing of money. Like Fatherland-All Russia and Yabloko, it advocated tax reform, including a reduction in taxes, and a better tax collection system. The main economic features that the CPRF retained from the past was complete opposition to private ownership of agricultural land (although Zyuganov called for equal rights for all forms of ownership - state, private, and co-operative land) and support for a 'powerful public sector' that would sustain social benefits, education, culture and science. Zyuganov promised to impose price controls for food and other key consumer goods, lower prices for energy and transport, and to re-establish savings devalued through inflation. Like Putin, he wanted a strong state and 'spiritual revival'. He supported Putin's policy in Chechnya, although he questioned whether it was as successful as Putin claimed. His own proposals for Chechnya included a full-scale economic recovery programme for the republic and a transitional period of direct rule from Moscow. His foreign policy favoured the removal of all obstacles to the 'unification of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in a single union state' (in fact, all parties and all presidential candidates supported the Russia-Belarus union) and a revival of Russia's military capacity. He opposed improving relations with NATO and roundly condemned the 'expansionist interests' of the United States.

Grigorii Yavlinsky favoured a market economy with minimal, but effective, state regulation. He wanted stricter budgetary discipline, and stronger control over the use of budget funds, including funds transferred to regional or local budgets. He promised to clamp down on the 'shadow' economy, and thought that national and foreign investment should be stimulated by strengthening property rights, lowering taxes and reforming the tax system. He promised social guarantees, which would include ending delays in the payment of wages, pensions, and other social benefits, raising minimum pensions to reflect real subsistence costs, and securing free health care and education. Yavlinsky paid more attention to civil rights than the

programmes of other candidates. In particular, he emphasised the importance of ensuring the independence of the mass media and the judiciary. He also advocated constitutional reform to strengthen the role of the Duma, particularly in the formation and dismissal of governments, and administrative reform to reduce the number of bureaucrats and to make civil servants more accountable. Yavlinsky was also the most 'internationalist' of the presidential candidates. However, like all the other candidates, he opposed the 'claims of the USA and NATO to unipolarity', and he supported the Russia-Belarus union (which should, he thought, be open for the membership of other former Soviet states). Yabloko had lost support during the Duma election campaign because of Yavlinsky's criticism of the war in Chechnya and Yavlinsky was far more muted on the issue in the presidential campaign. However, he did present Acting President Putin with a plan for bringing the war to an end, which emphasised the need to open negotiations with legitimate representatives in the republic. His plan involved dividing Chechnya into three zones (North of the Terek, a Central zone and a 'mountainous' zone) and adopting different policies in each of them.

As in previous elections, the most striking feature of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's programme was his foreign policy. He proposed the revival of a powerful Russia within its 'natural frontiers' (which, to Zhirinovskiy, meant that Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the predominantly Russian parts of the Baltic states should be included in Russia). Russia should seek closer relations with Iraq, Libya, Cuba, Vietnam and it should be surrounded by a buffer zone of neutral or friendly states.

Of the remaining candidates, Tuleyev's programme was very similar to Zyuganov's and Titov's was similar to Yavlinsky's.

2.4 The candidates and the campaign

The most notable feature of the electoral campaign was Vladimir Putin's refusal to participate in it. Apart from restricting his programme to his 'open letter' to voters, he refused to participate in television debates with other candidates or to make himself available for television interviews. This deprived other candidates of the opportunity to attack his programme and made it impossible for journalists to question him about his intentions. He did not avail himself of the free time and space accorded to all candidates in the state-owned media. On the other hand, he received ample coverage as prime minister and acting president as he criss-crossed the country in the last weeks of the campaign performing all sorts of duties which certainly gave the impression to analysts, if not to the CEC, that they had been staged for electoral purposes. In most cases he was portrayed as a man of action, on one notable occasion, piloting an airforce jet to his next meeting; but the occasional image (for example, shedding a tear at the funeral of servicemen who had lost their lives in Chechnya) showed someone with a soft heart. Although there was general agreement that it is difficult to distinguish between a presidential candidate and an acting president and prime minister, many candidates criticised the state-owned media for the unfair advantage it gave to Putin in this way.

Since they could not easily attack Putin for his programme or his policies, the other candidates were left to attack one another. For the most part, they concentrated on candidates close to their own political views (CPRF member Tuleyev, for example, criticised Zyuganov, while liberal-minded Titov and Govorukhin attacked Yavlinsky). Govorukhin, Pamfilova, Dzhaibrailov and Zhirinovskiy also banded together against Yavlinsky, complaining to the CEC that he had over-spent his permitted campaign budget several times over. Both Podberezkin and Tuleyev went further than abstaining from attacking the acting president –

while ostensibly campaigning for their own election, they voiced their support for Putin. But Putin's absence made the campaign rather lacklustre. Candidates frequently sent their authorised representatives to participate in TV debates on their behalf, causing other candidates to stalk out in disgust and, on at least one occasion, leaving the presenter with just Yavlinsky's accredited representative in the studio.

The war in Chechnya played a curious role in the election campaign. On the one hand, it was extremely important. Every television station led its news programmes with reports about the war and Putin's popularity was closely tied to the stance he took on the war. On the other hand, since all the candidates apart from Yavlinsky supported government policy in Chechnya (and Yavlinsky's criticism was tactical rather than principled), it was not a contentious issue and neither the conduct of the war nor Chechnya's status after the war were the subject of serious debate during the campaign.

Political and media analysts thought, on the whole, that the media campaign was conducted in an appropriate manner, particularly in comparison with the Duma electoral campaign. They were worried by the announcement during the election campaign that the TV licensing laws were to change; by the unexpected use of 'black PR' against Yavlinsky in the last couple of days of the campaign; and by the fate of Radio Free Europe journalist Babitsky who had been handed over by the Russian military in Chechnya to rebels in exchange for captured soldiers and who, when he reappeared, was arrested. Many of them expressed more general concern about the fate of freedom of the press and media pluralism after the election. They believed that a decisive Putin victory in the first round would leave him free to pursue what some feared would be an authoritarian agenda. A narrower victory, or a victory in the second round, might oblige him to take greater account of a wider range of liberal concerns.

Candidates and their representatives, in interviews, agreed that newspapers in general had been more objective and wider in their coverage than the electronic media. There was very general approval of the work that the CEC had undertaken in sometimes difficult circumstances. On the other hand, there were many specific complaints about the violation of the law by other candidates, including excessive spending and premature campaigning, and candidates believed that the CEC had not followed these up with sufficient speed. They acknowledged that Acting President Putin was bound to enjoy some advantage as a result of the fact that he was both a candidate and head of state and government. Nevertheless, there was general agreement that he and his campaign team had unfairly exploited their position, and that they had in practice made very extensive use of public resources. This included official transport, telecommunications, government staff and official buildings, and, above all, the opportunity that the acting President enjoyed to appear on the television screen in his official capacity. They equally deplored Putin's refusal to place a programme before the electorate, or to engage in debate and discussion with his opponents.

2.5 The results

The CEC announced the final results of the presidential election on 5 April 2000. They were published in the newspapers *Rossiiskaya gazeta* and *Parlamentskaya gazeta* on 7 April 2000.

68.74 per cent of all registered voters took part in the election. This represents a slight fall compared to the 69.81 and 68.88 per cent respectively who took part in the first and second rounds of the 1996 presidential elections. On the other hand, it was a higher proportion of eligible voters than the 60.1 per cent that had voted in the Duma elections in December 1999, and

this in spite of the fact that the change to summer time had reduced the number of hours the polling stations were open.

In the event, Vladimir Putin won outright in the first round. As expected, Gennadii Zyuganov came second and Grigorii Yavlinskii third, with 29.17 and 5.79 per cent of the vote respectively. Yavlinsky's vote was far lower than expected, however (in 1996 he came fourth with 7.34 per cent of the vote). None of the other candidates gained the three per cent of the vote that would have enabled them to retain the 400,000 roubles granted to them by the CEC for their campaign.

TABLE

Candidate	No. of votes	Percentage of votes
Vladimir Putin	39,740,434	52.94
Gennadii Zyuganov	21,928,471	29.21
Grigorii Yavlinsky	4,351,452	5.80
Aman Tuleyev	2,217,361	2.95
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy	2,026,513	2.70
Konstantin Titov	1,107,269	1.47
Ella Pamfilova	758,966	1.01
Stanislav Govorukhin	328,723	0.44
Yurii Skuratov	319,263	0.43
Aleksei Podberezkin	98,175	0.13
Umar Dzhabrailov	78,498	0.10
Against all candidates	1,414,648	1.88
Electorate	109,372,046	
Number of voters who participated in election	75,181,071	
Number of votes cast	75,070,776	
Total Valid Votes	74,369,773	
Invalid Votes	701,003	
Total Votes	75,070,776	

Source: *Vestnik Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'noi Komissii Rossiskoi Federatsii*, No. 13 (103) 2000.

applicable to other forms of elections. Quite the contrary in fact. The Federal law “On the Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right for Participation in Referendum for RF Citizens” (item 1 clause 3) specifies: “RF citizens participate in elections on the basis of general, equal and direct vote with secret balloting”. This implies that all elective bodies of state power and local self-government (including one-person ones) are formed exclusively on the basis of these principles.

The Law also includes *glasnost* in the basic sets of concepts governing election campaigning (item 7 clause 3). However, the suggested legal solution is far from being perfect, since the concept of *glasnost* is declared only in application to the election committee. The concept is interpreted much more broadly in the Federal law “On the RF President elections”: “The RF Presidential elections are prepared and conducted in an open and public way” (item 1 clause 10). In this way the law extends the transparency requirement to all elements of the electoral process.

Such an approach better complies with the basic content of electoral laws, setting relatively high requirements for openness. For example, banks and candidates are obliged to submit reports on financial deposits and how they spend election funds to the relevant election committees. Election committees present copies of the reports to the mass media. The transparency is pursued by the rule, in compliance with which each material published in periodicals for payment must contain a notification specifying from the election fund of which candidate it was paid. If material was published free of charge, then this must be specially notified. Also the candidate who provided the material or about whom it is written, must be identified (item 3 clause 41 of the “On the Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right for Participation in Referendum for RF Citizens”).

According to the Law “On the Basic Guarantees ... ” (clause 2) information coverage is one of the most important guarantees of electoral rights. The legislator appears to assume that openness is effected during the election campaign not only via the media. However nowadays it is the media via which millions of voters can get real access to all the variety of information circulating in the election campaign.

It should be also noted that all the federal-level electoral laws, which are in effect now, were adopted almost on the eve of elections. Such practice can be considered as a Russian tradition. So, the June 1991 presidential elections were carried out on the basis of the law of April 24, 1991; those in June 1996, of the law of May 17, 1995, and in March 2000, of the law of December 31, 1999. The same tendency is observed in the elections of State Duma deputies: in 1995, they were elected on the basis of the law of June 21, 1995, and in 1999, of the law of June 24, 1999. It seems that the legislator considers electoral laws as interim acts, with the limited effective duration, and, in that sense, as *ad hoc*.

The Russian legislation in effect distinguishes between *using* the media in the election campaign and their *participation*. In the first instance, the media act predominantly as a producer of mass information services, while in the second instance they are an independent democratic institution. However, the legislator does not always define in exact terms in what case the media are used and in what case they participate in the campaign. So, in item 7, clause 48 of the Federal law “On the RF President elections” no distinction is made between media participation in propaganda activity and their participation aiming at covering the election campaign objectively.

The media apparently are not, in contrast to candidates running for the presidency, the subject of agitation activity and, hence, cannot be considered as its participants.

They are nothing but producers of information services. This follows directly from the construction of norms specified in clause 8 of the Federal law “On the RF President elections”. On the one hand, it guarantees citizens and political non-governmental organisations the freedom of conducting pre-election agitation in any forms permitted by law. On the other hand, registered candidates are guaranteed equal access to the media for conducting pre-election agitation.

The legislation distinguishes between the use of the media by: a) election committees, b) self-governing bodies (e.g. for publishing list of constituencies), and c) by registered candidates.

The forms of media use are subdivided by their content into: a) informing and b) provisioning (for payment or free) of pages and airtime for agitation. Informing is, in turn, envisaged in publication and advertisement forms. Publicizing and advertising are distinguished by definite terms set by the legislation. Publicizing is distinguished by the fact that the law associates with this, as a rule, the emergence of certain legal consequences. Moreover, it is often used in the law as the ultimate stage of legitimisation. So, in conformity with item 2, clause 5 of the Federal law “On the RF President elections”, the decision on announcing elections is subject to official publication in the media no later than five days after its adoption. It is only “from the day of the official publication” of the decision concerning the election announcement that the election campaign begins, which continues “to the day of the official publication” of the election results (clause 2 of the Federal law “On the Basic Guarantees ...”).

Publicizing also differs from advertising in the complete reproduction of a document with all the attributes stipulated by law. It also usually requires a strictly established sequence of preparation of the relevant document and its submission for publication, and also the specification of bodies that are in charge of its proper publishing.

If the electoral legislation context assumes official publishing of documents, then the obligation of publishing lies not with the media, but with a government body. For example, the responsibility for publishing lists of constituencies with specification of their numbers and borders, location of constituency election committees, constituencies and local election committee phone numbers is borne by the heads of municipal bodies. The corresponding norms refer to only those print media which are official state or local-government publishers. In the absence of an official publisher, the state or local-government body is authorized to use other forms for publishing its decisions.

The election committees do not have, as a rule, publishers of their own (the exception is the RF CEC, which has its own press outlet). For that reason their decisions are published free of charge in media outlets that were launched with state participation or have budget financing (item 7 clause 12 of the Federal law “On the RF President elections”).

However, the law does not clearly distinguish publishing decisions or official information from informing about the elections in general. In practice the media are widely used for informing on the elections, while publishing official information is also not carried out just by periodicals. Item 1 clause 47 of the Federal law “On the RF President elections” and “On Basic Guarantees ...” specifies the pool of media outlets whose services can be used by registered candidates for conducting pre-election agitation. Within this pool the legislator distinguishes several categories of the media with different legal status. In sub-clauses “a” to “?” the law specifies the media which can conventionally be called “authorised” ones. This group comprises

TV and radio companies and printed periodicals: a) whose (co-)founders are state bodies, organisations, agencies, and/or b) which were financed, during the year preceding the elections, by no less than 15% of their budget from the resources allotted by the state or local self-governing bodies.

It should be stressed that using the conjunction “and/or” (which is so popular among lawyers) enables the inclusion in this group of media which have state co-founders but do not receive any financing from them. However, in this circumstance, what resources are available to such media for implementing functions required by the law?

The resolution of this paradox should be searched for in those clauses of the electoral laws, which specify that the state media should cover the expenditures related to the elections “from the resources of the current budget financing” of the specified mass media outlets (item 11 clause 49 of the Federal law “On the RF President elections”). The law particularly mentions the budget financing, i.e. special allotting of state budget resources to specific mass media outlets and not granting certain media categories any privileges, e.g. on taxes or rent. Hence, the law refers only to media financed from some part of the state budget.

It actually follows that the “authorised” category comprises only those media outlets – irrespective of the presence of state bodies among their founders – that receive state budget financing in the election year. It is important to stress that if a media outlet began receiving state budget financing only in the election year, then, strictly speaking, it is not included in the “authorised” category.

This category is subdivided, first, into printed and broadcast media and, second, into national and regional media.

The “authorised” media bear the main burden of informing on aspects of the election campaign. They are to fulfil the following tasks:

- 1) to ensure registered candidates equal conditions for conducting election agitation;
- 2) to enable election committees to place printed information (national and regional media published no less than once a week, no less than one per cent of the combined week printed area);
- 3) to provide election committees free air time for informing (national TV and radio companies, no less than 15 minutes of airtime weekly, and the regional ones, no less than 10 minutes);
- 4) to allot, on an equal basis, free airtime to the registered candidates in prime-time (national TV and radio companies, no less than one hour during working days during 30 days before voting, and the regional ones, no less than 30 minutes);
- 5) to reserve paid airtime for carrying out agitation by the registered candidates in the amount no less than the free airtime amount, but not exceeding it more than twice (the rates are to be the same, and they must be published no later than 30 days after the announcement of the elections; each candidate’s share is determined by dividing the total amount of the reserved free time by the total number of the registered candidates);

- 6) to allot free pages for placing materials submitted by the registered candidates (the total week amount in national printed media is to be no less than five per cent of the combined week printed area which is to be distributed among the candidates in equal shares by lots);
- 7) to reserve printed pages for conducting paid election agitation by the registered candidates (the total amount of the paid printed area is to be no less than the free one and it cannot exceed it more than twice);
- 8) to publish material, obtained from the CEC, on financial resources received and spent by election funds.

The “authorised” media relate to municipal media, which are founded with the participation of local self-governing bodies and/or financed, during the year preceding the elections, by no less than 15 per cent of their budget from the municipal resources. It is in these media outlets where the list of territory constituencies is published. In addition, the municipal media allot the registered candidates airtime and pages for the corresponding payment.

The second category of the media is specialised media, both state-owned and non-state-owned ones, focusing on non-political issues. The electoral laws grant such media the right to refuse the publication of any agitation materials, provided they completely refrain from participating in the election campaign in any form. Let us call this category the “abstaining” media. In practice this category exhibits certain problems.

First, how does the concept of “specialised” media used in the RF Law “On the Media” conform to the concept in the election laws? The first mentioned document relates to media specialising variously in advertising, erotica, publications for children, the disabled, or intended for educational, cultural and enlightenment purposes (part 1 of clause 14). The second document means publications for children, technical, scientific and others (item 1 clause 41 of the Federal law “On the Basic Guarantees ...”). The term “others” makes the boundaries of this media category rather obscure.

Second, compared to the Federal law “On the Basic Guarantees ...”, item 7 clause 48 of the Federal law “On the RF President Elections” makes the rules for specifying “abstaining” media outlets considerably more stringent. It allows: a) the refusal of non-state-owned and municipal TV and radio broadcasters, non-state-owned and municipal periodical printed editions and also of state-owned periodic printed editions published less than once a week from participation in agitation activity; b) the refusal of specialised TV and radio broadcasters and specialised periodic printed publications from participation in covering election campaign.

In addition, in both cases the refusal is interpreted as “non-submission to the corresponding election committee of the notification” on the amount and terms for allotting airtime and printed pages for election agitation. In this way the law relates the coverage of the election campaign with providing information services for agitation purposes. Here, in the most concentrated form, the legislator manifests his aspiration not to allow hidden election agitation in the disguise of “objective coverage of the election campaign”.

However, the measures adopted by the legislator prove to be insufficiently effective in practice. Moreover, it is completely unreasonable to demand from a media outlet

that refused paid election agitation that it completely refrain from covering the election campaign per se. Such a requirement is, in addition, completely impossible to meet particularly for specialised media. For example, music radio programmes occupying the dominant part of the air in the FM-range do not generally have room in their programming for election agitation, however, they almost always air short news programmes. Do such radio programmes really have to refrain from airing news about the election campaign? Such a requirement seems to be excessive. Moreover, it is ignored almost everywhere.

The third category is the mass media founded by registered candidates themselves. Let us conventionally call them “**aligned**” (????????????????). It should be emphasised that this category is invoked in the election laws only in application to periodic printed publications. If an election campaign participant launches a TV and radio programme or a TV and radio company, then it cannot – at least in conformity with the law – be included in the pool of the “aligned” media outlets. It is also of importance that this rule refers to only those media that were founded by the registered candidates, and hence, were created during the election campaign.

The peculiarity of the “aligned” media legal status is that such outlets are exempt from the obligatory allotment of pages on equal terms to all contesting candidates (item 18 clause 50 of the Federal law “On the RF President Elections”). The RF CEC opinion is that such media are authorised to place agitation materials of the founding candidates for payment only.

This category is also exempt from the obligation not to publish information that can damage the honour, dignity or business reputation of registered candidates in the case that such media cannot provide the registered candidate an opportunity for denial or other explanation defending his honour, dignity or business reputation before the end of the campaign term (item 4 clause 53 of the Federal Law “On the Elections of the RF President”). In this way the “aligned” media are brought beyond the responsibility stipulated by clause 40¹³ of the RSFSR Code on Administrative Offences and by clause 11 of the Federal Law “On Administrative Responsibility of Legal Entities for Violating of the RF Legislation on Elections and Referenda” of December 6, 1999.

It should be conceded that this exemption from the general rules is not harmonised with the requirements of the RF Civil Code and of the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Media” regarding the protection of honour, dignity and business reputation. This obviously cannot be interpreted as permission for the “aligned” media, releasing them from the responsibility for disseminating untruthful facts damaging the honour and dignity of the candidates in the elective office. Any other interpretation will inevitably contradict the RF Constitution.

Finally, the fourth category is the media not belonging to the first three groups and possessing the right to provide for payment, on the basis of agreement, airtime or pages to the registered candidates. Let us call conventionally this group the “**paid**” media. To be granted the right to belong to the fourth category the non-government media are to meet general requirements for obtaining permission to participate in agitation activities, i.e. to publish in advance information on the rates and procedures for paying for their information services and notify about their willingness to co-operate with the RF CEC or the regional election committees.

Some of the most general requirements of the election legislature are not differentiated with respect to separate categories of the media. So all the media and their official representatives are obliged to submit to the election committees the

required data and materials and to respond to the queries of the election committees (item 8 clause 12 of the Federal Law “On the Elections of the RF President”). Is this requirement applicable to confidential information? Does it mean the abolishment of state, medical, commercial or other secrets? The key issue is the concept of “required information”.

The situation as applied to the media is more transparent. If the election committee requests the editors to disclose the source of confidential information, then the editors may justify their denial referring to the RF Law “On the Media”. This law obliges not only the editorial board (clause 41) but also the journalist (item 4 part 1 clause) to keep confidentiality of information and/or of its source. The latter not being an official is not subject to the effect of the regulatory norm of the Federal law “On the RF Presidential elections”. However, if a disagreement on this issue between the media outlet and the committee is considered by the courts, the latter may demand disclosure of the information source.

One more general requirement is not to allow publishing of information that can damage the honour, dignity or business reputation of the registered candidates. This is only in the circumstance that the media outlets in question are not able to provide the registered candidate the possibility of a rebuttal prior to elapsing of the election agitation term (item 4 clause 53). One cannot exclude, however, that a candidate may request a media outlet to publish information libelling his contender in this “no-reply” period that may cause troubles for the outlet. By satisfying his request the outlet violates the quoted clause of the law. By denying it the media outlet will infringe the candidate’s right to independently determine the forms and character of his agitation via the media (item 2 clause 44). In this case the corresponding election committee “may appeal to the law-enforcing bodies, courts, executive bodies of the state power implementing the state policy in the area of the media with the request to stop illegal agitation activity and bring the TV and radio media outlet, printed publication and their official representatives to account in conformity with RF legislation” (item 6 clause 53).

3.2 The CEC Acts

RF legislation defines the election committees as collective bodies established in conformity with the law, that organise and enable the preparation and conduct of elections. Their total number, including election committees of the RF subjects, district, territory, and constituency committees exceeds 90,000. This pyramid is topped by the Central Election Committee. This body guides all the subordinate election committee and may control their activities.

Regarding media activity during preparing and conducting of the RF Presidential elections the following CEC functions are the most important:

- control over observing of the electoral rights of citizens and ensuring the consistent application of election legislation;
- publishing of instructions and other regulatory documents concerning the application of election legislation;

- ensuring for all candidates observation of the electoral activity conditions established by federal legislation;
- distributing of the budget resources allotted for financing preparation and conduct of the elections, control over their earmarked spending and of the observation of the federal legislation requirements concerning financing of the candidates' election campaigns;
- implementing measures for creating a consistent procedure for the distribution of airtime among the registered candidates for carrying out election agitation;
- informing voters about the terms and procedures for implementing electoral activities; about the development of the election campaign, candidates, and registered candidates;
- making decisions concerning complaints on decisions and activities (or lack of same) of the subordinate election committees and of their official members;
- preparing references on the incomes and property to be published if the candidate is registered;
- ensuring availability of information on the candidates for subscribers of the general purpose information and communication networks;
- checking the truthfulness of biographical and other information about the candidates including, if necessary, queries to the corresponding bodies (law-enforcing, tax, etc.);
- providing the media with information about the registered candidates within 48 hours after their registration;
- **publishing the list of national state-owned broadcasters and of national state-owned periodic printed publications;**
- **developing the forms for the accounting of airtime and pages allotted to the registered candidates free of charge or for payment by the TV and radio broadcasters and periodic printed publications;**
- **conducting a lottery to determine the schedule for the airing of agitation materials of the registered candidates on national state-owned TV and radio broadcasting channels;**
- receiving the financial reports of the registered candidates and transferring them within a five-day period to the media;
- **providing the media with general information about the results of the elections of the RF President within one day after they have been established.**

The CEC's capacity to develop regulatory norms is very limited. The RF CEC is only entitled to publish instructions concerning consistent application of federal election legislation. In other words, the RF CEC's documents cannot be considered as a

source of law. They are nothing but an official interpretation of the legal norms contained in the Federal law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in the Referendum of the Russian Federation". This also pertains to other laws granting the RF CEC corresponding powers (e.g. sub-item "?" item 1 clause 17 of the Federal Law "On the Elections of the RF President" grants the CEC the right to only publish "instructions and other regulatory documents" regarding its application).

In the context of media activity some RF CEC decrees are of special interest. They were adopted in 1999 in the period of the campaign of elections to the State Duma. It is worth noting that the CEC did not issue similar decrees during the presidential campaign 2000. The CEC seems to have considered as inexpedient a repeated interpretation of similar requirements of the federal legislation laws. Hence the instructions issued earlier for the parliamentary elections may be considered, with apparent corrections, as effective for the presidential elections.

The decree entitled "Explanations of some issues concerning the carrying-out of the election agitation" No. 8/52-3 adopted on August 13, 1999, contains, in particular, the following fundamental concepts:

- election agitation means an activity encouraging or aiming to encourage voters to participation in the elections, and also to vote for or against any of the registered candidates. This begins from the day of registration of the candidate and terminates at 12 a.m. (local time) the day preceding the day of voting. Election agitation may be financed only from the election fund. Activities of the citizens and of political public associations that feature the attributes of election agitation and conducted from the day of the official announcement of the elections to the registration of the candidates are in violation of federal law. Conducting such agitation may be the basis for denial of registration of the candidate;
- election agitation may be carried out via the media, by conducting mass rallies, publishing and distributing of printed, audio, visual and other agitation materials and in other forms not prohibited by law. Citizens and political public associations have the right to carry out election agitation in the forms permitted by law;
- registered candidates holding state or municipal offices may conduct election agitation only in the time when they are not exercising their official duties (time for rest, including vacations, week-ends and national holidays, other non-office days) and may not conduct election agitation during their business trips. However, if their statements in the media are not connected with carrying-out the election agitation, then they are not subject to the effect of federal election laws and are regulated by the federal Law "On the procedures for covering the activities of the state power bodies in the state media" No. 7-?? of January 13, 1995;
- officials, journalists and other creative personnel of broadcasting and print media, if they are registered candidates or registered proxies of registered candidates, are not allowed to participate in covering the election campaign by the media;
- commercial and other activities of registered candidates may be advertised in only non-state media and only applying the procedures of the paid election agitation; election agitation in the media may be carried out only by registered candidates and only from resources of the election fund. Other participants of the electoral process are not allowed to conduct the election agitation in the media;

- media outlets are obliged to publish information on rates and terms of paying for airtime and pages provided for election agitation in advance. The rates and terms must be the same for all the subjects eligible for conducting election agitation in the media. TV and radio companies must publish this information in one of the official periodic printed publications. Media outlets which have not published the specified information and have not informed the RF CEC about their willingness to allot airtime and pages to the registered candidates are not allowed to participate in the election agitation;
- in TV and radio programmes on current affairs, news about election events is to be presented as a separate slot at the beginning of the programmes without any commentary. Such information slots are not paid from the election fund. The editorial boards of the media outlets are to control the information slots to avoid favouring of any registered candidates including the time for the coverage of their election activity.

The CEC Recommendations are another important document concerning procedures for the preparation of agreements on providing airtime (or pages) for election agitation purposes for payment No. 38/468-3 of November 5, 1999. The document specifies that the relations between the media and the registered candidates regarding providing of the paid information services must base on a legal civil agreement made in a simple written form. The agreement must contain the following mandatory terms: the form of election agitation (interview, press conference, statement, political advertising, etc.); date and time of airing the programme; airtime duration; forms and terms of journalist (host) participation in the programme; rates and terms of paying for the airtime.

As agreement is made on the basis of a lottery; this is to be accompanied with a copy of the report on the lottery. The agreement on providing pages for election agitation is made in the same way.

An example of the document combining features of an instruction and a law-application act is the RF CEC Decree "On some issues of conducting election agitation during preparations to elect the RF Federal Assembly State Duma of the third convocation" No. 27/359-3 of October 21, 1999.

The document notes considerable numbers of violations of the procedures and rules for conducting election agitation: the carrying-out of activities featuring agitation prior to the registration of the corresponding candidate; distribution via the media of information materials containing open calls to voters and also hidden agitation encouraging or aiming at encouraging the voters to participate in the election. In addition it notes violations concerning the promotion of voting for or against specific candidates, advertising materials of candidates which exceed the corresponding election funds, the use of provocative methods for conducting the election contest (in particular, the posting of false or untruthful material on the Internet; public statements of officials of state bodies in support of specific candidates, etc).

The RF CEC came to the conclusion that the editorial boards of media outlets and their creative personnel often disregard the requirements of the election legislation being guided by financial incentives or political preferences. In particular, a host of information and analytical programmes covering the election campaign accompany information slots with subjective comments, and with negative or complimentary remarks about the participants of the election process. In the opinion of the RF CEC,

all these are features of election agitation conducted by persons whose participation in agitation via the media is not stipulated by law.

This CEC decree contains the controversial statement that the law prohibits “the expression by media professionals of personal or corporate preferences with respect to a candidate”. Moreover, in an attempt to consolidate this position while ignoring the basic prohibition on confusing objective coverage of the election campaign and election agitation, the RF CEC condemned experts who “dictate to society a controversial assessment of the rules and procedures stipulated by the law for conducting the election agitation. This way they mislead public opinion and also other subjects of election activity”.

Election legislation is interpreted in much the same vein the in the RF CEC Decree “On the results of considering claims and applications concerning violations by some participants of the electoral process of the procedure and rules for conducting election agitation during elections of the deputies of RF Federal Assembly State Duma of the third convocation” No. 56/697-3 of December 6, 1999. The decree justly notes – referring to ORT and TV-Centre – that “hosts of some information and analytical programmes systematically and purposefully accompany information slots with subjective comments addressing some registered candidates, electoral associations, and election blocs with complimentary or negative statements”. Indeed, in the course of the parliamentary election campaign, the authors of some analytical programmes did use various professional techniques to attempt to shape voters’ opinions, and to encourage voting for or against a particular registered candidate. There are similar examples in printed periodic publications when authors published material featuring attributes of direct or indirect agitation.

One should not mistake, however, hidden agitation (which is the result of, say, bribing a journalist) for objectively informing the audience about actual facts characterising the candidates. The latter is a normal result of the work of a professional journalist. For this reason the attempts of some election committees to limit the rights of journalists related with searching, obtaining and disseminating information can only be interpreted as a violation of clause 29 of the RF Constitution and of clause 47 of the RF Law “On the Media”. It should be stressed that election legislation itself does not contain direct contradictions with the legislation on the media.

3.3 Contradictions and loopholes in legal regulation

The legislator (being aware of the threat of election campaigns becoming overly commercialised) anticipated and attempted to preclude the emergence of “black election technologies” which reduce the electoral procedure to a political advertising contest. Analysis of the regulatory acts show that the legislator was aiming at precluding “clandestine” or hidden election agitation and manipulation of the votes by the secret buying-up of the media. However, the means used were far from being always adequate to the purpose. In some cases they did not achieve this goal at all, in others they achieved it only partially, and in still others they achieved the opposite of what they intended.

The contradictions and loopholes of the election legislation are so numerous that they are considered in virtually all sections of this review.

To preclude contradictions between the election legislation and other laws, special clauses were introduced into the Federal law “On the basic guarantees of election rights and the right to participate in the referendum of the RF citizens” allowing, at first glance, the resolution of contradictions in its favour. Item 7 clause 1 of the law states: “The federal laws, the laws of the FR subjects, legal regulatory acts on elections and referenda must not contradict this Federal law”. This means that this act establishes its higher legal priority when compared to other election laws. For example, in case of contradictions with clauses of the Federal law “On the RF Presidential elections” the clauses of the Federal law “On the basic guarantees ...” are to be applied. As concerns all other federal laws, it does not feature any special priority.

The issue of how these acts complement each other is most clearly demonstrated in legal provisions for the functioning of the media as an institution of civil control over the election campaign. The RF Law “On the Media” grants to journalists, in particular, the right to:

- seek, request, obtain, and disseminate information;
- visit state bodies and organisations;
- be received by officials on issues related to requesting information;
- access to documents and materials;
- copy, publish, announce or reproduce in any other way documents and materials;
- make records, including with the use of audio and video devices, make photos and films;
- check the truthfulness of received information;
- state their own opinions and assessments in the reports and material intended for distributing that are signed by them.

Within the electoral system these rights are somewhat modified and tailored to actual conditions, however, they are not cancelled or restricted. Actually the election legislation refers not to journalists specifically but to representatives of media outlets. The Federal law “On the RF Presidential election” grants the representatives of the media the following rights:

- to attend meetings of election committees, the processing of electoral documents and also the counting of the ballots (item 1 clause 21);
- to attend polling stations on the day of voting from the time when the constituency election committee begins its work to receiving the report of the supervising election committee about adopting the report on the ballot results (item 5 clause 21);
- to be present in other election committees when the voting results are established, the reports on the ballot results and the election results are prepared, and also at the re-counting of the ballots (item 6 clause 21);

- to have access to the premises of the constituency election committee at the polling station organised in a military unit, in closed administrative territories, hospitals, health centres, investigation wards or wards of interim detainment (item 7 clause 21);
- to read the decisions and reports of all the election committees on the voting results and on the election results (including the reports prepared for the second time), to make or get from the corresponding election committees copies of the said decisions and reports and accompanying documents, and to demand attesting of the decision copies (item 13 clause 21);
- to be informed about preparations by the election committee of the second report on the results of voting if slips of pen, typos or arithmetic errors were found in the original report (item 35 clause 69);
- to get the voting results from the election committees for each polling station or territory and the election results for each election constituency (item 1 clause 75);
- to get general data from the Central Election Committee on the results of the RF Presidential election within 24 hours after they have been determined (item 2 clause 75).

Notably the law (item 9 clause 76) stipulated access to electoral information via the general-purpose information and communication networks such as the Internet. If an automated information system is used in elections (in the first instance, from the State Automated System *Vybory*), then the data on voters' participation in voting and on the preliminary and final voting results are to be operatively available to Internet users. This way an unlimited number of people both in Russia and abroad become public monitors at the elections.

However, use of the Internet in the election campaign may have a negative effect. The *Fund for Effective Policy* posted results of exit polls on the day of elections to the State Duma in 1999. The RF CEC, having expressed its indignation about this, conceded that election legislation only prohibits publishing the polling results in the broadcast and print media. As the Internet is not considered as a medium in this sense, the violation of the spirit of the law remains unpunished.

Such a position is fundamentally wrong. First, the election laws consider publishing of polling results as a kind of the election agitation (as indicates the very fact of including the clause "Public opinion polls" in the "Election agitation" chapter). Second, the law prohibits any election agitation on the day of voting (item 2 clause 45 of the Federal law "On the RF President elections"). Hence election agitation was obviously conducted in the period when it was prohibited. This is stipulated by clause 40² of the RSFSR Code on Administrative Offences. In such an event the CEC had to make a report on the administrative offence and submit it to the court. However, the CEC did not do this. It remains to be seen how the problematic (as already seen in the West) issue of regulating the Internet is effectively resolved in the RF.

3.4 State bodies affecting media activity

Within the electoral system media activity is under the supervision of, in the first instance, the election committees whose role is analysed above. The election laws also mention “federal bodies of the executive power developing and implementing state policy in the media area”. During the parliamentary elections of 1999 and the presidential elections of 2000 this role was performed by the Ministry for Press, TV and Radio Broadcasting and Mass Communications which was established several weeks before the beginning of the election campaign.

The Statute on the Ministry approved on September 1999 - when the parliamentary election campaign was already in full swing - granted it the right to control observation of RF legislation. This meant it had the right to supervise media registration and licensing, to inflict punishment, issue warnings, and to suspend and annul registration acts and licenses. Moreover, the Ministry possesses an efficient financial leverage for affecting the media. It is through the Ministry that financing stipulated for supporting national, regional and local media outlets is transferred from the federal budget.

The other state body actively operating in this area is the Judicial Chamber on Information Disputes under the RF President. The Chamber is not mentioned in the election legislation, though it was established on the eve of the parliamentary elections of 1993 as a court of arbitration to solve conflicts emerging during campaign.

The Chamber, as a quasi-court body, combines the features of a department of the presidential administration and of an independent body for self-regulation of the journalistic community (part of the Chamber members work as volunteers). The Chamber's decisions though final are mandatory only for consideration. During the election campaigns of 1999-2000 the Chamber was only concerned with preparing decisions upon CEC requests.¹

The courts play a very important role in the electoral system. Here the legislator finalises every dispute. For the media the most interesting are the norms that concern the imposition by the courts of the administrative responsibility for violations of the election agitation rules.

The RSFSR Code on Administrative Offences now in effect contains several norms concerning media activity during the election campaign. Below the most important misdemeanour are listed:

- violation by the media outlet of the established procedure for publishing documents and other information connected with preparing and carrying out elections (with a fine inflicted on the outlet's editor-in-chief or on other responsible persons in the amount of ten to twenty minimum wages (MW) – clause 40⁵);
- violation of the rules, stipulated by the law, for carrying out election agitation in the media as well as favouring of a candidate in information slots of TV and radio companies (the fine inflicted on individuals in the amount of ten to twenty five MW, and on officials – from twenty to fifty MW – clause 40⁸);
- conduct of election agitation in the period when this is prohibited by federal law or in places where the conduct of agitation is prohibited by federal law

¹ The Chamber was abolished soon after Putin won the elections.

(the fine inflicted on individuals in the amount of five to 10 MW, and on officials – of twenty to fifty MW – clause 40¹⁰);

- conduct of election agitation by persons whose participation in its conduct is prohibited by federal law (the fine inflicted on individuals in the amount of ten to fifteen MW, and on officials – of twenty to fifty MW – clause 40¹¹);
- publicising information in TV or radio programmes and in periodic printed publications that may damage the honour, dignity or business reputation of a registered candidate or refusing to provide the possibility of publicising a retraction prior to the end of the election agitation term in the same TV or radio programmes or in the same periodic printed publication in conformity with the federal law (the fine inflicted on officials in the amount of twenty to fifty MW - clause 40¹³);
- infringement of the rights of a member of an election committee, a monitor, a foreign monitor, a registered proxy of a candidate, a representative of a media outlet (the fine inflicted on individuals in the amount of ten to fifteen MW, and on officials, of twenty to fifty MW - clause 40⁶).

For most administrative misdeeds, the responsibility of specific legal entities is specified. The Federal law “On the Administrative Responsibility of Legal Entities for Violation of the RF Legislation on Elections and Referenda” No. 210-?? of December 6, 1999, includes many similar misdemeanour stipulating much more serious punishments at the same time. For example, the fine for a media outlet for violating requirements for the conduct of election agitation is an amount from two hundred to five hundred MW.

The suits belonging to this category assume the preparation of a report by an election committee. The RF CEC Decree “On the procedure for preparing and the form of the report on an administrative misdemeanour prepared by an election committee during preparations and conduct of the elections of the deputies of the RF Federal Assembly State Duma of the third convocation” No. 13/90-3 of September 10, 1999, specifies the rules for preparing these legal documents by election committees of all levels.

The possible subjects of these reports are the registered candidates, authorised representatives of the electoral associations and blocs and also other persons in cases stipulated by federal law.

The person on whom the report about the administrative misdemeanour had been prepared is invited to the meeting of the election committee. They may familiarise themselves with the submitted materials on the administrative misdemeanour. When the report is prepared, the rights and obligations of the person accused are explained to them. In particular, they have the right to give explanations, submit proofs, use the assistance of a lawyer, appeal the decision, etc. After the report on the administrative misdemeanour had been prepared and signed, it is submitted with accompanying documents and other available materials to the district (city) court of the place where the administrative misdemeanour has occurred.

3.5 Legal application with respect to the media

Though election legislation guarantees registered candidates equal access to the media, the issue of actually providing equal conditions (which involves both “paid” and “authorised” media) is far from being straightforward. To avoid possible complaints from candidates and election committees it would be useful to provide to all participants equal space (measured, however, not in lines but in centimetres) on the same publication’s page with the same frequency. Concerning the broadcast media, the key indicators of equal access are the programme duration, the time of the day and frequency of broadcast. One should not forget, however, that the legislator opted not to define the term airtime and printed area. Owing to this the application of this requires good sense. For this reason disputes are possible e.g. regarding cable TV and wire radio, to which the said terms are not applicable at all.

One should also not forget that candidates may independently determine the form and character of their agitation via the media. This opens up avenues for artificially boosting ratings within formally equal quotas on print space and airtime. As a result, the election campaign may be transformed from being a contest of political programmes and candidates’ personal attributes (what it was designed to be) into an art competition between PR companies and political advertising experts. Moreover, in this event the voters are assigned the role not of spectators or of jury members but of guinea pigs who, against their will, become the object of dubious experiments.

In anticipation of such a potential metamorphosis the Congress of Journalists of Russia convened in Izhevsk (Republic of Udmurtiya) in September 1999 to adopt a special Declaration in support of fair and free elections. It says in particular: “Journalists cannot and should not bear responsibility for the statements of candidates, electoral associations or blocs which contradict the law but are disseminated by the media during the election campaign. The candidates, associations and blocs having been granted by the law the right “to determine independently the form and character of their agitation via the media”, shall themselves bear responsibility for the content of the election materials. In addition, this will encourage the heads of media outlets to refrain from hidden agitation and especially contra-agitation which is making journalists the “cannon fodder” of electoral battles”.

In an attempt to guarantee the contenders equal conditions, legislation prohibits using the advantages of office. However, the prohibition only covers (for an unknown reason) state and municipal officials and journalists. Registered candidates working in the media shall be dismissed from their official duties for the duration of the election campaign and are not allowed to participate in covering the election campaign via the media. There is an argument which puts the case that journalists are in this way discriminated against and deprived of their professional rights for the election campaign period. Moreover, a violation by a registered candidate of these provisions provides a basis for canceling their registration.

The legislator’s logic is quite clear: the journalist *ab initio* occupies a privileged position as he enjoys permanent access to the media. One might ask, however, whether a “rank-and-file oligarch” who owns financial resources and media outlets

does not possess much broader electoral capacities, as compared to journalist? Whether show business stars do not enjoy permanent access to voters? A straightforward extension of the list of persons subject to some restrictions does not seem to yield a solution to the problem. The very construction of the equal-conditions institution involves some inherent defects.

At the same time the election laws on prohibiting using the possible advantages of office are brazenly ignored both by journalists and by state and municipal officials. During the Duma election campaign of 1999, electoral events were commented on in ORT information programmes by the journalist Nevzorov who was running in a one-mandate constituency. Yet another journalist candidate, Aleksandr Minkin, was also a frequent guest author in various newspapers and guest speaker on NTV programmes covering the election process.

As regards municipal officials, the database of the non-government project *Informatics for Democracy: 2000+* contains data on more than fifty cases of abuse of office that were registered by activists of public Internet monitoring (see the site www.indem.ru/idd2000). However, the state official candidates, as a rule, did not violate the law directly (indirect means were used).

This was the reason why the above-mentioned Declaration in support of fair and free elections contained a call to numerous supervising, controlling, regulating, and licensing state and municipal bodies to show maximum restraint during the election campaign. This took the form of a call for them not to apply repressive sanctions against media participating in covering the elections except for cases of direct, obvious and unavoidable danger to vital public interests. "We call on them to refrain during this period from annulling licenses, closing down editorial offices under the pretext of fire safety or hygiene requirements, cutting off transmitters, etc. In any event the (preventive) punishment is to be commensurate with the actual damage. It is impermissible that administrative repression with respect to the media becomes a method of electoral struggle. For this reason each such case shall be considered as a criminal offence aiming at hindering the journalist's professional activity and an attempt to introduce indirect censorship and requires an immediate response of the electoral committees and courts".

To ensure equal conditions no less than a half (and for second round voting no less than two thirds) of the total amount of allotted airtime is to be reserved for conducting discussions, round tables and other similar events. This share of the free airtime is available for all the registered candidates on an equal footing (item 6 clause 49 Federal law "On the RF President elections").

To participate in the preparation and conduct of such programmes, the host has to meet special requirements. They must establish with the participants in advance the procedure of the event and control its observation, offer the participants questions including those from the audience. They are not allowed to violate the established procedure, limit the duration of statements unless agreed in advance (and if not caused by expiring of the airtime) or show favour to any of the participants.

The institution of "equal conditions" also requires that no candidate, electoral association or bloc is favoured in TV and radio information programmes. At the same time journalists may obviously have opinions of their own, and it would be a contradiction of their constitutional rights to demand that they conceal them. However, the "rules of the game" adopted in the election campaign dictate that the journalist's role is to compare opinions, provide an unbiased analysis of positions and represent the audience's interests. They must be equally disposed to all of the

candidates. Otherwise they may become the infamous “collective propagandist and agitator”.

It is noteworthy that the Russian media have already begun developing their own codes of conduct during election campaigns. A special NTV instruction contains a number of recommendations. Journalists are prohibited from demonstrating their political sympathies or antipathies in any way, from substituting information about an electoral event with their opinion about it; from using insufficiently verified information, from misquoting voters’ opinions, from encouraging acts of aggression or from resorting to ideological labelling or using offensive epithets, etc.

Some ethical norms are also contained in the Declaration mentioned above. “During election campaigns, media professionals must observe the requirements of the law especially carefully. They should observe all norms associated with professional journalistic ethics, including those mentioned in this declaration, so as not to cast doubt on the honesty, impartiality ...and informative character of their material, and not to undermine the image of the media and confidence in fair election results. Let us remember that a journalist performing their professional duties is considered a person performing social obligations. Journalists shall be motivated by serving society and the public good rather than private interests or career ambitions. In connection with this we confirm our commitment to understanding journalism as a liberal profession aspiring to the public good and vehemently condemn any attempts to bribe journalists or pressurise them”.

Unfortunately during the Duma election campaign of 1999 the Russian public had many chances to see how far away are the law provisions and the journalist codes from the real practice of some media outlets. As an example we can quote a fact that was assessed in the same way by the RF Central Election Committee and the Grand Jury of the Union of Journalists of Russia, a corporate self-regulation body established in 1998.

The statement of the RF CEC “On cutting short illegal agitation and making the ORT broadcasting organisation and its responsible officials answerable” No. 32/420-3 of October 29, 1999 reported: “The material of the analytical show *S. Dorenko’s Programme* considered by the working group indicates that its host and author is conducting agitation against the leaders and the federal list as a whole of the election bloc *Otechestvo – Vsyta Rossiya*”. As the “broadcasting organisation and its officials (including programme hosts) are not independent subjects of agitation activity” the RF CEC suggested to the RF Ministry for Press, TV and Radio Broadcasting and Mass Communications that it “take measures to cut short the illegal agitation conducted by the ORT broadcasting organisation connected with the preparation and airing of the analytical show *S. Dorenko’s Program*” and called for the organisation and the corresponding officials to be brought to task as stipulated by RF legislation”.

However, the Ministry disagreed with the RF CEC and refused to “take measures” with respect to ORT. The CEC itself also opted not to use its right to make a report on the administrative misdemeanour and launch a criminal file on Sergei Dorenko in conformity with clause 40⁸ of the RSFSR Code on Administrative Offences (“Violation of the rules for conducting election agitation and agitation in preparation of the referendum in periodic printed publications and in the channels of organisations carrying out TV and/or radio broadcasting”).

In contrast, the Grand Jury of the Union of the Journalists of Russia, in the name of the entire journalistic community, unambiguously distanced itself from Dorenko. In its decision of November 19, 1999, the Jury stated that Dorenko’s programmes featured

a confusion of information and comments. In a list of criticisms, the Jury noted that opinions and supposition were presented as established facts, that compromising information was aired without substantiation. It concluded that the legal requirement of providing balance was violated and that an information campaign aimed at single-mindedly discrediting specific citizens and organisations was carried out. The Grand Jury finished by announcing that Dorenko had violated the basic provisions of the International Declaration of the Principles of Journalists' Conduct. It demanded that Dorenko operate only with the facts he had established personally, that he use reasonable methods for obtaining information and that he do everything possible to correct any information publicised if it proved to be a distortion of the truth. The Jury considered that by his actions Dorenko had renounced the right to be called a journalist.

Later the CEC reconsidered the situation with national TV channels, taking into account new material. This time the consideration was not limited to Dorenko's programme. CEC statement No. 56/697-3 of December 6, 1999 had the title "On cutting short illegal agitation and making the broadcasting organisations ORT, TV-Centre and their officials answerable". In this way the CEC attempted to stress its neutrality in the information war between the two TV channels.

After analysing video footage of the information and analytical programmes aired in November 1999 by the national broadcasters ORT and TV-Centre, the CEC concluded that the hosts of these programmes were intentionally biased in an attempt to influence voters.

The RF CEC stated that such activities (particularly as regards TV-Centre) were systematic. For example, the economic programme of the election bloc *Otechestvo – Vsya Rossiya* was advertised on D. Kiselev's programme of November 10 with the participation of one of its authors, A. Kokoshin (who was on the federal list of this bloc). The following day, *Otechestvo – Vsya Rossiya's* economic programme was subjected to criticism on M. Leontyev's programme *Odnako* (However) aired by ORT.

On the ORT news show *Vremya*, its host P. Sheremet did a negative report on the activities as a deputy of V. Ilyukhin, the leader of the electoral association All-Russian Political Movement "In Support of the Army" on November 13, 1999. In *S. Dorenko's Programme* aired on November 14, 1999, the host persistently used material and commentary in order to discredit Primakov and Luzhkov, the leader of the election bloc *Otechestvo – Vsya Rossiya*. The large share of airtime devoted to this end, negative assessments and heavy sarcasm testified to Dorenko's intention to agitate against the leaders of the election bloc *Otechestvo – Vsya Rossiya*.

Similar programmes – both complimentary and radically negative – about the election bloc *Otechestvo – Vsya Rossiya* and its leaders were regularly aired by the said TV channels starting from October 1999. Such systematic covering by the TV broadcasting companies ORT and *TV-Centre* of the activity of the candidates, the forerunners in the registered federal lists of these and some other electoral associations and blocks, that aimed at shaping the voters' decision to vote in a certain way the Central Election Committee quite justly assessed as election agitation. The RF CEC stressed at the same time that the agitation was conducted by the organisations and persons who were not authorised for this activity and that it was paid beyond the election funds.

Having taken all the circumstances into account the CEC suggested that the RF Ministry for Press, TV and Radio Broadcasting and Mass Communications take measures to make ORT and TV-Centre and their officials take responsibility for their

actions as stipulated by the RF legislation.

This time the Ministry agreed with the RF CEC position and warnings were given. However, when making the warnings the Ministry invoked not the RF law “On the Media” but the Federal law “On Licensing of Certain Types of Activity” No. 158-?? of September 25, 1998 (with amendments of November 26, 1998).

One explanation for the position of the Ministry is the intricacy of the issue of punishment for violating election legislation. If an election committee discovers that the activity of the media outlet violates the legislation law, then it may appeal to law-enforcement bodies, the courts and executive government bodies implementing state policy in the media area with the request to call a halt to illegal agitation. It may also call for the organisations and their representatives to take responsibility for their actions according to the stipulations of RF legislation.

However, what exactly is meant by “responsibility” in this sense? In cases where the law puts the responsibility on the officials of editorial boards the answer is simple: if the journalist or the media outlet violates the requirements for carrying out election agitation, then the official or the journalist is fined (clause 40⁸ of the RF Code on Administrative Misdeeds). In addition, in conformity with the Federal law “On Administrative Responsibility of Legal Entities for Violating RF Legislation on Elections and Referenda” of December 6, 1999, not only the individuals but also organisations can be brought to account.

If “responsibility” has some meaning beyond the frameworks of the above law, the problem becomes more involved. On the one hand, the mention (in item 9 clause 45 of the Federal law “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of RF Citizens to Participate in Referenda”) of “executive government bodies implementing state policy in the media area” signals the legislator’s intention to use the RF Ministry for Press, TV and Radio Broadcasting and Mass Communications as a registration body. However, the law on the media entitles registration bodies only to handle cases of the abuse of mass information freedom, of violations in declaring output data and submitting obligatory copies, and to nullify the registration certificate.

On the other hand, the text does not indicate that the legislator considers the violation of the procedure for conducting agitation by media outlets as a specific abuse of mass information freedom.

One can certainly assume that the Federal law “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of RF Citizens to Participate in Referenda” introduces a special *corpus delicti*. Then it is unclear why the “responsibility stipulated by RF legislation” is mentioned. Obviously the mechanism of responsibility cannot be applied by analogy and “approximately”.

Finally, even if one assumes that the violation by the media of the rules established for carrying out agitation is a variation on abusing mass information freedom, then the only way for the registering body to respond is in issuing warnings. Only after the media outlet has “garnered” two or more warnings may the registration body apply to the courts with a case to suspend the media outlet’s activities. As to suspending the media outlet’s activities, the law treats this measure as a mean for implementing the case and not as a measure of responsibility.

The Federal law “On Licensing of Certain Types of Activity” stipulates a quite different responsibility. It does not contain involved mechanisms for protection, observation of law and the balance of interests inherent to the RF Law “On the

Media". The licensing body may, on the contrary, issue a warning to a licensee who is not taking care of the license validity. It can even suspend the license in effect (this measure implying actual death for any media outlet). It should be stressed that the law's text does not assume the possibility of appealing either the warning or the suspension of the license.

It should be noted at the same time that the effect of this law as regards TV and radio companies is, at least, controversial. The point is that item 3 clause 19 of the Federal law "On Licensing of Certain Types of Activity" excludes from the area of its application the specific types of activity whose licensing was established by federal laws that came into effect earlier. As for the licensing of TV and radio broadcasters, this was established by the RF Law "On the Media" of December 27, 1991 (well before the Federal law "On Licensing of Certain Types of Activity" of September 25, 1998). This means that the Federal law "On Licensing of Certain Types of Activity" does not cover broadcasting.

An important issue of legal application is the interpretation of the very concept of agitation. Considering the case of the ORT's Sergei Dorenko, the Grand Jury of the Union of Journalists of Russia stressed that "it is completely impermissible to restrict the journalist's right to collect and disseminate truthful information on candidates for elective office". In this way it began a dialogue with the RF CEC on the issue of whether the media may continue, during the election campaign, implementing their social function of informing the audience or whether they must restrict themselves to a presentation of events without commentary whilst providing airtime and pages to the registered candidates.

According to the election legislation the concept of agitation comprises all forms and methods permitted by the law which aim to urge voters to participate in the elections and also to vote for certain candidates or against them. The law prohibits the abuse of mass information freedom. This includes prohibition of calls for social, racial, national or religious hatred, calls for seizing power, for a violent change of constitutional order or for destroying the integrity of the state, the propaganda of war etc.

It is obvious that the media are not only within their rights but are also obliged to convey information collected by them to the electorate, without overstepping the bounds separating objective information and agitation. However, any reduction of the media to the level of "information provider" may only facilitate the transformation of election campaigns into mechanisms which openly attempt to manipulate the electorate.

4 Broadcast media

Benedicte Berner

4.1 Background

The dominant position of the Kremlin authorities and the government within the prevailing Russian TV outlets as well as the exploitation of this medium for political ends characterised the campaigns both for the Duma elections in Russia in December 1999 and for the presidential elections in March 2000. The former elections resulted in a massive victory for the Kremlin-backed political forces and, together with Yeltsin's resignation in late December, to an extent predetermined the positive outcome for Acting President Putin in the March 2000 elections. While "dirty" campaigning played a major role in government-controlled TV during the Duma elections it was less prevalent during the presidential elections, mainly due to the clear lead enjoyed by Putin and the lack of a serious threat to his position. Nevertheless, during the presidential campaign the official electronic media were clearly biased in their news reports and political commentaries.

4.2 The electronic media landscape in Russia.

The broadcast media landscape in Russia contains a large number of state-owned (300) and privately owned (approximately 500) TV channels throughout the country. Of the private broadcasters about 150 are reasonably professional in terms of programmes, equipment, staff etc. Cable and satellite are not yet wide-spread in Russia. The Internet is rapidly growing with over a million users and about 20,000 websites registered and a number of sites dealing with political and economic news.

Broadcasting penetration in the Russian Federation is almost total and most people have access to a variety of television channels but it is worth noting that newspapers still enjoy a widespread readership among Russians where two thirds read newspapers regularly. As these are almost exclusively local or regional they do not have a major national impact.

The television sector in Russia has been split, since independence, into state-controlled and privately owned channels. The successful Moscow-based commercial broadcasters NTV and TV-6 work side by side with the traditional state-controlled heavyweights ORT and RTR. In the regions, numerous local private television stations operate alongside the state-controlled broadcasters.

It should first be noted that only three channels operate nationwide, ORT, RTR and NTV. Ratings for local media are very low – from one to five per cent during prime time.

ORT covers approximately 98 % of the population, RTR 94 % and NTV 70 %. The two first-mentioned channels can thus be seen all over Russia while NTV covers a large number of cities. The fourth most popular channel TV6, can be seen in approximately 300 cities in the country. The Moscow based TV- Tsentr is rapidly expanding but still covers mainly the capital and surrounding areas.

According to research conducted at the end of 1997 in the regional centres of Central Russia the rating of popularity of the major channels was the following.

97,7% of respondents watched ORT;
91.1% of respondents watched RTR;
76.4% of respondents watched NTV;
23% of respondents watched TV-6.

TV-Tsentr began broadcasting in May 1997 and TNT TV-network began broadcasting early 1998.

According to a survey of 3000 viewers by Russian Research in November 1999, 87% of regular TV viewers in Russia watched ORT daily during the last two weeks of November, while 83% of viewers watched RTR, 72% NTV, 51% TV-6 and 35% TV-Tsentr.

The role and influence of the state is still highly important in broadcasting. As in many other countries, broadcasters must rely on government transmitters. RTR is wholly government owned and 51 % of ORT is in government hands but the channel is also heavily influenced by one business group (led by Boris Berezovsky).

Ownership of the private television companies is also fairly straightforward. NTV belongs to the Most-group (chaired by Vladimir Gusinsky). TV6 has recently come under the control of the Berezovsky group. TV-Tsentr was set up by the Moscow city administration (run by Yuri Luzhkov). This picture reflects the fact that electronic and print media are either controlled by the government, by local administrations or have come into the hands of Russia's "oligarchs" – those businessmen/politicians who benefited most directly from the transition to a market economy and who now control enormous business empires. Regional television stations are often under the control of governors or in any case sensitive to pressure from the state administration.

All channels, whether state-owned or private, accept paid advertising, including political advertising.

In July 1999 President Yeltsin signed a new decree "Perfecting State Management in the Field of Mass Information and Mass Communications".

The decree established a new Press Television, Radio Broadcasting and Communications Ministry. The stated goal of the initiative was to develop a single information area in the Russian Federation. The new ministry will have extensive powers. Among other things, it will be in charge of regulating production and distribution of audio and video products, developing a state policy on advertising and organising national tenders for various licenses required to carry out mass media and communications activities. The new minister, Mikhail Lesin, had played an important role in support of Yeltsin's reelection in 1996. The decree was widely seen as a presidential effort to extend and strengthen federal control over electronic media at the regional level.

4.3 Television coverage of the Presidential elections.

4.3.1 The general picture.

Compared to the parliamentary elections in December 1999 the election campaign this time was considerably less intensive and marked by a general understanding that the outcome, i.e. victory for acting President Putin, was a foregone conclusion. TV coverage for most of the period was less aggressive and biased than during earlier elections, both 1999 and 1996. However, during the last ten days of the campaign, debates became more heated and both news and analysis became more obviously biased on some channels. This appeared to be the result of slipping poll results for Putin and uncertainties as to whether he would be able to win in the first round. Government electronic media concentrated their attacks on Yavlinsky whose electoral support was deemed to pose a potential risk to Putin's chances of achieving a land-slide victory.

A characteristic feature of the campaign was that Putin refused to "campaign". He did not participate in any debates on TV, did not use his free time or buy any advertising time on TV. At the same time he was given massive coverage in the news programmes on all channels, particularly positive in those under government control, when performing his official functions as prime minister and acting president. As the principal question in all news broadcasts was the war in Chechnya, a prominent part of his public appearances stressed his role as the defender of Russia's state interests and as a strong and decisive Commander-in-Chief able to achieve total victory in the fight against "the terrorists". Notably, during the campaign Putin was shown in news broadcasts donning a fighter pilots' helmet and co-piloting a fighter-bomber SU-29 to fly to Chechnya.

The acting president's extensive and well-publicised travels around the country took on the character of an intensive campaign where Putin i.a. gave promises of increased salaries and pensions, repayment of arrears to state employees, funding from state resources of regional projects etc. Putin's official non-participation in the campaign prevented other candidates from confronting directly the leading contender and thus made the whole electoral debate somewhat unreal. This was compounded by the fact that substantial political issues did not get prominence in the political discussions, still taking place on TV, which instead were centered on personalities.

In a televised appeal to the voters on the last day of the official campaign Putin urged people to participate in the vote and not to listen to those who advocated abstention or a vote "against all candidates", alternatives which would both have lessened his chances of being elected in the first round. He stressed the large costs involved in a second round of elections, "almost as much as the monthly pensions of all pensioners in the Moscow region". His patriotic style and references in his speech to his role as a supreme military commander were obviously also meant to enroll electoral support for him as the strong, tough and decisive "new leader". This theme reappeared in the declaration that he made as acting president on the last day of the electoral campaign when he referred to the need to elect a new leader to meet the challenges of the new millenium.

Putin did not present any electoral programme and his statements on policies to be adopted, if he were elected, were vague and uncontroversial, intended to recruit the widest possible support. He promised to strengthen the military, crack down on corruption and crime with very strong measures, install "a dictatorship of the law" which would also serve to create a more efficient market economy, increase state salaries and pensions, pay wage arrears, shape a foreign policy which would defend Russia's great power interests but also maintain good relations with the United States and the European Union. As he had no government record to account for and as he clearly distanced himself from the Yeltsin presidency, other candidates had problems finding targets for criticism.

The leader of the Communist party, Zyuganov, was the principal contender against the acting president and yet, in contrast to the presidential elections in 1996 he was spared harsh criticism in the government media. Zyuganov's attacks on Putin were relatively mild. He concentrated on denigrating the Yeltsin era, its "heirs" and legacy, from which Putin in any case distanced himself.

Of the major candidates, Yavlinsky probably had the most clear-cut electoral political programme as contained in the Yabloko policy documents. Yavlinsky took a cautious approach to the Chechen conflict during the presidential campaign, preferring to express himself in general terms after being labelled a "traitor" during the Duma campaign by Putin-supporting "democrats", notably Chubais. He was nevertheless the most active and critical opponent of Putin amongst the presidential candidates. His campaign invested heavily in a variety of advertising, interviews and special appearances in non-political shows in the national and regional media.

4.3.2 The principal TV channels

There was a considerable difference in the behaviour of the various important TV channels particularly as regards the treatment of candidates other than Putin. Government media generally stressed the dissension and conflicts between the presidential pretenders, contrasting their politicking to Putin's statesmanlike activities. Attacks were concentrated on the main democratic/liberal candidate, Yavlinsky. Zyuganov was largely ignored or treated to slightly negative but not aggressive coverage, sometimes getting positive comments. Zhirinovskiy, who was admitted into the race fairly late, was shown frequently demonstrating his usual flamboyant if substance-free style of electioneering, ostensibly to give colour to the campaign. Tuleev was shown criticising Zyuganov and praising Putin, recommending people to vote for the latter. Other candidates were given limited attention on government channels. NTV, the independent channel, gave fairly wide coverage to the democratic/liberal camp, Yavlinsky, Titov and Savostyanov.

ORT and RTR, the state broadcasters with the greatest audience reach in the country, had a special responsibility to provide impartial and fair information about the political choice on offer to the electorate. ORT did not live up to this. The channel was clearly and consistently biased during the intensive part of the campaign, the last 10 days. Its news programmes then contained attacks on Yavlinsky, sparing other candidates with lesser prospects of drawing votes from the leading candidate. The propaganda contained numerous unsavoury techniques to discredit opponents to the frontrunner. Open support was given by ORT in its political and analytical programmes to the candidate Putin, a prominent commentator, Leontiev, going so far as to deliver direct and passionate exhortations to elect the acting president.

To illustrate the tenor of ORT news coverage during the peak period of the campaign its main evening news programme, "Vremya", is described here on a specific day (22 March). It began with reports on Russian military victories in Chechnya, including the discovery of an Arab mercenary among the Chechen "bandits", proving the involvement of foreign countries. "Vremya" then reported at length about links between the Chechen insurgents and banks in Moscow commenting that this proved that the terrorists had contacts everywhere in high places outside the government. The news programme devoted considerable time to Yavlinsky's presumed links to the American financier Soros and to two German political foundations, Friedrich Ebert and Friedrich Naumann Foundations, producing scant evidence for its accusations of illicit campaign financing and foreign influence on behalf of the presidential candidate.

Next, NTV was accused of slandering the Russian army in its coverage of military events in Chechnya and it was also reported that the TV channel was preparing a "treasonable" and provocative programme on the bomb explosions of September 1999. The following item contained reports about Acting President Putin's energetic travels around the country. His handling of serious business contrasted to the next news which showed irate presidential candidates Titov and Zhirinovskiy walking out of a TV studio because the third candidate due to participate in a debate, Yavlinsky, had sent a proxy to take his place. Another candidate, former Minister of Social Affairs, Pamfilova, was then interviewed commenting on a "Vremya" story that cosmetic surgery had been performed on Yavlinsky to make him look more energetic and attractive. This, she stated, was clearly a sign of unmanly behaviour. Polls were reported giving Yavlinsky an equal number of votes to the Communist outsider Tuleev, a move designed to show his slipping ratings. Finally, during the programme "Odnako", after the news, the analyst Leontiev concluded that Yavlinsky was a "cryptocommunist" on the grounds that he was taking votes away from Putin and thereby helping the main contender, Communist party leader Zyuganov.

In other news-programmes on ORT a link was described between Yavlinsky's foreign financing, the Media Most owner Gusinsky and Israeli and Jewish international circles. The implication was drawn that Yavlinsky would clearly be influenced in his political decisions by such backing. In another item, a group of homosexuals, shown in an unflattering photo montage, were reported to have declared their support for Yavlinsky. During a later news programme the channel publicised a written rebuttal by Yavlinsky on the above material.

Prior to the presidential campaign, RTR acquired new leadership, recruiting the former general director of NTV, Oleg Dobrodeyev. In the beginning of the campaign it broadcast several reports with positive coverage of Yavlinsky, even leading some other candidates, particularly Zhirinovskiy, to complain about RTR bias in favour of this candidate. RTR management also stated an ambition to take a more objective and less propagandistic line during the campaign, arguing that the first priority now had become to achieve better ratings in the public. Nevertheless, it gradually came to support Putin more and more openly in the tenor of its news coverage criticising his opponents and participating in some of the last-minute dirty campaigning against Yavlinsky.

RTR's chief political commentator, Nikolai Svanidze, had, together with his colleague, Sergei Dorenko from ORT, been one of the main "mud-slingers" during the Duma election campaign. During the presidential campaign, however, he took a much more subdued stance, refraining from massive ad hominem attacks while giving clear support to Putin.

Commercial channels gave more balanced presentations. NTV had fairly objective coverage in its news programmes and gave serious attention to Putin's presidential activities albeit in a more neutral tone than that seen on ORT and RTR. In weekly analytical, political programmes such as "Itogi" and "Glas Naroda", it took a more critical view of Putin. Thus the main presenter, Evgeny Kiselev, commented negatively on Putin's stand in the Babitsky affair and consistently tried to show up the more dubious aspects of the Chechnya campaign e.g. civilian casualties. Kiselev reported on the financial pressure exercised on Media Most by government circles to make it less critical and more subservient. NTV's favourable attitude to Yavlinsky could be seen in some analytical programmes and in the considerable attention given to this candidate. This coverage was also part of the interest shown by the channel for the efforts to unite the democratic, liberal opposition around one

candidate (in this case Yavlinsky). The way in which the channel, in a political programme taking place the last week of the campaign, presented the candidate Savostyanov's decision to stand down and give his support to Yavlinsky was criticised by other candidates, notably by Titov, as being carefully arranged and biased in favour of the latter, an interpretation which seemed well-founded.

The satirical and highly popular NTV puppet show "Kukly" portrayed the Duma as a brothel visited by Putin, where most politicians were for sale with all of them eager to cater to the new leader's taste. Some were shown as more enticing partners e.g. (implausibly) Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy, while Primakov and Luzhkov were shown as too old to attract Putin's interest. At the end the competing political prostitutes did a mass strip tease and as they took off their clothes they gradually disappeared into thin air. The programme caused a minor sensation as it was the most critical attention the acting president had received from any quarters for some time.

TV Centre, a channel set up by the Moscow City administration also had new leadership in the form of Oleg Poptsov, who stated an aim to make the station adopt an independent and objective position. Programmes were sometimes critical of the acting president which was noteworthy as the Moscow mayor, Luzhkov, had declared support for Putin well before the elections.

TV6 was generally supportive of Putin but not ostentatiously so, giving a fairly balanced coverage in its news programmes. Despite relying heavily on ORT for much of its news material, it did not participate actively in the dirty campaign of the last week.

4.4 Chechnya

The conflict in Chechnya played a major role as a background to the elections. The decision to enter the war and the strategy of its prosecution was closely linked to Putin and thus coverage of the war had a direct bearing on his candidacy. As before the parliamentary elections the state media gave unqualified support to the war. Putin's decisive and strong leadership was taken as a model for the way in which Russia should be ruled. Those who had expressed interest in "political solutions" (e.g. Yavlinsky and NTV) as opposed to total military victory were criticised as being unpatriotic. No politician or TV channel directly criticised the war effort or in any way condoned the activities of the "Chechen bandits", an expression used in most news programmes. The military successes on the ground further muted any expressions of doubt on the conduct of the war. NTV, however, underlined the humanitarian catastrophe and the Russian military sacrifices involved.

The "Babitsky affair" (see below) gave rise to widespread criticism of authorities' treatment of journalists covering the war. It was featured most prominently in NTV and not at all in ORT. The background to and the origin of the war, including the mysterious bomb explosions, attributed by the authorities without substantial proof to Chechen terrorists, was discussed on some NTV programmes.

4.5 Advertising

Ample free time was available on the public channels and, according to the electoral law, half of this time had to be devoted to debates between candidates. Putin's refusal to participate, the resulting hesitancy on the part of Zyuganov and Yavlinsky and the widespread use of proxies for the main contenders led to a situation where most debates took place between less prominent candidates. This obviously considerably reduced the interest of the debates for the viewers. The free time devoted to individual presentations was used by all candidates except Putin, who made a point of denigrating this activity – remarking that people seeking high office "should be involved with practical activities and not advertising". In these presentations several of the candidates, particularly Zhirinovskiy and Govorukhin, delivered violent attacks on their opponents using defamatory language and arguments.

Paid advertising time was used by several of the candidates. Yavlinsky conducted a massive advertisement campaign during the last two weeks of the campaign and was consequently attacked for allegedly spending resources far in excess of those permitted as well as using money from foreigners. Titov also had a great deal of advertisement time followed by Tuleev. Zyuganov, in contrast to earlier elections, also bought commercial time, particularly during the last week of the campaign. Other candidates had less resources for this type of campaigning.

4.6 Pressure on the media

One issue mentioned in a number of interviews with independent media representatives was that of growing apprehension about the possibility greater state control over society and particularly over media. A symbol for this became the handling of the Babitsky affair. Andrei Babitsky, a journalist from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty arrested in Chechnya by the Russian military authorities, was held incommunicado for weeks and then allegedly "exchanged" for Russian prisoners of war. Several leading media personalities in Russia participated in the campaign for Babitsky's release and the issue was well covered on the TV networks except for ORT. The authorities had a critical view of Babitsky's reporting in particular and a restrictive attitude to the task of journalists in Chechnya in general. Ivanov, the secretary of Russia's Security Council said that Russian journalists should show "patriotism" and "take part in the information war against the Chechen terrorists". Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky told the daily "Kommersant" that "when the nation mobilises its forces to achieve some task, that imposes obligations on everyone, including the media". The international attention given to this case helped decisively, according to most observers, in having the journalist freed and returned to Moscow.

At the beginning of March, Putin's staff reacted sharply against criticism of their candidate, stating that allegations of violations of campaign procedures were unfounded, ill-willed and tendentious and that the press service "reserves the right to use all means in its arsenal to implement an asymmetrical answer to provocation".

NTV reported to EIM monitors that from the summer of 1999, it was subjected to pressure from the presidential administration to support the government. When it resisted, various financial means of pressure were applied, such as the calling in of a sizeable loan from a state-sponsored bank. This pressure continued, according to NTV representatives, through the use of other economic instruments e.g. an increase in the cost of TV broadcasting signals for NTV. From 1996 onwards, NTV was paying

the same rates for its signal as the state-controlled media which are lower than commercial rates. While other sources responded that NTV had enjoyed preferential treatment from the government which was being withdrawn with the cooling of government/NTV relations, and that sudden loan repayments are a normal hazard for commercial firms, it seems clear that the timing of these measures were part of a politically motivated pressure tactic.

NTV was also under regular attack from ORT which accused the channel of producing tendentious and false anti-Putin stories and of reporting in favour of Yavlinsky. These polemics between the two stations reflected the complex relationship of business and politics in Russia at the time: it would be simplistic to present them as purely a pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin debate when they also represented the deteriorating competitive relationship between business rivals Berezovsky and Gusinsky.

At the same time, other TV channels said they were under pressure from the government. TV Centre representatives said they had problems with the authorities in discussing the renewal of their broadcasting license in May 2000. Government officials responding to this criticism pointed out that ORT's license was up for renewal at the same time.

Putin's demonstrated hostility to the media and to disloyal journalists (he referred to Babitsky in an interview as a "traitor") and government pressure on media groups not loyal to the Kremlin bode ill for the future of freedom of expression in Russia. Shortly after the elections, representatives of the new president asked the makers of the satirical NTV puppet show "Kukli" to remove the puppet of Putin because he found it offensive. It was duly withdrawn.

4.7 Monitoring of the media coverage of the campaign


Dr Åse Grødeland

From 3 to 26 March the team monitored six national television channels and 12 national newspapers. Television channels included in the monitoring were the partly state-owned ORT and RTR, the independent NTV and TVC and the Moscow-based TV6. Newspapers included in the monitoring were *Argumenty i Fakty*, *Izvestiya*, *Kommersant Daily*, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, *Novye Izvestiya*, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, *Segodnya*, *Trud*, *Pravda*, *Zavtra* and *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*. As campaigning was prohibited on the day preceding the elections (25 March) as well as on election day itself (26 March) and no violations were recorded of the election law on this account, the tables and charts show monitoring results from 3 to 24 March. Monitoring results are also compared from week to week (3-10 March, 11-18 March, 19-24 March).

For television the monitors recorded each candidate's total coverage. They also recorded news coverage, advertising, specials, analytical materials and other materials for each candidate. Further, direct and indirect speech were recorded, as was tone of coverage. Tone of coverage was indexed either as positive, negative or neutral. Paid political adverts were indexed as neutral. As regards the print media, the monitors recorded each candidate's coverage (square centimetres) in the form of articles and advertising. They also recorded the tone of coverage for each candidate. This report presents the findings for overall coverage, news coverage, advertising, tone and direct/indirect speech.

National Television

Most of the coverage on national television during the election campaign was given to Putin's candidacy. Altogether he received slightly less than a third of all mentions of the presidential candidates. Yavlinsky came a somewhat distant second, followed by Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy. Govorukhin and Dzhabrailov, who were by many observers considered as peripheral candidates, did fairly well in terms of coverage, accounting for 6.1% and 5.8% of the coverage respectively. Tuleev and Titov each got over 5% of the total coverage. All other candidates received 4% or less of the coverage.



Altogether, ORT, RTR, NTV, TV6 and TVC broadcast roughly 178 hours and 42 minutes of coverage of the various candidates. Putin's campaign accounted for 52 hours and 28 minutes of this coverage. Putin received approximately 30 hours' more coverage than did Yavlinsky. Skuratov received the least coverage with 5 hours and 55 minutes.

Table 1: Candidates' Share of Coverage on National Television. All Channels. 3-24 March 2000.

	Total Time
Putin	52 hrs 28 min
Yavlinsky	20 hrs 15 min
Zyuganov	19 hrs 23 min
Zhirinovskiy	19 hrs 5 min
Govorukhin	10 hrs 51 min
Savostyanov	10 hrs 19 min
Tuleev	10 hrs 12 min
Titov	9 hrs 3 min
Podberezkin	7 hrs 19 min
Dzhabrailov	7 hrs 18 min
Pamfilova	6 hrs 34 min
Skuratov	5 hrs 55 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

A comparison of coverage of the presidential candidates during the three weeks the monitoring took place, showed no dramatic changes for any of the candidates from week to week. The only exception was coverage of Putin's election campaign, which dropped by some 8% during the last week of monitoring. In contrast, Yavlinsky's coverage increased from week to week, though the total increase was just over 4%. Zhirinovsky's coverage dropped somewhat, whereas Savostyanov's and Titov's increased during the last week of campaigning.

Table 2: Candidates' Share of Coverage (in %) on National Television. All Channels. 3-24 March 2000

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	29.4	35.1	32.0	24.1
Yavlinsky	11.3	9.2	9.9	13.6
Zyuganov	10.8	11.3	9.3	11.8
Zhirinovskiy	10.7	12.1	10.9	9.6
Govorukhin	6.1	3.2	6.6	7.3
Savostyanov	5.8	5.6	4.2	7.1
Tuleev	5.7	4.4	6.7	5.7
Titov	5.1	4.2	4.3	6.1
Podberezkin	4.1	5.6	4.7	2.8
Dzhabrailov	4.1	3.1	2.8	5.6
Pamfilova	3.7	3.0	4.9	3.2
Skuratov	3.3	3.0	3.7	3.2
N=	178 hrs 42 min	45 hrs 2 min	57 hrs 36 min	76 hrs 57 min

Note: Seconds have been rounded or down to the nearest minute. The sums for each week added together therefore do not exactly match the total sum for the period 3-24 March.

It is interesting to look at each candidate's share of the total coverage for the whole monitoring period and then to compare this share with their share of coverage for each of the week of the monitoring period (3-11 March, 11-18 March and 19-24 March). Such a comparison indicates whether a candidate increased or decreased his share of the coverage as election day got closer. However, it is also useful to look at each candidate's coverage as recorded for the whole monitoring period, and then look at what proportion of this coverage was made during what particular week of the monitoring period.

Looking at the proportion of each candidate's coverage by week we find that the largest share of each candidate's coverage was broadcast during the last week of campaigning. With regard to the major candidates, Putin's share of the total coverage did not change significantly over the three weeks. In contrast, over half of Yavlinsky's coverage on national television was made during the last week of campaigning. Zyuganov's coverage during this week was also larger than during each of the two preceding weeks. Zhirinovskiy's increase, however, was less dramatic. Four other candidates (Govorukhin, Savostyanov, Titov and Dzhabrailov) received more than half their share of the coverage during the monitoring period during the last week of monitoring. In Savostyanov's case this can be explained by the fact that he withdrew from the presidential race this week. His decision to withdraw received coverage on all television channels.

Five candidates (Zyuganov, Titov, Dzhabrailov, Pamfilova, Skuratov) had their largest proportion of the overall coverage on RTR, three on ORT (Putin, Zhirinovskiy, Podberezkin), three on NTV (Yavlinsky, Savostyanov, Tuleev) and one on TVC (Govorukhin). Putin's coverage was evenly spread between ORT, RTR and NTV, though less of his coverage was shown on TVC and considerably less on TV6. Yavlinsky had an almost equal amount of his coverage broadcast on ORT, somewhat less on RTR and TVC and considerably less on TV6.

Table 3: Candidates' Distribution of Coverage (in %) on National Television. All channels. 3-24 March 2000.


	ORT	RTR	NTV	TV6	TVC	N=
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Putin	25.3	23.5	23.4	9.2	18.6	52 hrs 28 min
Yavlinsky	26.5	18.2	30.6	7.7	17.0	20 hrs 15 min
Zyuganov	20.9	37.1	20.6	7.0	14.5	19 hrs 23 min
Zhirinovskiy	25.8	22.4	21.2	10.5	20.1	19 hrs 5 min
Govorukhin	22.0	23.8	24.0	3.7	26.6	10 hrs 51 min
Savostyanov	17.1	20.8	36.6	4.4	21.1	10 hrs 19 min
Tuleev	15.1	27.7	31.9	4.9	20.5	10 hrs 12 min
Titov	25.2	26.2	22.8	12.7	13.1	9 hrs 3 min
Podberezkin	33.0	31.6	7.0	4.1	24.3	7 hrs 19 min
Dzhabrailov	23.7	31.4	12.3	15.0	17.5	7 hrs 18 min
Pamfilova	30.3	33.6	20.1	4.6	11.5	6 hrs 34 min
Skuratov	25.9	42.3	9.0	4.2	18.6	5 hrs 55 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

News coverage

Putin received the lion's share also of the news coverage. His share of the coverage in the news as compared to the overall coverage increased to almost 50%. His three main opponents, Yavlinsky, Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy trailed far behind at just over 10% each. None of the other candidates received more than 5% of the coverage.



In terms of real time, Putin got almost 45 hours of news coverage, compared to Zhirinovskiy's, Yavlinsky's and Zyuganov's just under 11 hours each. There was then a big gap to the next candidate, Titov, whose coverage was just under five hours. All other candidates received less than four hours of coverage each.

Candidate	Time
Putin	44 hrs 57 min
Zhirinovskiy	10 hrs 59 min
Yavlinsky	10 hrs 58 min

Zyuganov	10 hrs 45 min
Titov	4 hrs 51 min
Savostyanov	3 hrs 55 min
Tuleev	3 hrs 50 min
Dzhabrailov	3 hrs 27 min
Govorukhin	3 hrs 5 min
Pamfilova	2 hrs 41 min
Skuratov	2 hrs 35 min
Podberezkin	1 hr 48 min
Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.	

A comparison of each candidate's share of the coverage during each of the three weeks the monitoring lasted, show that most candidates increased the share of their coverage during the last week of the election campaign. It is therefore perhaps somewhat surprising that Putin's share of the coverage during this week dropped sharply to 33.7%, compared with 53.9% during the previous week. In contrast, Yavlinsky's share of the news coverage increased with some 7% from week 2 to week 3. Also Savostyanov's share of the coverage during week 3 was considerably higher than during the week before – connected no doubt to his decision to pull out of the presidential race just 12 minutes before the deadline for doing so expired.

Table 5: Candidates' Share (in %) of the News Coverage on National Television. All Channels. 3-24 March 2000

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	43.3	48.7	53.9	33.7
Yavlinsky	10.6	8.1	7.3	14.0
Zhirinovskiy	10.6	14.4	8.9	9.4
Zyuganov	10.3	8.9	12.0	10.2
Titov	4.7	3.0	3.4	6.4
Savostyanov	3.8	2.0	0.7	6.6
Tuleev	3.7	4.3	2.4	4.2
Dzhabrailov	3.3	3.2	1.9	4.2
Govorukhin	3.0	1.7	2.8	3.8
Pamfilova	2.6	2.0	2.1	3.2
Skuratov	2.5	1.5	3.4	2.5
Podberezkin	1.7	2.2	1.3	1.8
	103 hrs 51 min	28 hrs 50 min	29 hrs 21 min	47 hrs 14 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. The sums for each week added together therefore do not exactly match the total sum for the period 3-24 March.

A comparison of the proportion of each candidate's coverage on a weekly basis, revealed that most candidates received most of their coverage during the last week of the election campaign. In Savostyanov's case, as much of 80% of his news coverage was made during this week. And several other candidates received more than half their coverage during this week. Putin, in contrast, received roughly a third of his news coverage during each of the three weeks the monitoring lasted.

Table 6: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of News Coverage on National Television. All Channels. 3-24 March 2000.

	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N =
Putin	30.3	34.1	35.6	44 hrs 57 min

Zhirinovskiy	36.6	23.1	40.3	10 hrs 59 min
Yavlinskiy	20.5	19.1	60.4	10 hrs 58 min
Zyuganov	23.3	31.8	44.9	10 hrs 45 min
Titov	17.5	19.6	62.9	4 hrs 51 min
Savostyanov	14.5	5.5	80.0	3 hrs 55 min
Tuleev	31.3	17.4	51.3	3 hrs 50 min
Dzhabrailov	26.1	15.9	58.0	3 hrs 27 min
Govorukhin	15.7	25.9	58.4	3 hrs 5 min
Pamfilova	20.5	22.4	57.1	2 hrs 41 min
Skuratov	16.8	37.4	45.8	2 hrs 35 min
Podberezkin	33.3	19.4	47.3	1 hr 48 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Six candidates (Putin, Dzhabrailov, Govorukhin, Pamfilova, Skuratov and Podberezkin) had their largest proportion of news coverage on ORT, four (Yavlinskiy, Zhirinovskiy, Titov and Savostyanov) on NTV and two (Zyuganov and Tuleev) on RTR. Putin's and Zyuganov's coverage was fairly evenly spread between ORT, RTR and NTV. Both candidates had less of their coverage on TVC and the least on TV6. Zhirinovskiy, and to a lesser extent also Yavlinskiy, had a considerably larger proportion of their news coverage on NTV than on the other channels. Titov had almost equal shares of his news coverage on NTV and ORT, whereas Tuleev's largest shares were on NTV and RTR. Savostyanov got a much larger proportion of his news coverage on NTV than on the other channels.

Tone of coverage


All candidates except Pamfilova received some negative coverage on national television during the monitoring period. Yavlinskiy got most of this (41 minutes), though Putin (29 minutes), Zyuganov (28 minutes) and Zhirinovskiy (22 minutes) also got a relatively big share of the negative coverage.

	%
Yavlinskiy	22.9
Putin	16.2
Zyuganov	15.6
Zhirinovskiy	12.3
Savostyanov	8.4
Tuleev	5.0
Dzhabrailov	5.0
Titov	4.5
Skuratov	3.9
Podberezkin	3.4
Govorukhin	2.8
N=	2 hrs 59 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

There was more than an hour less positive coverage than negative coverage of the various candidates on national television between 3 and 24 March. Altogether, 1 hour and 18 minutes of positive coverage was broadcast on the channels included in the monitoring. Tuleev (28 minutes) and Savostyanov (25 minutes) received more than twice as much positive coverage as did Putin (11 minutes). Yavlinskiy did rather badly, with only 3 minutes. All other candidates received 5 minutes or less of positive coverage. Only one candidate – Podberezkin – did not get any positive coverage on national television during the last three weeks of the election campaign.

Each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.



More than 90% of each candidate's coverage was neutral in tone. Yavlinsky had the largest proportion of negative coverage (3.4%). In comparison, 0.9% of Putin's coverage was negative. Zyuganov also received some negative coverage, though it accounted for only 2.4% of his overall coverage.

Table 8: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage. All Channels. 3-24 March 2000.

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Time
Putin	0.9	98.8	0.3	52 hrs 28 min
Yavlinsky	3.4	96.6	0.3	20 hrs 15 min
Zyuganov	2.4	97.6	0.0	19 hrs 23 min
Zhirinovskiy	1.9	98.1	0.0	19 hrs 5 min
Govorukhin	0.8	99.2	0.0	10 hrs 51 min
Savostyanov	2.4	93.5	4.1	10 hrs 19 min
Tuleev	1.5	94.1	4.4	10 hrs 12 min
Titov	1.5	97.4	1.1	9 hrs 3 min
Podberezkin	1.4	98.6	---	7 hrs 19 min
Dzhabrailov	1.8	97.5	0.7	7 hrs 18 min
Pamfilova	---	99.5	0.5	6 hrs 34 min
Skuratov	2.0	98.0	0.0	5 hrs 55 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. 0.0 indicates that the candidate received less than 30 seconds of positive coverage.

Yavlinsky received 41 minutes of negative coverage on national television between 3

and 24 March, compared to Putin's 29 minutes. Table 9 shows that Putin had all his negative coverage during the first and second week of monitoring. In contrast, Yavlinsky received more than half of his negative coverage during the last week of monitoring. Zhirinovskiy was not referred to in negative terms between 3 and 10 March. Once he entered the presidential race, however, he received quite a lot of criticism: 22 minutes – and almost 60% of it during the last week of the presidential campaign. Zyuganov, on the other hand, received most of his negative coverage between 11 and 18 March and Titov all of his negative coverage between 3 and 10 March. Savostyanov's negative coverage decreased sharply during the last week of monitoring, compared to the first. And he received less than 30 seconds of negative coverage between 11 and 18 March.

Table 9: Candidates' Weekly Distribution (in %) of Negative Coverage on National Television. All Channels. 3-24 March 2000.

	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N=
Yavlinsky	17.1	22.0	60.9	41 min
Putin	27.6	72.4	0.0	29 min
Zyuganov	17.9	67.9	14.2	28 min
Zhirinovskiy	0.0	40.9	59.1	22 min
Savostyanov	80.0	---	20.0	15 min
Tuleev	22.2	0.0	77.8	9 min
Dzhabrailov	55.6	---	44.4	9 min
Titov	100.0	---	---	8 min
Skuratov	0.0	14.3	85.7	7 min
Podberezhkin	33.3	---	66.7	6 min
Govorukhin	40.0	---	60.0	5 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. 0.0 indicates that the candidate received less than 30 seconds of positive coverage. Pamfilova is not included in the table as she did not get any negative coverage.

Tuleev and Savostyanov received most of their positive coverage during the second week of monitoring. In contrast, Putin received more than half of his positive coverage during the last week of the election campaign. Yavlinsky was only referred to in positive terms during the last week of the campaign.

There were considerable changes in distribution of negative coverage amongst the candidates from week to week. Although Yavlinsky overall received the largest amount of negative coverage on national television between 3-24 March, his share of the negative coverage during the last week of the election campaign was more than twice as high as during the first and the second weeks. Putin received no negative mentions during the last week of campaigning. Most of the criticisms against him were broadcast the week before. The most unpopular candidate during the first week of monitoring was Savostyanov.

Table 10: Candidates' Share (in %) of Negative Coverage on National Television. All Channels. 3-24 March 2000.

	NEGATIVE MENTIONS			
	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Yavlinsky	23.0	15.7	15.3	36.2
Putin	16.3	13.7	35.6	0.0
Zyuganov	15.7	9.8	32.2	5.8

Zhirinovskiy	12.4	0.0	15.3	18.8
Savostyanov	8.4	23.5	---	4.3
Tuleev	5.1	3.9	0.0	10.1
Titov	4.5	15.7	---	---
Dzhabrailov	4.5	9.8	---	5.8
Skuratov	3.9	0.0	1.7	8.7
Podberezkin	3.4	3.9	---	5.8
Govorukhin	2.8	3.9	0.0	4.3
Pamfilova	---	---	---	---
N=	2 hrs 58 min	51 min	59 min	1 hr 9 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. The sums for each week added together therefore do not exactly match the total sum for the period 3-24 March. 0.0 indicates that the candidate received less than 30 seconds of positive coverage.

Tuleev and Savostyanov took the largest share of the positive coverage. Putin trailed somewhat behind these at 14.1%, though he got 9% more positive coverage than did Yavlinsky. Savostyanov was the most popular candidate during the first and second weeks. However, his popularity dropped sharply compared to that of the other candidates, during the last week of monitoring. Tuleev's share of the positive coverage increased gradually from the first through to the third week. Putin took a larger share of the positive coverage during the last week, as did Yavlinsky – who received less than 30 seconds of positive coverage during both the first and the second weeks.

Table 11: Candidates' Share (in %) of Positive Mentions on National Television. All channels. 3-24 March 2000.

	POSITIVE MENTIONS			
	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Tuleev	34.6	26.1	38.2	45.0
Savostyanov	32.1	30.4	47.1	10.0
Putin	14.1	13.0	5.9	30.0
Titov	7.7	21.7	0.0	0.0
Yavlinsky	5.1	0.0	0.0	15.0
Dzhabrailov	3.8	8.7	2.9	0.0
Pamfilova	2.6	---	5.9	---
Zyuganov	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Zhirinovskiy	0.0	---	0.0	---
Govorukhin	0.0	---	0.0	---
Skuratov	0.0	0.0	0.0	---
N=	1 hr 18 min	23 min	34 min	20 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. The sums for each week added together therefore do not exactly match the total sum for the period 3-24 March. 0.0 indicates that the candidate received less than 30 seconds of positive coverage. Podberezkin has not been included in the table as he failed to get positive coverage on national television between 3 and 24 March.

To find out which channels were most critical to each of the candidates, we percentaged the candidates' negative coverage on each channel from their total coverage. As can be seen from table 12, Yavlinsky got more than 50% of all his negative coverage on ORT. RTR was also critical of Yavlinsky. Negative coverage on this channel accounted for 32.5% of all negative references to this candidate. Putin, on the other hand, received close to 50% of all his negative coverage on NTV – by many seen as a channel supporting Yavlinsky's candidacy. Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy had most of their critical coverage on RTR, as did Tuleev. Only one candidate – Zhirinovskiy – got a substantial proportion of his negative coverage on TVC.

Table 12: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative Coverage on National Television by Channel. 3-24 March 2000.

	ORT	RTR	NTV	TV6	TVC	N=
Yavlinsky	55.0	32.5	12.5	0.0	0.0	40 min
Putin	13.8	41.4	44.8	---	0.0	29 min
Zyuganov	35.7	42.9	14.3	7.1	0.0	28 min
Zhirinovskiy	0.0	63.6	18.2	---	18.2	22 min
Savostyanov	53.3	---	46.7	0.0	---	15 min
Tuleev	30.0	50.0	---	20.0	---	10 min
Dzhabrailov	---	---	100.0	0.0	---	8 min
Titov	25.0	0.0	50.0	25.5	0.0	8 min
Skuratov	85.7	0.0	---	14.3	0.0	7 min
Podberezkin	---	---	66.7	33.3	0.0	6 min
Govorukhin	60.0	---	---	40.0	0.0	5 min
Pamfilova	---	---	---	---	---	---

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

As for positive coverage, Putin got most of his on ORT. Most other candidates received the largest share of their positive coverage on RTR. Yavlinsky had half of his positive coverage on RTR and the other half on TVC.

Table 13: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Positive Coverage on National Television by Channel. 3-24 March 2000.

	ORT	RTR	NTV	TV6	TVC	N=
Tuleev	21.4	64.3	---	---	14.3	28 min
Savostyanov	40.0	44.0	---	---	16.0	25 min
Putin	58.3	16.7	16.7	0.0	8.3	12 min
Titov	0.0	83.3	16.7	---	0.0	5 min
Dzhabrailov	---	66.7	---	0.0	33.3	3 min
Yavlinsky	0.0	50.0	0.0	---	50.0	3 min
Pamfilova	---	100.0	---	---	0.0	2 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Tone of news coverage

News coverage of the presidential candidates during the election campaign on national television was predominantly neutral. Although a majority of the presidential hopefuls received some negative mentions, their amount was very limited. There was less positive than negative coverage of the candidates in the news between 3 and 24 March.

Some 45.8% of all negative coverage of the presidential hopefuls were made in the news. Nine of the twelve candidates were criticised in the news on national television. Yavlinsky got the highest share of negative coverage, with 22 minutes. Some 16 minutes of Putin's news coverage was negative in tone. Only three candidates – Putin (11 minutes), Yavlinsky (3 minutes) and Pamfilova (2 minutes) were given positive coverage in the news on national television between 3 and 24 March.


Table 14: Candidates' Share (in %) of Negative News Coverage on National Television. All Channels. 3-24 March 2000.

	%
Yavlinsky	26.8

Putin	19.5
Zhirinovskiy	11.0
Zyuganov	11.0
Savostyanov	8.5
Tuleev	8.5
Skuratov	8.5
Govorukhin	3.7
Titov	2.4
N=	1 hr 22 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.



None of the candidate's negative share of news coverage exceeded 4% of their total news coverage. Skuratov received the largest share of negative coverage at 4%. Savostyanov and Tuleev each received 3% negative coverage, whereas 1.4% of all references to Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy were negative. The negative share of Yavlinsky's coverage was slightly higher than that of Putin. The two received an almost equal share of positive coverage.

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N=
Putin	0.6	99.0	0.4	44 hrs 57 min
Zhirinovskiy	1.4	98.6	---	10 hrs 59 min
Yavlinsky	3.3	96.2	0.5	10 hrs 58 min
Zyuganov	1.4	98.6	0.0	10 hrs 45 min
Titov	0.7	99.3	---	4 hrs 51 min

Savostyanov	3.0	97.0	---	3 hrs 55 min
Tuleev	3.0	97.0	---	3 hrs 50 min
Govorukhin	1.6	98.4	0.0	3 hrs 5 min
Pamfilova	---	98.8	1.2	2 hrs 41 min
Skuratov	4.5	95.5	---	2 hrs 35 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. 0.0 indicates that the candidate received less than 30 seconds of positive coverage. Those candidates whose news coverage was 100% neutral are not included in the table.

All negative coverage of Tuleev's campaign took place during the last week of monitoring. However, the most striking finding from looking at the proportion of candidates' negative mentions on the news is that more than 90% of Yavlinsky's negative news coverage was made during the last week of the election campaign. In sharp contrast, Putin received less than 30 seconds of negative news coverage during the same week. Most of the negative references to this candidate were made between 11 and 18 March. No negative mentions were made of Zhirinovskiy during the first week and of Savostyanov during the second week of monitoring.

Yavlinsky received all his positive coverage during the last week of campaigning. Putin's positive coverage was spread over three weeks, though more than 50% was made during the last week of the campaign. Pamfilova was referred to in positive terms only between 11 and 18 March.

The candidates' share of negative news coverage varied sharply from week to week. During the first week, Savostyanov was given the most negative coverage (36.4%). During the second and third week, however, his negative coverage was either non-existing or modest. Yavlinsky received less than 30 seconds of negative coverage during the second week of monitoring – compared to Putin's 48.1%. During the following week, however, Yavlinsky's share of the negative coverage accounted for 45.5% of the total negative coverage, compared to Putin's less than 30 seconds.

Table 16: Candidates' Share (in %) of Negative News Coverage on National Television. All Channels. 3-24 March 2000.

	NEGATIVE MENTIONS			
	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Yavlinsky	26.8	27.3	0.0	45.5
Putin	19.5	18.2	48.1	0.0
Zyuganov	11.0	0.0	33.3	0.0
Zhirinovskiy	11.0	---	14.8	11.4
Savostyanov	8.5	36.4	---	6.8
Tuleev	8.5	---	---	15.9
Skuratov	8.5	---	3.7	13.6
Govorukhin	3.7	---	0.0	6.8
Titov	2.4	18.2	---	---
N=	1 hr 22 min	11 min	27 min	44 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. 0.0 indicates that the candidate received less than 30 seconds of positive coverage. Candidates who received no negative coverage are not included in the table.

During the first week of monitoring, Putin was the only candidate to receive any noticeable amount of positive coverage (Yavlinsky also received some, though only two seconds). During the second week, Putin and Pamfilova got about two minutes each, and during the last week, Putin got two thirds and Yavlinsky a third of all

positive coverage.

Table 17: Candidates' Share (in %) of Positive News Coverage on National Television. All Channels. 3-24 March 2000.

	POSITIVE MENTIONS			
	Whole period	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3
Putin	68.8	100.0	50.0	66.7
Yavlinsky	18.7	0.0	---	33.3
Pamfilova	12.5	---	50.0	---
N=	16 min	3 min	4 min	9 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. 0.0 indicates that the candidate received less than 30 seconds of positive coverage. Candidates who received no positive coverage are not included in the table.

Table 18 shows that Yavlinsky got almost all his negative news coverage on the two state channels: an astonishing 81.8% of all negative references to Yavlinsky during the last three weeks of the election campaign were made on ORT! Most of the other candidates also received a majority of their negative coverage on this channel. In contrast, Putin received more than 50% of his on NTV. RTR was critical of Tuleev and Zhirinovskiy.

Table 18: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative News Coverage on National Television. All channels. 3-24 March 2000.

	ORT	RTR	NTV	TV6	TVC	N=
Yavlinsky	81.8	13.6	4.5	0.0	---	22 min
Putin	23.5	11.8	64.7	---	0.0	17 min
Zyuganov	60.0	20.0	---	20.0	0.0	10 min
Zhirinovskiy	0.0	55.6	---	---	44.4	9 min
Tuleev	37.5	62.5	---	---	---	8 min
Savostyanov	57.1	---	42.9	---	---	7 min
Skuratov	85.7	---	---	14.3	---	7 min
Govorukhin	100.0	---	---	---	0.0	3 min
Titov	100.0	0.0	---	---	---	2 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

More than 50% of Putin's positive coverage was recorded on ORT. Yavlinsky and Pamfilova, on the other hand, received most of their positive coverage on NTV. Interestingly, though perhaps somewhat surprising, Yavlinsky failed to get any positive mentions on the NTV news.

Table 19: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Positive News Coverage on National Television. All channels. 3-24 March 2000.

	ORT	RTR	NTV	TV6	TVC	N=
Putin	58.3	16.7	16.7	0.0	8.3	12 min
Yavlinsky	0.0	66.7	---	---	33.3	3 min
Pamfilova	---	100.0	---	---	---	2 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Adverts on all channels

Monitoring revealed that ORT was the most popular channel for paid political adverts: all candidates except Putin advertised on this channel. TVC advertised eight of the candidates and RTR – seven. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, only two of the presidential candidates chose to advertise on NTV (Yavlinsky and Titov). TV6 did not carry paid political adverts for any of the candidates.


	ORT	RTR	NTV	TV6	TVC
Putin					
Yavlinsky	X	X	X		X
Titov	X	X	X		X
Zyuganov	X	X			X
Zhirinovskiy	X	X			X
Tuleev	X	X			X
Skuratov	X	X			X
Podberezkin	X				X
Dzhabrailov	X				X
Savostyanov	X	X			
Pamfilova	X				
Govorukhin	X				

Table 21 shows that most candidates purchased the largest amount of advertising on ORT. In the case of Yavlinsky and Zhirinovskiy, more than half of all their adverts were shown on this channel. Yavlinsky also purchased a substantial amount of advertising on RTR and only a very small amount on both NTV and TVC. Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov also concentrated their advertising campaign on ORT. Tuleev, Titov and Skuratov, in contrast, purchased the majority of their adverts on RTR. Skuratov also purchased a decent share of his coverage on TVC. Titov's and Tuleev's amount of advertising on NTV and TVC respectively, was relatively modest. More minor candidates, such as Govorukhin, Pamfilova and Podberezkin advertised only on ORT.

	ORT	RTR	NTV	TVC	N=
Yavlinsky	63.0	33.3	1.9	1.8	54 min
Tuleev	31.6	60.5	---	7.9	38 min
Titov	43.2	51.4	8.1	---	37 min
Skuratov	16.7	63.3	---	20.0	30 min
Zyuganov	46.2	30.8	---	23.0	13 min
Savostyanov	83.3	16.7	---	---	6 min
Zhirinovskiy	50.0	25.0	---	25.0	4 min
Dzhabrailov	25.0	---	---	75.0	4 min
Govorukhin	100.0	---	---	---	3 min
Podberezkin	100.0	---	---	0.0	2 min
Pamfilova	100.0	---	---	---	1 min
Putin	---	---	---	---	---

Note: Percentages were made from the total amount of advertising (in minutes) purchased by each candidate on all channels added together. Seconds were rounded up or down to the nearest minute. Podberezkin did purchase a very small amount of advertising on TVC, but the share of his advertising on TVC was too small to be statistically significant.

The two biggest advertisers were Yavlinsky, Tuleev and Titov. Yavlinsky purchased almost a third of all advertising on national television during the monitoring period whereas Tuleev's and Titov's share reached almost 20%. Perhaps more surprising, Skuratov was also an active advertiser. His adverts accounted for 15.6% of all advertising on national television. The other candidates purchased more modest amounts (less than 7% each). Putin did not advertise on national television during the last three weeks of the election campaign.



In terms of actual time, there was little advertising on national television during the election campaign. None of the candidates purchased more than one hour each of advertising, and a majority of the candidates less than 7 minutes each. Yavlinsky purchased 54 minutes, Tuleev 38 minutes, Titov 37 minutes, Skuratov 30 minutes and Zyuganov 13 minutes

Table 22: Candidates' Amount of Advertising on National Television, 3-24 March 2000.	
	Entire period
Putin	---
Yavlinsky	54 min
Tuleev	38 min
Titov	37 min
Skuratov	30 min
Zyuganov	13 min
Savostyanov	6 min
Zhirinovsky	4 min
Dzhabrailov	4 min
Govorukhin	3 min
Podberezkin	2 min
Pamfilova	1 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Table 23 shows each candidate's percentage of the advertising for the entire week as well as for each week monitored. Whereas there was little political advertising on national television between 3 and 10 March, the amount of adverts increased as the election day approached. Most of the advertising shown on national television during the last two weeks of the election campaign was Yavlinsky's. Yavlinsky's advertising campaign started rather modestly at the beginning of March and then picked up as the election day came closer. Titov followed a similar strategy. The second most active advertiser, Tuleev, took the largest share of the advertising during week 1 of the monitoring and came a fairly close second to Yavlinsky during week 3. During week 2, however, his share of the advertising was considerably smaller – possibly explained by Tuleev's decision to temporarily abandon his campaign and return to Kemerovo to deal with the aftermath of the mining accident at that time. Zyuganov and Savostyanov took a substantially larger share of the total advertising shown on Russian national television at the beginning of March than towards the end.

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	---	---	---	---
Yavlinsky	28.1	8.0	28.2	31.3
Tuleev	19.8	33.8	9.1	25.8
Titov	19.4	1.6	22.6	19.7
Skuratov	15.6	3.7	24.2	10.8
Zyuganov	6.6	20.5	5.7	5.1
Savostyanov	3.2	16.8	3.1	1.2
Zhirinovskiy	1.9	---	1.7	2.4
Dzhabrailov	1.9	3.8	2.4	1.2
Govorukhin	1.8	3.7	1.5	1.7
Podberezkin	1.1	4.3	0.8	0.9
Pamfilova	0.6	3.8	0.8	---
N=	3 hrs 12 min	17 min	1 hr 17 min	1 hr 40 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. The sums for each week added together therefore do not exactly match the total sum for the period 3-24 March.

We would expect the candidates to do most of their advertising in the last week of the election campaign. To check, we percentaged each candidate's weekly proportion of advertising from their total amount of advertising. As can be seen in table 24, six of the candidates concentrated their advertising on the last week of the election campaign: Zhirinovskiy (75.0%), Tuleev (68.4%), Yavlinsky (57.4%), Titov (54.1%) and Podberezkin (50.0%) all did half or more of their advertising during this week. More unexpectedly, Savostyanov and Pamfilova conducted half of their advertising campaign on national television during the first week of monitoring.

	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N=
Putin	---	---	---	---
Yavlinsky	1.9	40.7	57.4	54 min
Tuleev	13.2	18.4	68.4	38 min
Titov	0.0	45.9	54.1	37 min
Skuratov	3.3	63.3	33.4	30 min
Zyuganov	23.1	30.8	46.1	13 min

Savostyanov	50.0	33.3	16.7	6 min
Zhirinovskiy	---	25.0	75.0	4 min
Dzhabrailov	25.0	50.0	25.0	4 min
Govorukhin	33.3	33.3	33.3	3 min
Podberezkin	25.0	25.0	50.0	2 min
Pamfilova	50.0	50.0	---	1 min


Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Paid political adverts were by the monitoring team indexed as neutral in tone.

4.7.1 State Television

ORT

The largest share of the coverage of the various presidential candidates on ORT was given to Putin. Altogether he accounted for 30.7% of this coverage, compared to Yavlinsky's 12.4%, Zhirinovskiy's 11.4% and Zyuganov's 9.3%. Three other candidates were given more than 5% each of the coverage (Podberezkin, Govorukhin and Titov). All candidates received some coverage on ORT.



The monitoring revealed that Putin increased his share of the coverage of ORT in the course of the three weeks the monitoring lasted. Yavlinsky, on the other hand, increased his share – narrowing the gap between the two to just over 8% during the last week of the presidential campaign. Zhirinovskiy's share of the coverage reached a peak between 11 and 18 March. This was the week Zhirinovskiy, Govorukhin and Dzhabrailov together questioned Yavlinsky's amount of advertising, arguing that he must have exceeded his campaign budget to pay for his adverts. The three candidates were allowed to present their view to the public on all television channels, including ORT.


Table 25: Candidates' Share (in %) of Coverage on ORT. 3-24 March 2000/

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	30.7	36.7	33.9	24.1
Yavlinsky	12.4	8.3	10.6	16.6
Zhirinovskiy	11.4	7.1	18.3	8.9
Zyuganov	9.3	10.6	8.1	9.5
Podberezkin	5.6	9.1	4.8	3.8
Govorukhin	5.5	1.7	4.5	8.9
Titov	5.3	3.4	4.9	6.8
Pamfilova	4.6	5.1	4.9	4.0
Savostyanov	4.1	6.5	2.7	3.5
Dzhabrailov	4.0	4.0	1.5	6.0
Tuleev	3.6	3.6	2.6	4.3
Skuratov	3.5	4.0	3.2	3.5
N=				

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

RTR

Putin's share of the overall-coverage of the presidential candidates on RTR was slightly smaller than on ORT. Zyuganov received more coverage on RTR than on ORT, putting him in second place with 15.4% of the total coverage. Trailing a little behind were Zhirinovskiy (9.2%) and Yavlinsky (7.9%). Tuleev doubled his share of the coverage on RTR compared to ORT, ending up with 6% of the coverage. Four other candidates (Govorukhin, Skuratov, Titov and Podberezkin) received over 5% each of the coverage on RTR.



There were no major differences in coverage for most of the candidates from week to week – though Putin's share dropped rather a lot during the last week of the election campaign. In contrast, Zyuganov's share of the coverage increased by more than 10%. No references to Zhirinovskiy were recorded between 11 and 18 March.

Table 26: Candidates' Share (in %) of Coverage on RTR. 3-24 March 2000


	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	26.4	30.2	30.6	21.2
Zyuganov	15.4	11.8	10.4	21.0
Zhirinovskiy	9.2	11.1	---	10.6
Yavlinsky	7.9	6.9	6.5	9.5
Tuleev	6.0	4.9	6.6	6.2
Govorukhin	5.5	3.4	6.4	5.9
Skuratov	5.3	5.3	5.1	5.5
Titov	5.1	6.2	4.8	4.7
Podberezkin	5.0	8.7	6.0	2.3
Dzhabrailov	4.9	2.7	4.6	6.3
Pamfilova	4.7	3.2	7.3	3.5
Savostyanov	4.6	5.7	5.6	3.2
N=				

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Tone of Coverage

ORT

There was not a lot of negative coverage on ORT during the three weeks prior to the elections. However, to the extent there was, Yavlinsky in particular, but also Zyuganov and Savostyanov, were at the receiving end. Five other candidates (Skuratov, Putin, Tuleev, Govorukhin and Titov) received six or less minutes each of negative coverage. Only three of the candidates (Putin, Savostyanov and Tuleev) received a small amount of positive coverage. Most of this coverage was given to Savostyanov (10 minutes). Putin and Tuleev received 7 and 6 minutes respectively. All other coverage was neutral.



Percentaging each candidate's share of negative, neutral and positive coverage produced the following result: The four candidates with the highest share of negative

coverage out of their overall coverage were Savostyanov, Skuratov, Yavlinsky and Zyuganov. Savostyanov, however, also received a fair amount of positive coverage (close to 10%) as did Tuleev (6.5%). Less than 1.5% of Putin's coverage was either negative or positive.

Table 27: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage. ORT. 3-24 March 2000.

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N=
Putin	0.5	98.6	0.9	13 hrs 19 min
Yavlinsky	6.8	93.2	0.0	5 hrs 22 min
Zyuganov	4.3	95.7	0.0	3 hrs 53 min
Zhirinovskiy	---	100.0	0.0	4 hrs 55 min
Titov	1.5	98.5	0.0	2 hrs 17 min
Tuleev	3.2	90.3	6.5	1 hr 33 min
Pamfilova	---	100.0	---	1 hr 59 min
Podberezkin	---	100.0	---	2 hrs 25 min
Dzhabrailov	---	100.0	---	1 hr 44 min
Govorukhin	2.1	97.9	---	2 hrs 23 min
Savostyanov	7.5	83.1	9.4	1 hr 46 min
Skuratov	6.5	93.5	0.0	1 hr 32 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Yavlinsky clearly took the largest share of all negative coverage on ORT: With over a third of all negative coverage, he was well ahead of Zyuganov at 17.2%. Putin, on the other hand, was given almost a third of all positive coverage on ORT. Tuleev also got a fair amount of positive coverage. Most of the positive coverage, however, was given to Savostyanov (almost 50%).

Table 28: Candidates' Share (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage. ORT. 3-24 March 2000.


	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Putin	6.9	31.3	30.4
Yavlinsky	37.9	11.9	0.0
Zyuganov	17.2	9.3	0.0
Zhirinovskiy	0.0	11.7	0.0
Titov	3.4	5.4	0.0
Tuleev	5.2	3.3	26.1
Pamfilova	---	4.7	---
Podberezkin	---	5.8	---
Dzhabrailov	---	4.1	---
Govorukhin	5.2	5.6	---
Savostyanov	13.8	3.5	43.5
Skuratov	10.3	3.4	0.0
N=	58 min	41 hrs 57 min	23 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

RTR

Neutral coverage of the various presidential candidates on RTR made up 96.5% of the total coverage on this channel. There was slightly more negative coverage (2%) than positive coverage (1.5%). Negative coverage was reserved for the four top candidates (Putin, Yavlinsky, Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy). Savostyanov also received some negative coverage. In terms of actual time, none of the candidates received more than 14 minutes of negative coverage respectively. Seven candidates

received some positive coverage on RTR. Most of this was given to Tuleev (18 minutes) and Savostyanov (11 minutes). Titov was given 5 minutes of positive coverage, whereas Putin, Yavlinsky, Pamfilova and Dzhabrailov were each given 2 minutes.



Percentaging the negative, neutral and positive coverage of each candidate showed that no candidate received more than 6% of their coverage in the form of negative references. Yavlinsky got most of the negative coverage at 5.9%, followed by Zhirinovskiy (5.5%). The share of positive coverage was biggest for Tuleev (10.6%) and Savostyanov (8.5%).

Table 29: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage. RTR. 3-24 March 2000.

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N=
Putin	1.6	98.1	0.3	12 hrs 20 min
Yavlinsky	5.9	93.2	0.9	3 hrs 41 min
Zyuganov	2.8	97.2	---	7 hrs 11 min
Zhirinovskiy	5.5	94.5	---	4 hrs 16 min
Titov	---	98.6	1.4	2 hrs 18 min
Tuleev	2.9	86.5	10.6	2 hrs 50 min
Pamfilova	---	98.5	1.5	2 hrs 13 min
Podberezkin	---	100.0	---	2 hrs 19 min
Dzhabrailov	---	98.6	1.4	2 hrs 18 min
Govorukhin	---	100.0	---	2 hrs 35 min
Savostyanov	---	91.5	8.5	2 hrs 9 min
Skuratov	0.0	100.0	---	2 hrs 30 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.


Percentaging each candidate's share of all negative, neutral and positive coverage respectively, shows that Tuleev got almost half of all positive coverage on RTR and Savostyanov close to a third. Those candidates given negative coverage on RTR

received roughly a quarter each, the exception being Tuleev at 8.9%. Most of the neutral coverage was taken up by Putin and Zyuganov.

News Coverage

ORT

Putin dominated the news scene at ORT, with almost 50% of the total news coverage. Yavlinsky (and Zhirinovskiy), in contrast, got less than 10% of the coverage each. Zyuganov got 8.7%, whereas all other candidates were given under 5% each.



News coverage of most candidates remained fairly stable from week to week. Only Putin's coverage fluctuated significantly, increasing by more than 10% from week 1 to week 2, but then dropping by over 30% during week 3.

Table 30: Candidates' Share (in %) of News Coverage. ORT. 3-24 March 2000.


	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	44.8	49.2	62.8	32.6
Yavlinsky	9.4	6.6	5.9	13.3
Zhirinovskiy	9.4	9.8	8.1	9.7
Zyuganov	8.7	8.2	10.3	8.2
Titov	4.8	3.5	1.4	7.4
Dzhabrailov	4.0	4.4	1.8	4.8
Govorukhin	3.8	2.1	0.7	6.7
Skuratov	3.8	3.2	4.8	3.7
Pamfilova	3.6	3.0	1.3	5.2
Savostyanov	3.1	2.3	1.3	4.7
Tuleev	2.5	4.3	0.7	2.1
Podberezkin	2.1	3.4	1.1	1.7

N=				
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Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

RTR

The news on RTR were also dominated by Putin. References to the incumbent took up 43.9% of the total news coverage on this channel. Zyuganov came second, at 12.5%, followed by Yavlinsky (9.7%) and Zhirinovskiy (9%). None of the other candidates got more than 5% each of the total news coverage on RTR.



As on ORT, Putin’s share of the news coverage dropped considerably during the last week of the election campaign – dropping by over 20%. Zhirinovskiy took a larger chunk of the news coverage on RTR during early March – reflecting controversies surrounding his entrance into the presidential race.


	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	43.9	50.7	58.3	32.5
Zyuganov	12.5	8.1	13.3	13.9
Yavlinsky	9.7	8.2	5.6	12.9
Zhirinovskiy	9.0	11.6	6.1	9.6
Tuleev	4.6	2.9	4.2	5.6
Titov	4.3	3.8	3.6	4.9
Skuratov	3.5	1.0	4.0	4.2
Savostyanov	3.1	1.9	0.9	4.9
Pamfilova	3.1	3.1	0.9	4.3
Podberezkin	2.4	4.0	1.6	2.3
Govorukhin	2.4	2.6	1.5	2.8
Dzhabrailov	1.5	2.1	0.0	2.1
N=				

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Tone of News Coverage

ORT

Most of the negative news coverage on ORT was given to Yavlinsky, who received 18 minutes of negative coverage. All positive coverage – with the exception of Yavlinsky's 2 seconds – went to Putin (7 minutes).



The candidate with the largest share of negative mentions was Yavlinsky (11.8%). Skuratov's negative share was almost 10%. Savostyanov (8%) and Tuleev (7.3%) also got some negative coverage, whereas Zyuganov, Govorukhin and Titov each received less than 5% of their coverage as negative references. Putin got an almost equal share of negative and positive mentions.

Yavlinsky's share of all negative news coverage on ORT reached almost 40%. In contrast, Putin accounted for only 8.7% of the negative but all positive news coverage on ORT.


Table 32: Candidates' Share (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive News Coverage. ORT. 3-24 March 2000.

	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Putin	8.7	45.6	100.0
Yavlinsky	39.1	8.6	0.0
Zyuganov	13.0	8.6	---
Zhirinovskiy	0.0	9.7	---
Titov	4.3	4.9	---
Tuleev	6.5	2.4	---
Pamfilova	---	3.7	---
Podberezkin	---	2.2	---
Dzhabrailov	---	4.1	---

Govorukhin	6.5	3.8	---
Savostyanov	8.7	2.9	---
Skuratov	13.0	3.5	---
N=	46 min	26 hrs 2 min	7 min
Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.			

RTR

An overwhelming 98.3% of all news coverage on RTR was neutral. Negative mentions made up 1.2% and positive mentions made up 0.4% of the total coverage. In terms of real time, there were 17 minutes of negative coverage and 6 minutes of positive coverage on RTR. Both negative and positive coverage was fairly evenly spread between the various candidates. Five candidates (Putin, Yavlinsky, Zyuganov, Zhirinovskiy and Tuleev) were referred to in negative terms, three (Putin, Yavlinsky, Pamfilova) in positive terms.



Tuleev had the largest share of negative coverage (7.8%). Also Zhirinovskiy (4.1%) had a larger negative share of coverage than the other candidates. The share of positive coverage given to any candidate on RTR was less than 5% of their total coverage in the news.

Zhirinovskiy and Tuleev got almost a third each of all negative coverage on RTR. Putin, Yavlinsky and Pamfilova shared the positive coverage.


	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Putin	11.8	44.4	33.3

Yavlinsky	17.6	9.5	33.3
Zyuganov	11.8	12.6	---
Zhirinovskiy	29.4	8.8	---
Titov	0.0	4.3	---
Tuleev	29.4	4.4	---
Pamfilova	---	3.0	33.3
Podberezkin	---	2.5	---
Dzhabrailov	---	1.5	---
Govorukhin	---	2.4	---
Savostyanov	---	3.1	---
Skuratov	---	3.6	---
N=	17 min	22 hrs 26 min	6 min
Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.			

4.7.2 Private television

NTV

Although NTV was frequently accused of supporting Yavlinsky during the presidential campaign, in terms of coverage Putin came first: he received 29.6% of the coverage during the three weeks the monitoring lasted – compared with Yavlinsky’s 14.9%. Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov received almost the same amount of coverage at 9.8% and 9.6% respectively. Savostyanov (9.1%), Tuleev (7.8%), Govorukhin (6.3%) and Titov (5.0%) then followed. Other candidates received less than 4% each.



Altogether, NTV broadcast some 41 hours and 28 minutes of coverage about the various presidential candidates. Of this, Putin’s campaign accounted for 12 hours and 16 minutes, compared to Yavlinsky’s 6 hours and 12 minutes.

Table 34: Candidates' Coverage on NTV, 3-24 March 2000.	
	Entire period
Putin	12 hrs 16 min
Yavlinsky	6 hrs 12 min
Zhirinovskiy	4 hrs 3 min
Zyuganov	4 hrs
Savostyanov	3 hrs 47 min
Tuleev	3 hrs 15 min
Govorukhin	2 hrs 36 min
Titov	2 hrs 4 min
Pamfilova	1 hr 19 min
Dzhabrailov	53 min
Skuratov	33 min
Podberezkin	31 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

We compared coverage of the presidential candidates on NTV for each week the monitoring lasted. It is interesting to note that coverage of Putin's election campaign dropped rather sharply during the three weeks: during week 1 his coverage accounted for 43.2% of the total coverage on NTV, dropping to 33.5% during week 2 and ending up at 22.7% during week 3. In contrast, there was not much change in Yavlinsky's coverage. Coverage of Savostyanov, on the other hand, sharply increased during week 3 – probably reflecting the fact that Savostyanov withdrew his candidacy under rather dramatic circumstances this week and received coverage accordingly. Tuleev's share of the total coverage rose sharply during week 2. This was the week that the accident at one of the coal mines in Kemerovo – Tuleev's oblast – took place, and Tuleev suspended his campaigning and returned to Siberia to deal with the accident. Coverage of Zhirinovskiy's and Zyuganov's campaigns during week 3 was half that of during week 1.

Table 35: Candidates' Share (in %) of Coverage on NTV. 3-24 March 2000.				
	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	29.6	43.2	33.5	22.7
Yavlinsky	14.9	13.8	11.6	17.0
Zhirinovskiy	9.8	14.8	12.9	6.4
Zyuganov	9.6	15.8	8.7	7.9
Savostyanov	9.1	2.3	2.4	14.9
Tuleev	7.8	3.4	15.3	5.7
Govorukhin	6.3	0.4	4.8	9.1
Titov	5.0	3.2	1.5	7.4
Pamfilova	3.2	0.6	5.0	3.2
Dzhabrailov	2.2	1.5	2.0	2.5
Skuratov	1.3	0.9	1.7	1.2
Podberezkin	1.2	0.0	0.6	2.0
N=	41 hrs 28 min	7 hrs 58 min	11 hrs 12 min	20 hrs 39 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. The total sums for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

Comparing the weekly distribution of coverage for each candidate, we found that a majority of the candidates had the largest share of their coverage during the last week of the election campaign. More than 50% of Tuleev's coverage on NTV, however, was made between 11 and 18 March.

Table 36: Candidates' Weekly Distribution (in %) of their Coverage on NTV. 3-24 March 2000.


	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N=
Putin	28.1	30.6	41.3	12 hrs 16 min
Yavlinsky	17.7	21.0	61.3	6 hrs 12 min
Zhirinovskiy	29.2	35.8	35.0	4 hrs 3 min
Zyuganov	31.7	24.2	44.1	4 hrs
Savostyanov	4.8	7.0	88.2	3 hrs 47 min
Tuleev	8.2	52.8	39.0	3 hrs 15 min
Govorukhin	12.8	20.5	66.7	2 hrs 36 min
Titov	12.1	8.1	79.8	2 hrs 4 min
Pamfilova	3.8	43.0	53.2	1 hr 19 min
Dzhabrailov	13.2	24.5	62.3	53 min
Skuratov	12.1	36.4	51.5	33 min
Podberezkin	0.0	12.9	87.1	31 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. 0.0 indicates that a candidate received less than 30 seconds of coverage.

TV6

TV6's coverage of Putin was slightly higher than that of NTV, at 34.1%. Zhirinovskiy – not Yavlinsky – followed at 14.1%, Yavlinsky received 11.1% of the coverage and Zyuganov 9.5%. Titov did fairly well in terms of coverage at TV6, with 8.1%.

Dzhabrailov, who received very modest coverage on the other private television channels included in the monitoring, followed suit, at 7.7%. All other candidates' share of the coverage was 3.5% or less each.



Coverage of the presidential candidates on TV6 was considerably less extensive than on NTV, which broadcast some 27 hours more. Altogether TV6 broadcast some 14 hours and 13 minutes' election coverage of the twelve presidential candidates. Putin got almost 5 of these, whereas Zhirinovskiy got almost two. Yavlinsky received

one and a half hours' of coverage on TV6.

	Entire period
Putin	4 hrs 51 min
Zhirinovskiy	2 hours
Yavlinskii	1 hr 34 min
Zyuganov	1 hr 21 min
Titov	1 hr 9 min
Dzhabrailov	1 hr 6 min
Tuleev	30 min
Savostyanov	27 min
Govorukhin	24 min
Pamfilova	18 min
Podberezkin	18 min
Skuratov	15 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Whereas coverage of Putin dropped sharply week by week on NTV, it increased – though not by more than roughly 7% - on TV6. In contrast, coverage of Yavlinskii was very stable. Zhirinovskii received most of his coverage during week 1 – perhaps not so surprising, given that this was the week the Supreme Court's Cassation Chamber allowed him into the race for the presidency. Coverage of Tuleev dropped significantly during week 2.

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	34.1	29.8	35.6	36.6
Zhirinovskiy	14.1	16.8	12.9	12.8
Yavlinskii	11.1	11.5	10.1	11.6
Zyuganov	9.5	6.7	13.2	8.4
Titov	8.1	5.8	12.6	5.7
Dzhabrailov	7.7	9.1	4.1	9.9
Tuleev	3.5	4.5	0.9	5.2
Savostyanov	3.1	3.8	1.2	4.4
Govorukhin	2.9	4.8	1.5	2.5
Pamfilova	2.1	3.4	1.3	1.8
Podberezkin	2.1	3.6	2.5	0.3
Skuratov	1.8	0.2	4.1	0.8
N=	14 hrs 13 min	4 hrs 24 min	4 hrs 54 min	4 hrs 57 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. The total sums for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

The candidates' coverage on TV6 was more evenly distributed from week to week than on NTV. Only two candidates – Tuleev and Savostyanov – received half their coverage on TV6 during the last week of campaigning. Yavlinskii's coverage increased slightly from week 2 to week 3, whereas Putin's remained almost unchanged. However, the incumbent received 10% less of his coverage during the first week of monitoring than during the second. Most of Zyuganov's coverage on TV6 was broadcast between 11 and 18 March.


Table 39: Candidates' Weekly Distribution (in %) of Coverage on TV6. 3-24 March 2000.

	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N=
Putin	26.7	36.0	37.3	4 hrs 52 min
Zhirinovskiy	36.7	31.7	31.6	2 hrs
Yavlinsky	31.6	31.6	36.8	1 hr 35 min
Zyuganov	22.0	47.6	30.4	1 hr 22 min
Titov	21.7	53.6	24.7	1 hr 9 min
Dzhabrailov	36.4	18.2	45.4	1 hr 6 min
Tuleev	40.0	10.0	50.0	30 min
Savostyanov	38.5	11.5	50.0	26 min
Govorukhin	54.2	16.7	29.1	24 min
Pamfilova	50.0	22.2	27.8	18 min
Podberezkin	55.6	38.9	5.5	18 min
Skuratov	6.7	80.0	13.3	15 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. 0.0 indicates that a candidate received less than 30 seconds of coverage.

TVC

TVC also focused its coverage on the incumbent – though such coverage accounted for less than a third of the total coverage during the monitoring period. Zhirinovskiy came second with 11.6% of the coverage, followed by Yavlinsky (10.4%), Govorukhin (8.7%), Zyuganov (8.5%), Savostyanov (6.6%) and Tuleev (6.3%). Other candidates received less than 6% coverage each.



TVC broadcast just over 33 hours of coverage of the various presidential candidates – making the station second to NTV, but putting it well ahead of TV6 in terms of coverage. Putin was given more than 6 hours more coverage on TVC than Yavlinsky.

Table 40: Candidates' Coverage on TV6, 3-24 March 2000.	
	Entire period
Putin	9 hrs 44 min
Zhirinovskiy	3 hrs 50 min
Yavlinskiy	3 hrs 26 min
Govorukhin	2 hrs 53 min
Zyuganov	2 hrs 49 min
Savostyanov	2 hrs 11 min
Tuleev	2 hrs 5 min
Podberezkin	1 hr 47 min
Dzhabrailov	1 hr 17 min
Titov	1 hr 11 min
Skuratov	1 hr 6 min
Pamfilova	45 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Putin's coverage dropped somewhat during weeks 2 and 3, compared with week 1. Coverage of the other candidates was fairly stable, though Zhirinovskiy's share of the coverage shrank considerably during week 2, compared with weeks 1 and 3. In contrast, Govorukhin's coverage roughly doubled during week 2, compared with weeks 1 and 3. Coverage of Dzhabrailov was also uneven, increasing almost by four times in week 3, compared with the previous week.

Table 41: Candidates' Share (in %) of the Coverage on TVC. 3-24 March 2000.				
	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	29.4	34.1	28.9	26.2
Zhirinovskiy	11.6	15.4	6.7	13.8
Yavlinskiy	10.4	8.1	11.7	10.8
Govorukhin	8.7	6.7	12.9	5.8
Zyuganov	8.5	9.9	8.0	7.9
Savostyanov	6.6	7.8	6.9	5.4
Tuleev	6.3	5.9	5.9	7.1
Podberezkin	5.4	3.4	7.4	4.8
Dzhabrailov	3.9	1.0	2.1	8.0
Titov	3.6	3.3	2.4	5.1
Skuratov	3.3	2.4	4.1	3.2
Pamfilova	2.3	1.9	2.9	2.0
N=	33 hrs 4 min	9 hrs 14 min	12 hrs 9 min	11 hrs 38 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. The total sums for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

Two candidates – Dzhabrailov and Titov – had half or more of their coverage on TVC during the last week of campaigning. Putin and Zyuganov received roughly a third of their coverage during each of the three weeks of monitoring, whereas Yavlinskiy received somewhat less of his coverage during week 1 and most of it during week 2. Zhirinovskiy almost doubled his coverage from week 2 to week 3.

Table 42: Candidates' Weekly Distribution (in %) of Coverage on TVC. 3-24 March 2000.				
	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N=
Putin	32.4	36.2	31.4	9 hrs 43 min
Zhirinovskiy	37.0	21.3	41.7	3 hrs 50 min

Yavlinsky	21.8	41.4	36.9	3 hrs 26 min
Govorukhin	21.4	54.9	23.7	2 hrs 53 min
Zyuganov	32.5	34.9	32.6	2 hrs 49 min
Savostyanov	32.8	38.2	29.0	2 hrs 11 min
Tuleev	26.4	34.4	39.2	2 hrs 5 min
Podberezkin	17.9	50.9	31.2	1 hr 46 min
Dzhabrailov	7.8	19.5	72.7	1 hr 17 min
Titov	26.8	23.9	49.3	1 hr 11 min
Skuratov	20.0	46.2	33.8	1 hr 5 min
Pamfilova	22.2	46.7	31.1	45 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. 0.0 indicates that a candidate received less than 30 seconds of coverage.

Tone of coverage

NTV


NTV's coverage of the various presidential candidates was overwhelmingly neutral in tone. However, some criticism was also raised against the candidates on this channel. Altogether NTV broadcast 49 minutes of criticism directed against eight of the candidates. Putin received the largest share of criticism (26.5%) and some 20% more negative comments than Yavlinsky.

	Week 1
Putin	26.5
Dzhabrailov	16.3
Savostyanov	14.3
Yavlinsky	10.2
Zyuganov	8.2
Zhirinovskiy	8.2
Titov	8.2
Podberezkin	8.2
N=	49 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

However, Putin was also the candidate to receive most of the positive coverage on NTV: The monitoring revealed that he got two minutes of positive coverage between 19 and 24 March. The only other candidate to receive some positive coverage was Titov, and altogether he got 30 seconds.

Each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.



Most candidates received less than 4% of their coverage in the form of criticism – though the negative share of both Podberezkin and Dzhabrailov coverage exceeded 10%. Tuleev, Pamfilova, Govorukhin and Skuratov were referred to in negative terms only.

Table 44: Candidates' Distribution of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage. NTV. 3-24 March 2000.

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N=
Putin	1.8	98.0	0.2	12 hrs 15 min
Yavlinsky	1.3	98.7	---	6 hrs 11 min
Zyuganov	1.7	98.3	---	4 hrs
Zhirinovskiy	1.6	98.4	---	4 hrs 3 min
Titov	3.2	96.0	0.8	2 hrs 4 min
Podberezkin	12.9	87.1	---	31 min
Dzhabrailov	15.1	84.9	---	53 min
Savostyanov	3.1	96.9	---	3 hrs 46 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. Candidates who were given only neutral coverage are not included in the table.

An analysis of tone of coverage by week, shows that most negative references to the various presidential candidates on NTV were made during the first and third week of monitoring. Only one candidate – Putin – received negative coverage during week 2. Putin was also referred to in negative terms during week 1. All criticism of Savostyanov and Titov – Yavlinsky's main challengers – were made during the first week of monitoring. In contrast, Yavlinsky, Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy were criticised only in week 3.

Titov received half of his positive coverage (15 seconds) between 3 and 10 March and the other half during the last week of monitoring. Putin got all his positive coverage (except for one second) between 19 and 24 March.


TV6

Only one of the presidential candidates received some positive coverage on TV6. Putin's two seconds of praise does not show in the chart below. Six candidates – Zyuganov, Podberezkin, Titov, Govorukhin, Tuleev and Skuratov – received a very modest and identical (with the exception of Skuratov) amount of negative coverage.

	%
Zyuganov	18.2
Podberezkin	18.2
Titov	18.2
Govorukhin	18.2
Tuleev	18.2
Skuratov	9.1
N=	11 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.



By looking at each candidate's mixture of negative, neutral and positive coverage we see that Podberezkin, Govorukhin, Skuratov and Tuleev received the largest shares of negative coverage. Only one candidate - Putin - received some positive coverage (2 seconds in all). Yavlinsky, Zhirinovskiy, Pamfilova, Dzhabrailov and Savostyanov were referred to in neutral terms only.

Table 46: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage. TV6. 3-24 March 2000.

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N=
Putin	---	100.0	0	4 hrs 51 min
Zyuganov	2.5	97.5	---	1 hr 21 min
Titov	2.9	97.1	---	1 hr 9 min
Tuleev	6.7	93.3	---	30 min
Podberezkin	11.1	88.9	---	18 min
Govorukhin	8.3	91.7	---	24 min
Skuratov	6.7	93.3	---	15 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. Candidates who were given only neutral coverage are not included in the table.

Only one candidate (Putin) received a (very small) amount of positive coverage on TV6. Most of the very limited number of negative references to the various candidates were made during the first week of monitoring (3-10 March). Only one candidate – Skuratov – was given negative coverage during week 3. All negative coverage of Zyuganov was broadcast between 11 and 18 March.

TVC


Unlike NTV and TV6, TVC was more generous with its praise of the various candidates: Five candidates (Putin, Yavlinsky, Dzhabrailov, Savostyanov and Tuleev) were fortunate enough to share 12 minutes of positive coverage and only one candidate – Zhirinovskiy - was referred to in negative terms. Tuleev and Savostyanov got the largest share of the positive coverage on TVC. Putin and Yavlinsky received an equal number of positive references.

Table 47: Candidates' Share of Positive Coverage on TVC, 3-24 March 2000.

	%
Tuleev	33.3
Savostyanov	33.3
Dzhabrailov	16.7
Putin	8.3
Yavlinsky	8.3
N=	12 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.



As shown in table 48 the amount of both positive and negative coverage on TVC was very small – accounting for no more than roughly 3% of any of the candidates’ total coverage. Six candidates – Zyuganov, Titov, Pamfilova, Podberezkin, Govorukhin and Skuratov – received only neutral coverage on TVC.

Table 48: Candidates’ Distribution of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage. TVC. 3-24 March 2000.

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N=
Putin	---	99.8	0.2	9 hrs 44 min
Yavlinsky	---	99.0	1.0	3 hrs 26 min
Zhirinovskiy	1.7	98.3	---	3 hrs 51 min
Tuleev	---	96.8	3.2	2 hrs 5 min
Dzhabrailov	---	98.7	1.3	1 hr 16 min
Savostyanov	---	96.9	3.1	2 hrs 11 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.


The only candidate criticised by TVC – Zhirinovskiy – received four minutes of negative coverage during the second week of the monitoring (11-18 March). The largest amount of positive coverage (4 minutes) was given to Tuleev (during week 3) and to Savostyanov (during weeks 1 and 2). Dzhabrailov received one minute of positive coverage during both weeks 1 and 2; Putin one minute of praise during week 2, and Yavlinsky – one during week 3.

News Coverage

NTV

Putin’s share of the coverage on NTV rose sharply when only looking at the news. References to the incumbent increased by just over 10%, to 41.2%. Yavlinsky’s and Zyuganov’s share of the coverage dropped by some 2%, whereas Zhirinovskiy’s increased by roughly 3%. Govorukhin, Savostyanov and Tuleev received some 4%

less coverage in the news than overall.



Altogether NTV broadcast 25 hours and 17 minutes of news coverage of the various candidates between 3 and 24 March. All candidates were mentioned in the news on NTV. Putin received more than 7 hours more news coverage on NTV than Zhirinovsky, Yavlinsky and Zyuganov.

Table 49: Candidates' share of news coverage on NTV, 3-24 March 2000.

	News Coverage
Putin	10 hrs 26 min
Zhirinovsky	3 hrs 7 min
Yavlinsky	3 hrs 2 min
Zyuganov	2 hrs 47 min
Savostyanov	1 hr 23 min
Titov	1 hr 19 min
Tuleev	59 min
Pamfilova	39 min
Govorukhin	34 min
Dzhabrailov	22 min
Skuratov	22 min
Podberezkin	17 min
N=	25 hrs 17 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

A comparison of news coverage of the presidential candidates during the three weeks of monitoring shows that Putin's share of the coverage dropped by almost 20% during the last week of campaigning, compared with the two weeks preceding it. In contrast, coverage of the three liberal candidates – Yavlinsky, Titov and Savostyanov – increased sharply during the last week of campaigning. This is perhaps not so surprising, given that Savostyanov pulled out of the campaign in the very last minute, and there was some pressure on Titov to do the same. Savostyanov withdrew his candidacy while appearing on the NTV-programme Glas Naroda (chaired by Evgenii Kiselev). This event, and Titov's criticism of the

programme the following day, were covered in the news by most television channels.

Table 50: Candidates' Share (in %) of the News Coverage on NTV. 3-24 March 2000.


	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	41.2	50.0	50.9	32.4
Zhirinovskiy	12.3	20.5	12.4	8.7
Yavlinsky	12.0	8.7	7.4	16.1
Zyuganov	11.0	10.5	13.1	10.1
Savostyanov	5.5	1.2	---	10.2
Titov	5.2	1.9	2.3	8.2
Tuleev	3.9	4.7	0.5	5.3
Pamfilova	2.6	0.9	4.0	2.6
Govorukhin	2.2	0.6	4.3	1.9
Skuratov	1.5	1.2	2.7	0.9
Dzhabrailov	1.5	0.4	1.4	2.0
Podberezkin	1.1	---	0.9	1.7
N=	25 hrs 17 min	5 hrs 41 min	6 hrs 42 min	12 hrs 56 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. The total sums for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

The majority of the candidates were given half or more of their news coverage on NTV during the last week of the election campaign. Both Putin and Yavlinsky got their highest share of the news coverage this week, though Yavlinsky a considerably larger share than Putin.

TV6

There was very little difference between the overall coverage and the news coverage of the presidential candidates on TV6: Putin increased his share of the coverage by some 3% and Zyuganov's share increased by 1%. In contrast, Yavlinsky's coverage dropped by 1.5% and Zhirinovskiy's - by 1%. Changes in coverage for all the other candidates were less than 2% either way.



TV6 broadcast two times less coverage of the presidential candidates in its news programmes than did NTV. Altogether 12.5 hours of news were broadcast, and of

these four and a half hours focused on Putin. Zhirinovskiy, Zyuganov and Yavlinskii each received less than two hours of news coverage.

	News Coverage
Putin	4 hrs 35 min
Zhirinovskiy	1 hr 38 min
Zyuganov	1 hr 20 min
Yavlinskii	1 hr 11 min
Dzhabrailov	1 hr 2 min
Titov	53 min
Tuleev	25 min
Savostyanov	25 min
Govorukhin	19 min
Pamfilova	14 min
Podberezkin	14 min
Skuratov	13 min
N=	12 hrs 29 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

News coverage during the three weeks the monitoring lasted was fairly stable – though Zhirinovskiy received considerably more coverage during the first week than during the second and third. This was no doubt linked to the fact that he was allowed to enter the presidential race following the Supreme Court's annulment of the CEC's refusal to register him as a presidential candidate. Zyuganov received a larger share of the news coverage on TV6 during the second week of monitoring, as did Titov.

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	36.7	36.0	37.6	36.5
Zhirinovskiy	13.1	16.7	10.7	12.5
Zyuganov	10.7	8.3	15.5	8.3
Yavlinskii	9.5	8.6	7.9	11.6
Dzhabrailov	8.2	9.5	4.8	10.3
Titov	7.0	4.1	10.8	5.9
Tuleev	3.4	3.5	1.0	5.4
Savostyanov	3.3	4.0	1.4	4.5
Govorukhin	2.6	4.0	1.7	2.2
Pamfilova	1.9	2.4	1.5	1.9
Podberezkin	1.8	2.6	2.9	0.3
Skuratov	1.7	0.3	4.2	0.6
N=	12 hrs 29 min	3 hrs 32 min	4 hrs 11 min	4 hrs 45 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. The total sums for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

Almost half of Yavlinskii's coverage on TV6 was broadcast during the last week of the election campaign. Tuleev, Savostyanov got more than half of their coverage on this channel during the same week. Putin's and Zhirinovskii's coverage was fairly evenly spread over the three weeks the monitoring lasted, whereas Zyuganov and Titov received almost half of his coverage between 11 and 18 March.


	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N=

Putin	27.7	34.3	38.0	274 min
Zhirinovsky	35.7	27.6	36.7	98 min
Yavlinsky	25.4	28.2	46.5	71 min
Zyuganov	22.2	48.1	29.6	81 min
Savostyanov	33.3	12.5	54.2	24 min
Titov	17.0	50.9	32.1	53 min
Tuleev	28.0	12.0	60.0	25 min
Pamfilova	35.7	28.6	35.7	14 min
Govorukhin	47.4	21.1	31.6	19 min
Dzhabrailov	32.8	19.7	47.5	61 min
Skuratov	7.1	78.6	14.3	14 min
Podberezkin	42.9	50.0	7.1	14 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. 0.0 indicates that a candidate received less than 30 seconds of coverage.

TVC

TVC gave considerably more coverage to Putin in the news than in the overall coverage of the presidential candidates: His share of the coverage in the news was some 20% higher than the overall coverage – no doubt a reflection of Putin’s very hectic schedule and high-profile as acting president during the election campaign. For the other candidates, though, there was little difference between news coverage and overall coverage: Yavlinsky increased his coverage by some 2% in the news, whereas Yavlinsky – somewhat surprisingly – dropped 1.5% of his. The candidates who lost most in terms of coverage were Govorukhin and Podberezkin – they lost some 5% and 4% of their share of the coverage respectively. Changes either way for the other candidates were no more than 3%.



TVC broadcast some four hours more news coverage on the presidential candidates than TV6, of which Putin’s coverage accounted for almost half (close to eight hours). Yavlinsky got two hours coverage, whereas Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov were given roughly one and a half hours each.

	News Coverage
Putin	7 hrs 52 min
Yavlinsky	2 hrs
Zhirinovskiy	1 hr 40 min
Zyuganov	1 hr 26 min
Tuleev	42 min
Dzhabrailov	39 min
Govorukhin	38 min
Savostyanov	35 min
Titov	23 min
Skuratov	11 min
Podberezkin	10 min
Pamfilova	8 min
N=	16 hrs 24 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

As on TV6, Putin lost a considerable part of his share of the news coverage during the last week of campaigning also on TVC (some 15%). Yavlinsky's coverage gradually increased from week 1, through to week 3, though not significantly. Most of Zhirinovskiy's coverage was made during the first week of monitoring when he entered the presidential race following the ruling of the Supreme Court's Cassation Chamber. Coverage of Savostyanov reached a peak during the last week of monitoring, when he withdrew from the presidential elections. Dzhabrailov also received his largest share of the news coverage during week 3.

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	48.0	53.1	54.8	39.7
Yavlinsky	12.2	9.9	11.2	14.8
Zhirinovskiy	10.2	16.2	7.3	7.2
Zyuganov	8.8	9.7	7.4	9.0
Tuleev	4.3	5.6	5.6	2.1
Dzhabrailov	4.0	1.2	2.9	7.0
Govorukhin	3.9	---	6.5	5.2
Savostyanov	3.5	1.3	0.3	7.7
Titov	2.4	2.0	0.4	4.1
Skuratov	1.1	0.6	0.7	1.8
Podberezkin	1.0	0.5	0.0	2.2
Pamfilova	0.8	---	2.7	---
N=	16 hrs 24 min	5 hrs 21 min	4 hrs 42 min	6 hrs 23 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. The total sums for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

Putin's coverage was fairly stable from week to week. Yavlinsky, however, received almost half of his coverage during the last week of the election campaign. In contrast, most of Zhirinovskiy's coverage was made during the first week of monitoring.

	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N=
Putin	36.0	32.6	31.4	7 hrs 52 min
Yavlinsky	26.7	26.7	46.7	2 hrs
Zhirinovskiy	51.5	20.8	27.7	1 hr 41 min
Zyuganov	36.0	24.4	39.5	1 hr 26 min
Tuleev	42.9	38.1	19.0	42 min
Dzhabrailov	10.3	20.5	69.2	39 min
Govorukhin	---	47.4	52.6	38 min
Savostyanov	11.4	2.9	85.7	35 min
Titov	26.1	4.3	69.6	23 min
Podberezkin	18.2	0.0	81.8	11 min
Skuratov	18.2	18.2	63.6	11 min
Pamfilova	---	100.0	---	8 min


Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. 0.0 indicates that a candidate received less than 30 seconds of coverage.

News – Tone of Coverage

NTV

News coverage on NTV was – like the overall coverage – overwhelmingly neutral. Nine of the candidates (Zyuganov, Zhirinovskiy, Titov, Tuleev, Pamfilova, Podberezkin, Dzhabrailov, Govorukhin and Skuratov) were referred to only in neutral terms.

Almost all negative references made about Putin on NTV were made in the news. Of the 14 minutes' of negative coverage broadcast on the NTV news, Putin got 10, or 71.4%. Savostyanov and Yavlinsky each received a very small amount of negative coverage (3 and 1 minutes respectively). Putin – who was the only candidate given some positive coverage on the NTV news – received a total of 2 minutes' of praise.



As shown in the table below, the share of negative/positive mentions of their total coverage amounted to no more than slightly over 3%.


Table 57: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage. NTV. 3-24 March 2000.				
	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N=
Putin	1.8	97.9	0.3	10 hrs 27 min
Yavlinsky	0.5	99.5	---	3 hrs 3 min
Savostyanov	3.6	96.4	---	1 hr 23 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Most of the negative news coverage of the presidential candidates on NTV appeared during the first and second weeks of monitoring. Between 3 and 10 March, the monitors recorded three minutes of negative coverage for Putin and three minutes for Savostyanov. The remaining coverage during this period was neutral. During the last week of the presidential campaign, Yavlinsky received one minute of negative coverage and Putin – two minutes of positive coverage.


TV6

No positive references were made to any of the candidates on the TV6 news. Only two candidates – Zyuganov (2 minutes) and Skuratov (1 minute) – were referred to in negative terms. Skuratov's negative coverage accounted for 7.7% of his total coverage, whereas Zyuganov's accounted for 2.5%. The two candidates who were referred to in negative terms – Zyuganov and Skuratov – received their negative coverage in weeks 2 and 3 respectively.



TVC

All candidates except for Putin, Yavlinsky and Zhirinovskiy were referred to only in neutral terms on the TVC news. Putin and Yavlinsky each received one minute of positive coverage, whereas Zhirinovskiy was given four minutes of negative coverage. Negative coverage accounted for 4% of Zhirinovskiy's total coverage, whereas positive coverage accounted for 0.8% and 0.2% of Yavlinsky's and Putin's coverage respectively.




All news coverage on TVC between 3 and 10 March was neutral. During the following week Zhirinovskiy received some negative coverage (4 minutes), whereas Putin was given one minute of positive coverage. During the last week of campaigning none of the candidates were referred to in negative terms and only one – Yavlinsky – received a very small amount of positive coverage (1 minute).

Advertising

Paid political advertising on the national privately owned television channels was rather limited. TV6 did not broadcast any political adverts at all, and only two of the presidential candidates chose to advertise themselves on NTV. TVC was more popular in terms of advertising: seven of the 12 candidates chose to advertise on this channel. All their adverts taken together, though, did not amount to more than some 15 minutes. Advertising on NTV accounted for less than four minutes of air time. Putin kept his pledge not to advertise on national television – no adverts for Putin were recorded by the monitors. In terms of tone, all paid political adverts were by the monitors recorded as 'neutral'.

NTV

Advertising on NTV was limited to two of the presidential candidates – Titov and Yavlinsky. Titov purchased 66.7% of all the political advertising on NTV, whereas Yavlinsky purchased the rest. The amount of advertising purchased by the two candidates was very modest: Titov bought two and a half minutes and Yavlinsky one minute and 15 seconds.



No paid political adverts were shown on NTV during the second week of monitoring. Titov spread his advertising over weeks 1 and 2, whereas Yavlinsky did all his advertising during the final week of the election campaign.

Table 58: Candidates' Share (in %) of Advertising on NTV. 3-24 March 2000.

	Entire period	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3
Titov	66.7	100.0	---	58.3
Yavlinsky	33.3	---	---	41.7
N=	4 min	3 min	---	1 min

Note: All seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

TVC


Altogether, 14 minutes of political advertising was shown on TVC from 3 to 24 March. Skuratov, who was the most active advertiser on TVC, purchased 7 of these. The six other candidates who advertised on TVC ran more modest advertising campaigns. Yavlinsky, Zhirinovskiy and Podberezkin each bought less than half a minute of advertising.

Table 59: Advertising on TVC, 3-24 March 2000.

	Time
Skuratov	7 min
Tuleev	3 min
Zyuganov	2 min
Dzhabrailov	2 min
Yavlinsky	(26 sec)
Zhirinovskiy	(19 sec)
Podberezkin	(11 sec)
N=	14 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute. Numbers in brackets not added to the total sum.

Each candidate's share of the advertising on TVC is depicted in the chart below.



Only one of the presidential candidates – Zyuganov – spread his advertising over three weeks. The other candidates advertised during the two last weeks, though Zhirinovsky and Podberezkin purchased adverts only during the second week of campaigning. Most of Skuratov's adverts appeared on air during the second week of monitoring. Zyuganov, Tuleev and Dzhabrailov, on the other hand, did most of their advertising during the last week of the presidential campaign.

Table 60: Candidates' Share (in %) of Advertising on TVC. 3-24 March 2000.

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Skuratov	43.0	---	57.3	22.1
Zyuganov	19.4	35.5	13.5	28.5
Tuleev	15.9	---	9.0	17.7
Dzhabrailov	15.6	---	12.3	28.1
Yavlinsky	2.8	---	2.9	3.6
Zhirinovsky	2.1	---	3.2	---
Podberezkin	1.2	---	1.9	---
N=	14 min	1 min	9 min	4 min


Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

Direct and indirect speech

NTV

As can be seen from the chart below, almost all coverage of Putin and Titov during the three weeks of monitoring was made in the form of indirect speech. Zhirinovsky

and Zyuganov were also primarily referred to indirectly, as was Yavlinsky – though to a somewhat lesser extent. Most of the coverage of Savostyanov, Tuleev and Govorukhin, on the other hand, was made in the form of direct speech.



The proportion of direct speech on NTV was much higher for most of the candidates than their proportion of direct speech for the broadcast media as a whole. Tuleev, Govorukhin and Savostyanov received roughly two thirds of their coverage in the form of direct speech. Yavlinsky received considerably less (39%), though not as little as Putin (10.3%). Podberezkin received the smallest percentage of direct speech.

	Direct Speech
Tuleev	70.9
Govorukhin	67.3
Savostyanov	62.1
Pamfilova	47.5
Yavlinsky	39.0
Dzhabrailov	27.8
Zyuganov	19.6
Zhirinovskiy	18.1
Titov	16.8
Skuratov	15.2
Putin	10.3
Podberezkin	6.5

Tuleev received a larger share of the direct speech on NTV between 11 and 18 March – the week the mining accident in Kemerovo took place. Savostyanov, on the other hand, got the largest share of direct speech during the last week of the election campaign, i.e. the week he pulled out from the presidential race. Yavlinsky, Zyuganov and Putin took larger shares of the direct speech during the first week of monitoring.

Table 62: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Direct Speech. NTV. 3-24 March 2000.

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	9.8	21.4	10.9	6.0
Yavlinsky	18.6	35.9	16.7	15.5
Zyuganov	6.0	35.0	0.7	2.3
Zhirinovskiy	5.7	3.9	12.7	1.5
Titov	2.7	1.0	0.4	4.8
Tuleev	17.9	1.9	37.1	8.8
Pamfilova	4.9	---	6.5	4.8
Podberezkin	0.3	---	---	0.5
Govorukhin	13.5	---	6.2	22.1
Dzhabrailov	1.9	---	2.5	2.0
Savostyanov	18.1	---	5.8	31.3
Skuratov	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.5
N=	12 hrs 58 min	1 hr 43 min	4 hrs 35 min	6 hrs 39 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.


More than half the direct speech of most candidates was broadcast during the last week of the election campaign – though Zyuganov did more than two thirds of his during week 1 and Zhirinovskiy during week 2. As for Zhirinovskiy, week 2 was when he together with Govorukhin and Dzhabrailov accused Yavlinsky of having exceeded his election budget. This was given proper coverage in the news on all channels.

Table 63: Candidates' Weekly Distribution (in %) of Direct Speech. NTV. 3-24 March 2000.

	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N=
Yavlinsky	25.5	31.7	42.8	2 hrs 25 min
Savostyanov	---	11.3	88.7	2 hrs 21 min
Tuleev	1.4	73.4	25.2	2 hrs 19 min
Govorukhin	---	16.2	83.8	1 hr 45 min
Putin	28.9	39.5	31.6	1 hr 16 min
Zyuganov	76.6	4.3	19.1	47 min
Zhirinovskiy	8.9	77.8	13.3	45 min
Pamfilova	---	48.6	51.4	37 min
Titov	4.8	4.8	90.4	21 min
Dzhabrailov	---	46.7	53.3	15 min
Skuratov	25.0	25.0	50.0	4 min
Podberezkin	---	---	100.0	2 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

TV6



TVC

The monitors recorded a considerably larger amount of direct speech by the presidential candidates on TVC than on NTV and TV6. One might suspect that this had to do with the fact that there was more paid political advertising on TVC than on the other two channels: However, the candidates who spoke directly to the TVC viewers the most (Govorukhin and Savostyanov) did not purchase any advertising on this channel at all. Govorukhin – together with Zhirinovskiy and Dzhabrailov – criticised Yavlinsky in harsh terms, as in their view, he had exceeded his election campaign budget through an active advertising campaign. And Savostyanov was allowed to explain on television why he decided to withdraw from the election campaign.




Table 64: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Direct Speech. TVC. 3-24 March 2000.

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Govorukhin	16.9	21.3	25.4	7.1
Yavlinsky	13.7	4.6	17.0	15.8
Zhirinovskiy	13.4	20.1	3.9	18.0
Podberezkin	11.9	9.8	18.0	7.7
Savostyanov	11.3	14.9	15.9	5.3
Dzhabrailov	6.3	0.6	0.4	14.6
Tuleev	6.3	0.6	2.5	12.4
Titov	5.0	6.9	2.8	5.9
Zyuganov	4.7	5.7	5.3	3.7
Pamfilova	4.5	5.7	4.2	4.3
Skuratov	3.3	5.7	2.1	3.1
Putin	2.8	4.0	2.5	2.2
N=	13 hrs 2 min	2 hrs 54 min	4 hrs 43 min	5 hrs 23 min

Note: Seconds rounded up or down to the nearest minute.

5 Print media

Michel Tatu

Most national print media, particularly the “quality” newspapers, devoted a large amount of space – from two to three pages – to the coverage of the election campaign. Despite the low purchasing power of the average Russian consumer, statistics show that around a third of the population read newspapers regularly. Furthermore, Moscow is one of the largest cities of the world with the greatest numbers of dailies – nearly twenty.

5.1 Pressure from the government

Restrictions on coverage of the war in Chechnya were among the few concrete cases of pressure which became public. In February, the Ministry of the Press, TV, Radio and Mass Communications stated that media directly quoting Chechen military commanders were in breach of the law. Afterwards, Ministry officials backtracked, saying that direct quotes could appear in the media but exclusively alongside commentary and analysis. The Babitsky affair added to this pressure, even though the REF/RL reporter’s behaviour was covered critically by a rather large part of the print media.

Vladimir Putin was considered with suspicion by some editors who feared increased pressure from the government, but such editors felt that this fear was not yet supported by hard evidence. Nevertheless, there was a long Soviet tradition of exchanges between the press and the authorities, and many editors still have a special telephone in their office called a “vertushka” for direct connection with the Kremlin. According to one such editor, on a normal day his “vertushka” rings every three hours.

There were several cases of mild warnings addressed to the media by the Central Electoral Commission. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* was criticised for having published a telephone interview with Putin and its readers – a text which the CEC considered as advertising the programme of the candidate – in a way which was interpreted as a warning to other candidates. Altogether, the interventions of the CEC rarely went further than a demand for information or the sending of a warning. Many journalists and observers spoken to thought that the CEC should have been more strict about the way paid political publicity was used in the campaign (see below).

5.2 The influence of the oligarchs

The large number of daily newspapers coming out in Moscow each day explains the heavy competition between them and the fact that very few media companies can survive on their own, without the support of the government and/or the oligarchs.

Many editors pointed to the fact that while the oligarchs are highly conscious of the power of television and exert a strong influence over TV-channels they control, they

take a lower profile in their print media, knowing that the credibility of these newspapers – especially the quality newspapers – is at stake: they would lose their readership if they become overtly militant in favour of one party or candidate.

Furthermore, unlike the big TV companies with vast audiences, most print media with large circulations apply the common sense rule: the larger the audience, the more it is necessary not to antagonise this or that category of readers by strong attacks on certain persons or groups. An editor of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, which belongs to the Potanin group and claims to have the largest circulation of all national daily newspapers (740,000 on weekdays, 2.5 million on weekend) said: “We are a family journal, our readers vote for Putin, Zhirinovskiy, Zyuganov, etc. We must respect their choice and refuse to offend anybody”.

A few newspapers try to neutralise the power of the oligarchs by collecting the financial support of several donors, so that none has a decisive voice. This is what Yegor Yakovlev managed to achieve with his newspaper *Obshchaya Gazeta*, which is supported jointly by the Moscow government (Luzhkov), by the Avtovaz Concern (Kadannikov), by Gusinsky and, until last year, by the NRB Bank. *Obshchaya Gazeta* is one of the very few publications which criticised the war in Chechnya.

A source told EIM monitors that Vladimir Potanin (who controls *Izvestiya* through the Interros Concern) called the chief editor just three times throughout 1999, in most cases because he had been contacted by rival oligarch Gusinsky about an unfriendly report about him in *Izvestiya*. However, the editor of *Komsomolskaya Pravda* said he meets Potanin four times a month, including at least one extended session of what he described as a “philosophical discussion”. Many said that Gusinsky and Berezovsky are the most intrusive managers of their media empires.

Altogether, many actors, either editors, journalists or readers, think that the fact that there are several oligarchs competing in the media is good for pluralism and helps improve the variety of information, including about the oligarchs themselves.

5.3 Coverage of the campaign

The campaign was covered heavily by all political and general newspapers, with from two to four pages in most publications and up to 50 to 60 per cent of the total space in *Argumenty i Fakty*, the weekly with the largest circulation of 3 million.

Putin received nearly as much coverage as all the other candidates together, as the media covered the frequent trips and activities of the acting president. Nevertheless, pluralism was much more developed in the print media generally than on the television networks. Provided they could afford to read several newspapers every day, the Russian urban citizen could have a rather fair picture of the political landscape, of the profile of the various candidates and of the issues raised in the campaign.

Nevertheless, with only a few exceptions, most editors and journalists admitted that the political weight of all newspapers together is less than the weight of one national television network. Many pointed out the absence of any significant newspaper in many rural areas.

With the exception of party organs like *Pravda*, all monitored newspapers claimed not to be affiliated to a party and rejected the idea of their publications appealing explicitly to vote for one or another candidate. Nevertheless, most admitted a leaning to Putin or Yavlinsky and a strong hostility to Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy. This was generally felt not directly, but by the selection of materials and events to be covered, the choice of letters from the readers, etc.

All agreed that the campaign was less violent than the previous presidential campaign in 1996 – when there was a “communist danger” -- and that there were much less dirty tricks and “kompromaty” than during the campaign for the parliamentary elections in December 1999. Most observers and editors spoken to praised this fact, although many pointed to the fact that such tricks were useless since the result of the election – Putin’s victory – was a foregone conclusion. However a consequence of this situation was that there was no real political fighting and that the campaign was judged boring and less interesting to the reader.

The EIM was given information of one example when an editor was contacted by an emissary of a candidate who offered him money – not to his newspaper, but to him directly – if he agreed to improve the coverage of his candidate. This editor said that he had refused, but we cannot exclude that others accepted similar offers, without of course revealing anything about it. It is a well-known fact that some politicians are boasting, half jokingly, that “it is easier and cheaper to buy one journalist than a newspaper”.

5.4 Advertising

The campaign brought important income to the media, especially those with the biggest circulations. According to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* for example, which draws 55 per cent of its income from publicity, about 30 per cent of all adverts published during the election period were political, for a price varying from \$5,000 a page on weekdays to \$15,000 or \$20,000 a page on the weekend, when the newspaper reaches a 2.5 million circulation. The other newspapers reported charging from \$5,000 a page in *Moskovskye Novosti* and *Kommersant Daily* – the last one claimed to have reduced its tariff four times as a “contribution to democracy”, but only Putin bought a whole page -- at \$20,000 in *Izvestiya* and at \$32,000 in *Trud* (to compare, the price of one minute of television is said to be \$25,000). As an exception, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* charges \$7,000 for a page despite its small circulation (50,000).

Nevertheless, these tariffs were not constant: for one thing they were higher at the end of the campaign than at the beginning – notably in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* ; second, important discounts (up to 30 or 40 per cent) were made according to the type of contract and, although it was rarely admitted, according to the political preferences of the editors.

EIM monitoring results show that the most active candidates in terms of advertising during the campaign were Yavlinsky, Tuleev and Titov. But even these candidates concentrated their efforts on television, rather than on big circulation publications. Editors of newspapers with less than 200,000 circulations said they got few orders for political adverts.

In some cases, there was a dilemma for editors. For example, Putin decided to publish his "letter to the voters" as a paid political advertisement in *Kommersant*, *Trud* and *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. The editor of *Komsomolskaya Pravda* said he accepted it, adding that he would have published it anyway as an information, but not in full. Many editors complained that the law is too complicated and makes it impossible to distinguish between a paid advertisement and a piece of information. This explains, but does not justify, the violations observed on paid advertising which are explored below.

According to the law, official government or institutional publications like *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* (financed by the government, with a 500,000 circulation) or *Parlamentskaya Gazeta* (the official organ of the Duma and of the Council of the Federation, 50,000 circulation) had to accept free advertising from each candidate. All the candidates used this possibility of having one full page in those publications, with the exception of Putin. The same newspapers could sell additional space to those candidates willing to pay, but *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* carried no paid advertising. Only Tuleev applied for three paid ads in *Parlamentskaya Gazeta*, but he was turned down "because it would have been unequal", according to the editor.

All other newspapers charged for political advertisement. Zyuganov, for example, had to pay for publishing his programme in *Pravda*, according to the editor, even though the newspaper is officially subsidised by the KPRF.

Editors did not conceal the fact that they felt free to accept or refuse paid adverts from candidates, according to their political preferences. Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy were often turned away by newspapers and, in the knowledge that this might happen, decided not to apply, perhaps sometimes wrongly. For example, Zhirinovskiy did not attempt to advertise in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, but the editor said that, had he made such a request, it would have been accepted. In other cases, there were disagreements. *Trud*, for example, refused an advert from Zyuganov because the text criticised Putin. They said they were ready to accept advertising from him, but only with an explanation of his programme, not to criticise others. *Argumenty i Fakty*, though strongly anti-communist, accepted a paid advert from Zyuganov on three quarters of a page, but, as the editor put it, "without a discount". The editors of *Novye Izvestiya*, though they are searching for more income from publicity, said they refused an advert from Tuleev "because he is communist" and would have done the same with Zyuganov if he had applied.

Yet the most serious violations of the law and journalistic ethics were observed in the way these adverts were presented to the readers. The official rule as explained by the Central Electoral Commission is clear: "Such material must be paid from the electoral fund of the registered candidate". In addition, Article 50, point 19 of the law "On elections of the President" states that when publishing information about the candidate, all publications must indicate which party or individual paid for it. The official language for such an indication is the following mention, at the bottom of the text: "This material has been paid from the electoral fund of the candidate X".

This mention has been observed only in a minority of cases.

Firstly, most publications had invented other much more discreet ways of presenting paid political ads. *Trud* used a very small star, *Izvestiya* a "K" in a circle, *Obshchaya Gazeta* added the title "Pryamaya Rech" (Direct Speech), where the initials "PR" are also those usually denoting "public relations" (a word which has been transcribed as is from English into Russian). *Parlamentskaya Gazeta* also used a star, but also,

since it took orders for paid political ads through an agency called Veche Press, it sometimes stated only the name of the agency.

Secondly, often these newspapers added other types of indications, which made the picture more confusing for the reader. For example *Izvestiya* used, in addition to the “K”, various banners like “Press Conference”, “Elections 2000” or “The opinion of a Leader” to signal paid political ads. While *Izvestiya* indicated at the bottom of its last page that the texts presented under those banners were “published in the form of advertisement”, other newspapers did not bother with an explanation, or, like *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, inserted a general remark: “The editorial group is not responsible for the accuracy of the content of advertisement texts”, without explaining which texts fell in this category. Some editors explained that they printed the adverts with a special character, or inside a frame. This may have been clear for professional journalists, but certainly not for the average reader. *Trud* and *Moskovskye Novosti* received a complaint from the CEC on this matter, but in this case, the editors said that the frame and the special character they used “were clear enough”.

Thirdly, many newspapers, including those signalled above, published many clearly paid advertisement materials without any special indication, either general or particular.

This practice, which was already widespread prior to and during the Duma elections of December 1999, was encouraged by the candidates themselves. Some editors said they had to accept this practice on the demand of the campaigners, who threatened to buy space in other newspapers if an official mention of paid information had been added. A few editors refused such demands (notably the editor of *Segodnya*), but it is clear that many others accepted them. One editor said: “We try to obey the law and sometimes, for example for Putin, we mention that it is a paid advert. But we don’t do it for the smaller candidates. The campaigners want it this way. As far as the candidates themselves are concerned, they just don’t want to know anything about it”.

Another reason for this hidden publicity was the desire of some candidates to conceal the fact that they exceeded the amount of expenditure allowed by the law. One candidate who was often denounced as far as hidden paid advertisements were concerned was Yavlinsky. He is said to have proposed a paid interview to *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* “provided it is not indicated as paid material”, said an editor, who added that he had refused the offer.

All this is a deception of the reader, the more so since the paid texts look exactly like any other article form: interview, portrait, analysis, comment by a “politologist” (political scientist), coverage of an event, etc. It is also a violation of journalistic ethics and a serious blow to the credibility of the profession, since it gives the impression that newspapers and journalists themselves are for sale. In particular, it is difficult to know whether the signatures added to those materials are those of members of the editorial group of the given newspaper, or of campaigners on the candidate’s staff, or indeed are just fake signatures. It must be noted that not only journalists, but also political scientists, contributed to this hidden publicity and distorted information.


5.5 Monitoring of the media coverage of the campaign

Dr Åse Grødeland

Coverage

The EIM monitored the coverage of the presidential election campaign in 12 national newspapers from 3 to 24 March. These newspapers included the state-owned *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, the Communist dailies *Pravda* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, the left-wing *Zavtra* (formerly *Den*), *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and *Trud*, which, although they supported Yeltsin's candidacy in the 1996 presidential elections, have been ardent critics of him since. *Argumenty i Fakty* and *Moskovskiy Komsomolets* were also included in the monitoring, as were the liberal-intellectual *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, *Izvestiya*, *Segodnya* and *Kommersant-Daily*.

A comparison of the coverage of each presidential candidate in all the 12 newspapers included in the monitoring added together, shows that Putin received close to a third of all coverage. His main contenders, Zyuganov and Yavlinsky trailed rather far behind with 14% and 12% of the coverage respectively. Zhirinovskiy received 7% of the coverage, as did Tuleev, whereas coverage of Titov amounted to 5%. All the other candidates received 4% or less of the total coverage.



We compared coverage of each candidate in the monitored press during each week of the monitoring (3-10 March, 11-18 March, 19-24 March). As shown in table **XXX** below, coverage remained stable for all the candidates during the campaign. Only one candidate – Zhirinovskiy – increased by 5% in coverage from week 1 to week 2. This was probably linked to the fact that he entered the race somewhat later than the other candidates.

Table XXX: Candidates' Share (in %) of Coverage in the National Press. All newspapers. 3-24 March 2000.

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	32	33	33	29
Zyuganov	14	14	14	15
Yavlinsky	12	13	11	13

Zhirinovskiy	7	4	9	7
Tuleev	7	8	6	7
Titov	5	5	4	6
Podberezkin	4	5	4	3
Dzhabrailov	4	4	3	4
Govorukhin	4	3	4	4
Pamfilova	4	3	4	4
Skuratov	4	4	5	4
Savostyanov	3	4	3	4
N (sq. cm) =	1,088,319	208,842	418,888	460,586

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm. The totals for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

Overall, newspaper coverage of the candidates was overwhelmingly neutral. The most negative newspapers were the left-wing *Zavtra*, *Pravda* and *Trud* – though *Pravda* also scored highest in terms of positive coverage. The positive coverage was given primarily to Zuyganov – *Pravda*'s preferred candidate. There was no big difference between the other newspapers in terms of tone of coverage.

Table XXX: Tone of Coverage (in %) in the National Press. All newspapers, 3-24 March 2000

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N (sq.cm) =
All papers	8.5	86.8	4.7	1 088 316
Argumenty i Fakty	4.0	91.8	4.2	83 463
Izvestiya	3.9	92.9	3.2	120 812
Kommersant Daily	9.5	86.6	3.9	64 541
Komsom. Pravda	9.6	84.6	5.8	139 083
Mosk. Komsom.	5.5	88.1	6.4	114 202
Nez. Gazeta	7.5	88.6	3.9	200 488
Novye Izvestiya	3.1	93.7	3.2	40 641
Pravda	28.5	52.5	19.0	43 496
Ross. Gazeta	9.4	87.4	3.2	111 979
Segodnya	4.2	92.3	3.5	80 589
Trud	10.0	88.7	1.3	53 158
Zavtra	30.3	66.5	3.2	35 871

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm. The sums for each newspaper added together therefore do not match the total for all the newspapers.

The 12 newspapers included in the monitoring published a total of 50,879 sq.cm of positive references to the various candidates. Putin's share of the positive coverage was 59.2%. Zyuganov trailed far behind, at 19%. Yavlinsky's share was 12.6%. Six other candidates – Podberezkin, Govorukhin, Tuleev, Savostyanov, Titov and Pamfilova – each got less than 3% of the positive coverage. Skuratov, Dzhabrailov and Zhirinovskiy all failed to receive any positive mentions in the national press during the monitoring period.

Table XXX: Candidates' Share of Positive Coverage in the National Press. All newspapers. 3-24 March 2000


	%
Putin	59.2
Zyuganov	19.0

Yavlinsky	12.6
Podberezkin	2.9
Govorukhin	2.6
Tuleev	2.0
Savostyanov	1.3
Titov	0.3
Pamfilova	0.1
N (sq.cm) =	50,879
Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm	

The three candidates with the biggest share of positive coverage (Putin, Zyuganov and Yavlinsky) also got most of the negative coverage in the national press between 3 and 24 March. They got 38.2%, 22.6% and 14.7% respectively. Zhirinovskiy was also more frequently referred to in negative terms than most other candidates (6.2%). The latter received around 4% or less each of the negative coverage.

Table XXX: Candidates' Share of Negative Coverage in the National Press. All newspapers. 3–24 March 2000	
	%
Putin	38.2
Zyuganov	22.6
Yavlinsky	14.7
Zhirinovskiy	6.2
Titov	4.1
Skuratov	2.9
Dzhabrailov	2.7
Savostyanov	2.3
Pamfilova	1.9
Govorukhin	1.9
Tuleev	1.7
Podberezkin	0.7
N (sq.cm) =	92,534
Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm	

Each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.



By taking a look at each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive mentions we see that Zyuganov (13.6%), Putin and Yavlinsky (10.2% each) received the highest proportion of negative coverage. However, the very same three candidates also scored highest in terms of positive coverage. Thus, 8.6% of Putin's coverage was positive, as was 6.2% of Zyuganov's and 4.7% of Yavlinsky's.

Table XXX: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage. All Newspapers. 3-24 March 2000

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N (sq.cm) =
Putin	10.2	81.2	8.6	348 486
Yavlinsky	10.2	85.1	4.7	134 077
Zhirinovskiy	7.6	92.4	---	75 797
Zyuganov	13.6	80.2	6.2	154 271
Titov	6.8	92.9	0.3	55 227
Tuleev	2.2	96.4	1.4	72 202
Dzhabrailov	6.3	93.7	---	40 019
Govorukhin	4.1	92.9	3.0	43 699
Pamfilova	4.2	95.7	0.1	41 222
Podberezkin	1.5	94.9	3.6	41 557
Savostyanov	5.7	92.5	1.8	37 058
Skuratov	6.1	93.9	---	44 701

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm.

Comparing tone of coverage by candidate during each of the three weeks prior to the elections showed that of the nine candidates who received positive coverage in the national press, only three (Putin, Yavlinsky and Zyuganov) were given positive coverage each week. Putin and Yavlinsky received most of their positive coverage during the second week of monitoring (11-18 March), whereas Zyuganov received

almost two thirds of his positive coverage during the last week of the election campaign. Govorukhin and Pamfilova received all their positive coverage during week 1, whereas all positive coverage of Savostyanov, Tuleev, Podberezkin and Titov was limited to week 3.

Table XXX: Candidates' Weekly Distribution (in %) of Positive Coverage in the National Press. All Newspapers. 3-24 March 2000				
	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N (sq.cm) =
Putin	7.8	63.1	29.1	30,098
Zyuganov	15.4	17.3	67.3	9,659
Yavlinsky	20.4	53.6	26.0	6,410
Podberezkin	66.7	---	33.3	1,500
Govorukhin	100.0	---	---	1,333
Tuleev	---	---	100.0	1,031
Savostyanov	---	---	100.0	667
Titov	---	---	100.0	150
Pamfilova	100.0	---	---	31

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm.


In terms of negative coverage, most candidates had their negative mentions spread over the three weeks the monitoring lasted. Govorukhin and Podberezkin, however, were only referred to in negative terms between 11 and 18 March. No negative mentions of Skuratov were recorded between 3 and 10 March. A majority of the candidates also received most of their negative mentions between 11 and 18 March. The lion's share of Putin's negative coverage, however, was made during the third week of the monitoring.

Table XXX: Candidates' Weekly Distribution (in %) of Negative Coverage in the National Press. All newspapers. 3-24 March 2000				
	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N (sq.cm) =
Putin	14.2	35.9	49.9	35,377
Zyuganov	17.3	51.2	31.5	20,928
Yavlinsky	24.1	41.9	34.0	13,628
Zhirinovskiy	4.5	78.3	17.2	5,758
Titov	8.7	52.9	38.4	3,780
Skuratov	---	51.5	48.5	2,728
Dzhabrailov	21.7	56.2	22.1	2,503
Savostyanov	9.8	53.4	36.8	2,108
Govorukhin	---	100.0	---	1,781
Pamfilova	2.9	65.0	32.1	1,730
Tuleev	15.9	25.6	58.5	1,588
Podberezkin	---	100.0	---	625

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm.

Argumenty i Fakty

Putin received the largest share of coverage in *Argumenty i Fakty* – though the gap between Putin and his main challengers, Zyuganov and Yavlinsky, was considerably less than in many other newspapers. Putin received 21% of the coverage, compared to Zyuganov’s 14% and Yavlinsky’s 11%. Tuleev got 9%, Titov 7% and all the other candidates 5-6% each.




Perhaps the most interesting thing about *Argumenty i Fakty's* coverage of the election campaign is the large difference in coverage from week to week for Putin. During the first week, he received 32% of the coverage, compared to 22% during week 2 and only 16% during week 3 – matching Zyuganov’s 16% of coverage that week. Unlike Putin, Zyuganov’s coverage increased from 8% in week 1, though 13% in week 2, to peak at 16% during week 3. There was very little difference from week to week in the newspaper’s coverage of Yavlinsky’s campaign. Tuleev’s coverage dropped from 14% in week 2 to 7% in week 3.

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	21	32	22	16
Zyuganov	14	8	13	16
Yavlinsky	11	13	8	11
Tuleev	9	10	14	7
Titov	7	7	8	7
Zhirinovskiy	6	4	4	7
Dzhabrailov	6	4	5	7
Pamfilova	6	3	5	8
Podberezkin	5	3	5	6
Govorukhin	5	3	5	6
Savostyanov	5	4	5	6
Skuratov	5	9	6	3
N (sq.cm) =	83,470	18,474	17,106	47,880

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm The totals for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period. MISMATCH OF 10!

Argumenty i Fakty published a total of 3,484 sq.cm of positive coverage. Putin got most of this (79,4%). Tuleev received a substantially smaller share (14.4%), as did Yavlinsky (6.2%). None of the other candidates were referred to in positive terms. Six candidates shared 3,318 sq.cm of negative coverage. Once again Putin took the largest share. Negative coverage of the incumbent accounted for more than half (52.7%) of all negative coverage of the various candidates in *Argumenty i Fakty* during the three weeks the monitoring lasted. Yavlinsky and Zyuganov received 18.1% and 15.1% of the negative coverage respectively, whereas Titov, Dzhabrailov and Savostyanov each got 4.7% each of the negative coverage.

Each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.




Argumenty i Fakty's coverage of the election campaign was predominantly neutral. The only candidate to receive a particularly large share of positive/negative coverage was Putin. Some 10% of his coverage were negative and 16% was positive. Yavlinsky also received some negative coverage (6.6%). Compared to Putin, however, positive mentions of Yavlinsky were far between (2.4%). Tuleev did not receive any negative mentions. Some 6.6% of his coverage were positive. Five of the candidates (Zhirinovskiy, Govorukhin, Pamfilova, Podberezkin and Skuratov) were referred to exclusively in neutral terms.

Calculating each candidate's positive proportion by week show that *Argumenty i Fakty* only referred to Putin in positive terms every week throughout the monitoring period. He received an almost equal share of positive coverage between 3-10 March (42.2%) and 11-18 March (45.8%), though only 12% during the last week of the election campaign. In contrast, Tuleev received all his positive coverage during this week. Yavlinsky received all his positive coverage between 3 and 10 March.

As regards negative coverage, only one candidate – Zyuganov – received a share of his negative coverage during the last week of the election campaign (100%). All negative references to Titov, Dzhabrailov and Savostyanov were printed between 3 and 10 March. Putin’s negative coverage peaked between 3 and 10 March (57.1%) and dropped somewhat from 11 to 18 March (42.9%). All negative coverage of Yavlinsky appeared in print between 11 and 18 March.

IZVESTIYA

The gap between Putin and his main opponents Yavlinsky and Zyuganov was bigger in *Izvestiya* than in *Argumenty i Fakty*. Whereas Putin got 32% of the total coverage, Yavlinsky and Zyuganov received 14% and 12% respectively. Zhirinovskiy trailed close behind at 10%, followed by Tuleev (9%) and Titov (6%). The other candidates received 2-3% coverage each.



A week-by-week comparison of *Izvestiya*'s coverage of the candidates, showed that Putin received considerably more coverage during the first week of monitoring (41%) than during the two latter weeks (32% and 31%). In contrast, Yavlinsky's coverage increased from week to week, starting at 7% and increasing to 16%. Zyuganov received most of his coverage during week 1 (19%), hit a bottom in terms of coverage during week 2 (7%), though he recovered some coverage during week 3 (14%). Zhirinovskiy's coverage climbed steadily from 4% during week 1, to 10% in week 2. He gained another 2% during week 3, putting him in fourth place with 12% of the coverage. Tuleev's coverage in *Izvestiya* dropped from 15% during the first week, to 9% in the second week and 8% in the third. Two candidates – Skuratov and Dzhabrailov – received no coverage during week 1.

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	32	41	32	31


Yavlinsky	14	7	13	16
Zyuganov	12	19	7	14
Zhirinovskiy	10	4	10	12
Tuleev	9	15	9	8
Titov	6	2	7	6
Pamfilova	4	4	5	4
Dzhabrailov	3	---	5	1
Savostyanov	3	2	4	2
Skuratov	3	---	3	4
Podberezkin	2	4	2	1
Govorukhin	2	2	3	1
N (sq.cm) =	120,812	10,402	51,597	58,814

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm The totals for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

Izvestiya published a total of 3,925 sq.cm of positive coverage of the presidential candidates. More than half of all the positive mentions was made of Putin (58%). Yavlinsky (24.3%) and Savostyanov (17%) followed. Tuleev got the smallest share of the positive coverage (only 0.8%).

Eight candidates shared 4,722 sq.cm of negative coverage in *Izvestiya*. Most of the negative coverage was given to Zyuganov (29%) and Putin (23.3%), though also Yavlinsky (15.7%) and Zhirinovskiy (12.9%) received a fair amount of negative coverage. Four candidates – Skuratov (6.9%), Tuleev (6%), Dzhabrailov (6%) and Govorukhin (6%) - each received less than 7% of the negative coverage.

Each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive mentions is depicted in the chart below.




Izvestiya was overwhelmingly neutral in its coverage of the election campaign. None of the candidates received more than 10% negative coverage (though Govorukhin and Zyuganov got close at 9.9% and 9.7% respectively). The newspaper was rather favourable to Savostyanov, 18.4% of whose coverage was positive. Putin and Yavlinsky received fairly similar proportions of positive coverage in *Izvestiya*: 5.9% of the former's coverage was positive, as compared to 5.7% of the latter's. All references to Pamfilova and Podberezkin were neutral.

Of the four candidates who received some positive coverage in *Izvestiya*, two (Savostyanov and Tuleev) had all their positive coverage during the last week of the election campaign. Neither Putin nor Yavlinsky was referred to in positive terms between 11 and 18 March. Both had most of their positive coverage (63.1% and 70.1% respectively) during the last week of the election campaign.

Titov, Tuleev, Dzhabrailov, Govorukhin were referred to in negative terms only between 11 and 18 March. Zhirinovskiy received all his negative coverage during the first week of monitoring (3-10 March). Putin and Yavlinsky were criticised only during the last week of the election campaign. Skuratov's negative coverage was spread over two weeks (86.2% between 11 and 18 March; 13.8% between 19 and 24 March), whereas Zyuganov's was spread over three (30.7% between 3 and 10 March; 20.5% between 11 and 18 March; and 48.8% between 19 and 24 March).

KOMMERSANT DAILY

Almost half of *Kommersant Daily's* coverage of the presidential candidates was given to Putin (48%). Yavlinsky (11%), Zyuganov (8%) and Zhirinovskiy (6%) trailed rather far behind. Tuleev received 5% of the coverage, whereas coverage of the other candidates accounted for 4% or less each.




Monitoring revealed a large difference in weekly coverage only for Putin. His share of the coverage rose from 41% in week 1 to 61% in week 2. Though it dropped to 40% in week 3. Dzhabrailov, who received a mere 2% of the total coverage during

weeks 1 and 2, increased his share of the coverage to 8% in week 3. Podberezkin, on the other hand, saw his coverage drop from 8% during week 1 to 1% during week 2 – though it improved somewhat in the course of week 3 (4%). One candidate – Savostyanov – was not referred to during week 2.

Four candidates received positive coverage in *Kommersant Daily*. Of these, Putin got more than half of all positive coverage (67.3%), Podberezkin 20%, Zyuganov 10.1% and Yavlinsky 2.5%. Altogether the newspaper printed some 2,494 sq.cm of positive coverage.

Kommersant Daily printed considerably more negative than positive coverage of the various candidates (6,102 sq.cm). Yavlinsky got the largest share of negative coverage (41.3%), though Zyuganov (24.6%) and Titov (14.3%) also received a considerable amount. In contrast, Putin received no more than 7% of the negative coverage. Other candidates (Savostyanov, Tuleev, Zhirinovskiy, Dzhabrailov and Skuratov) received less than 4% each.

Each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive mentions is depicted in the chart below.



Kommersant Daily was said to be supporting Putin's candidacy during the election campaign. The low proportion of negative coverage in Putin's mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage could be taken in support of such a view. Only 1.4% of his total coverage was negative in tone. In contrast, main challengers Yavlinsky's and Zyuganov's proportions of negative coverage were 36.1 and 27.9% respectively. Also the two other liberal candidates – Titov (38.1%) and Savostyanov (15.6%) were frequently criticised on the pages of *Kommersant Daily*. Podberezkin received 19.4% positive coverage. Govorukhin and Pamfilova were referred to in neutral terms only.

Those candidates who were given positive coverage in *Kommersant Daily* usually received all of it at the same time. Thus Podberezkin was only praised during the last week of the election campaign. Yavlinsky was popular between 11 and 18 March, whereas all positive references to Zyuganov were made between 3 and 10 March. Putin received most of his positive coverage between 11 and 18 March (88.5%) and the remaining between 3 and 10 March (11.5%). The various candidates' weekly distribution of negative coverage can be seen in table **XXX**.


Table XXX: Candidates' weekly distribution (in %) of negative tone in the National Press. *Kommersant Daily*. 3-24 March 2000.

	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N (sq.cm) =
Yavlinsky	39.7	9.9	50.4	2,522
Zyuganov	66.7	---	33.3	1,500
Titov	13.9	28.7	57.4	871
Putin	73.8	---	26.2	427
Savostyanov	---	---	100.0	222
Tuleev	100.0	---	---	200
Dzhabrailov	100.0	---	---	154
Zhirinovskiy	---	100.0	---	150
Skuratov	---	---	100.0	56

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA

Komsomolskaya Pravda – although it focused its attention on Putin's candidacy – was fairly even-handed in its coverage of his main challengers. Thus, whereas Putin got 29% of the coverage, references to Yavlinsky accounted for 18%, to Zyuganov – 12% and to Tuleev 9%. The other candidates received between 3% and 6% each.



Putin received the largest share of the coverage during week 1. From week 1 to week 2, his share of the coverage shrunk by 17%, from 41% to 24%. He only regained 5%

of this from week 2 to week 3. Yavlinsky also got most of his coverage during week 1. Zhirinovskiy, on the other hand, got the most attention during week 2 – as did Savostyanov.

Table XXX: Candidates' Share of Coverage (in %) in the National Press. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. 3-24 March 2000


	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	29	41	24	29
Yavlinsky	18	24	15	18
Zyuganov	12	12	11	13
Tuleev	9	9	7	9
Titov	6	6	5	6
Zhirinovskiy	5	2	10	4
Dzhabrailov	4	1	7	3
Savostyanov	4	1	6	3
Skuratov	4	---	6	4
Pamfilova	3	---	3	4
Govorukhin	3	---	3	4
Podberezkin	3	4	3	3
N (sq.cm) =	139,084	26,927	40,412	71,746

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm. The totals for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

Komsomolskaya Pravda printed a relatively generous amount of positive coverage of the various candidates between 3 and 24 March. Altogether, positive coverage accounted for 8,057 sq.cm. Yavlinsky and Putin got almost equal shares of this (41.4% and 38.2% respectively). Other candidates received considerably less (Podberezkin – 12.4%; Tuleev – 6.2%; and Titov – 1.9%).

Six candidates received some negative coverage in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. Of the 13,330 sq.cm of negative coverage that appeared in the pages of this newspaper between 3 and 24 March, Zyuganov (39.8%) and Putin (29.1%) received the most. Zhirinovskiy's share was considerably smaller at 12.2%. He was followed by Yavlinsky (9.4%), Skuratov (7.5%) and Titov (2.1%).

Each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.




Komsomolskaya Pravda was rather unfavourable to Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy: 31.1% and 21.7% of their coverage was negative and they received no positive mentions. Skuratov (17.2%) was also referred to in negative terms. Some 13.3% of Yavlinsky's coverage, on the other hand, were positive. And Podberezkin had an even larger share of positive mentions at 22.0%. The difference in percent between negative and positive references made to Putin was very small, at 2%. Four candidates (Dzhabrailov, Govorukhin, Pamfilova and Savostyanov) were referred to in neutral terms only.

Of the five candidates who received positive mentions in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, two (Tuleev and Titov) received all their positive coverage during the last week of the election campaign. Podberezkin received all his positive coverage between 3 and 10 March, whereas Putin and Yavlinsky had their praise spread over more than one week. Putin's positive coverage was evenly spread between 11 and 18 March (50.8%) and 19 and 24 March (49.2%). Yavlinsky had most of his positive coverage between 11 and 18 March (67.5%) and the rest during the first (10%) and the last (32.5%) week of the monitoring.

None of the candidates received any negative coverage between 3 and 10 March. Skuratov was only referred to in negative terms during the last week of the election campaign, whereas Titov had all his negative coverage between 11 and 18 March. Zyuganov received an equal amount of negative coverage between 11-18 March and 19-24 March. Most of the negative coverage of Zhirinovskiy, Yavlinsky and Putin was made between 11 and 18 March (84.6%, 63.5% and 55.4% respectively).

MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS

Putin got most of the coverage also in *Moskovskiy Komsomolets* (30%). He was followed by Zyuganov at 14%, Yavlinsky at 11%, Zhirinovskiy at 9% and Tuleev at 8%. The other candidates received between 3% and 6% each of the newspaper's coverage of the presidential candidates.




There were no big surprises in terms of weekly coverage of the candidates. Zyuganov's coverage peaked during week 2 when it reached 17%. Coverage of Zyuganov's candidacy dropped by 5% during week 3.

Table XXX: Candidates' Share of Coverage (in %) in the National Press. Moskovskiy Komsomolets. 3-24 March 2000

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	30	31	31	28
Zyuganov	14	14	17	12
Yavlinsky	11	11	13	9
Zhirinovsky	9	8	10	9
Tuleev	8	7	8	8
Podberezkin	6	3	6	8
Titov	5	3	3	7
Govorukhin	5	9	5	4
Dzhabrailov	3	3	1	5
Savostyanov	3	3	1	4
Pamfilova	3	3	3	3
Skuratov	3	5	2	3
N (sq.cm) =	114,201	24,356	40,987	48,860

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm. The totals for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

Moskovskiy Komsomolets printed an almost equal amount of positive (7,315 sq.cm) and negative coverage (6,333 sq.cm) of the various candidates. Three candidates got some positive coverage in this newspaper. Of these, Putin got the most (70.2%), compared to Govorukhin's 18.2% and Yavlinsky's 11.6%. Putin received the largest share of the negative coverage (65.7%) in *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, though Zyuganov (31.6%) also received a fairly large amount of criticism. Three other candidates (Dzhabrailov, Zhirinovsky and Skuratov) shared the remaining (1%, 0.9% and 0.9% respectively).



In terms of tone of coverage, Putin was the only candidate who received a roughly equal share of both (15.4% positive and 12.4% negative mentions). Zyuganov, on the other hand, received no positive mentions. Some 12.2% of all references made to this candidate were negative in tone. Some 21.7% of all references to Govorukhin were positive. Yavlinsky received no negative mentions. Some 6.8% of all references made to this candidate were positive. Five candidates (Titov, Tuleev, Pamfilova, Podberezkin and Savostyanov) were referred to only in neutral terms.

All positive references to Govorukhin were made during the first week of monitoring. Yavlinsky received most of his positive mentions that same week (55.7%), though also some between 11 and 18 March (29.5%) and 19 and 24 March (14.8%). Putin was not praised during the first week of monitoring, though he received a fair amount of positive coverage during the second (57.8%) and third (42.2%) weeks.


Zhirinovskiy and Skuratov were criticised only during the last week of the election campaign. Dzhabrailov, on the other hand, received all his negative mentions between 3 and 10 March.

Neither Putin nor Zyuganov were criticised during the first week of monitoring. Zyuganov received most of his negative coverage between 11 and 18 March (75%), whereas Putin received most of his between 19 and 24 March (84.2%).

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA

Putin received 28% of the total coverage of the presidential candidates in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*. Zyuganov came second, at 15%, followed by Yavlinsky (13%) and Zhirinovskiy (9%). Titov's coverage accounted for 6%, whereas the other candidates received between 3% and 5% each.

**Coverage of Candidates in National Press:
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 03 - March 24 2000**



Putin saw his share of the coverage drop from 35% during week 1, via 32% during week 2, to 24% during week 3. Yavlinsky's share of the coverage was also highest during week 1, though he regained some ground during week 3 (14%). Zyuganov received the highest share of coverage in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* during the second week of monitoring (18%). Two candidates – Govorukhin and Podberezkin – were not referred to during week 2.

Table XXX: Candidates' Share (in %) of Coverage in the National Press. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*. 3-24 March 2000


	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	28	35	32	24
Zyuganov	15	9	18	13
Yavlinsky	13	19	12	14
Zhirinovskiy	9	6	10	9
Titov	6	7	4	8
Govorukhin	5	---	6	4
Pamfilova	5	5	5	4
Skuratov	5	3	4	6
Podberezkin	4	---	3	5
Tuleev	4	4	3	5
Dzhabrailov	3	6	2	4
Savostyanov	3	6	1	4
N (sq. cm) =	200,488	16,543	101,961	81,986

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm The totals for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

All candidates received some negative mention in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*. Most of this was given to Zyuganov, though also Zhirinovskiy received a fair amount of negative coverage.

Table XXX: Candidates' share of negative tone, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3-24 March 2000	
	%
Zyuganov	22.4
Zhirinovskiy	14.1
Putin	9.8
Titov	9.1
Skuratov	8.2
Savostyanov	7.5
Dzhabrailov	7.5
Pamfilova	7.5
Govorukhin	6.6
Yavlinsky	5.6
Tuleev	0.8
Podberezkin	0.8
N (sq.cm) =	15,051

Almost all positive references to the candidates in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* were given to Putin (99.6%). The only other candidate to receive some positive mentions was Pamfilova (0.4%). Altogether, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* published 7,790-sq. cm of positive coverage. Each candidate's mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.



Of the two candidates who received some positive coverage in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Putin received the largest proportion: Some 13.5% of his coverage was positive in tone, compared to only 0.3% of Pamfilova's. Savostyanov (19.6%), Dzhabrailov (16.5%) and Skuratov (31.2%) had the highest proportions of negative coverage. Titov (11.8%), Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy (11.4% each) also had a relatively high proportion of negative coverage. Yavlinsky was not referred to in

positive terms, though the proportion of his negative coverage was relatively modest (3.2%).

Table XXX: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage in the National Press. All Newspapers. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 3-24 March 2000

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N (sq.cm) =
Putin	2.5	84.0	13.5	57 139
Yavlinsky	3.2	96.8	---	26 300
Zhirinovskiy	11.4	86.6	---	18 690
Zyuganov	11.4	88.6	---	29 617
Titov	11.8	88.2	---	11 671
Tuleev	1.5	98.5	---	8 499
Dzhabrailov	16.5	83.5	---	6 825
Govorukhin	10.0	90.0	---	10 008
Pamfilova	12.4	87.3	0.3	9 106
Podberezkin	1.7	98.3	---	7 500
Savostyanov	19.6	80.4	---	5 750
Skuratov	13.2	86.8	---	9 383

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm.


If we look at the weekly distribution of positive mentions by candidate, it becomes clear that Putin received the largest share of these (76%) between 11 and 18 March. He also received some positive coverage during the last week of the election campaign. Pamfilova, on the other hand, received all her positive coverage (31 sq. cm altogether) at the very beginning of March.

Three of the four candidates who received negative coverage in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Zyuganov, Titov and Skuratov) received all their negative coverage between 11 and 18 March. All of them received more than 80% of their negative coverage during this week. Negative references to Yavlinsky were made throughout the monitoring period, though most of these appeared in print during the last week of the election campaign (66.7%).

Of those candidates whose negative coverage was spread over a longer period of time, only one – Yavlinsky – got most of this during the last week of the election campaign. Yavlinsky was also the only candidate to receive negative coverage throughout the monitoring period, though considerably less between 3 and 10 March. Yavlinsky received only 3.7% of his negative coverage during the first week of monitoring.

NOVYE IZVESTIYA

Novye Izvestiya focused most of its attention on Putin's pre-election campaign. Putin received 40% of the coverage of the election candidates, compared to Zyuganov's 15% and Yavlinsky's 14%. Tuleev and Dzhabrailov received 5% coverage each, whereas the other candidates received between 2% and 4%.



It is interesting to note that Putin's share of the coverage in *Novye Izvestiya* increased week by week, from 27% during week 1, to 36% during week 2 and 51% during week 3. Coverage of Yavlinsky showed the same trend, increasing from 9% in week 1 to 21% in week 2. Titov and Savostyanov saw their share of the coverage decrease sharply from 10% to 2% and 11% to 1% respectively. Skuratov's share also fell rather sharply from 7% to less than 1%.


Table XXX: Candidates' Share (in %) of Coverage in the National Press. *Novye Izvestiya*. 3-24 March 2000

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	40	27	36	51
Zyuganov	15	12	14	16
Yavlinsky	14	9	12	21
Tuleev	5	1	9	2
Dzhabrailov	5	9	5	3
Zhirinovsky	4	5	7	1
Savostyanov	4	11	4	1
Titov	3	10	0	2
Podberezkin	3	7	4	---
Govorukhin	3	1	4	3
Pamfilova	2	1	4	---
Skuratov	2	7	1	0
N (sq. cm) =	40,637	7,628	17,100	15,909

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm 0 indicates that a candidate got less than 1% of the coverage.

There was very little positive and negative coverage of the various presidential candidates in *Novye Izvestiya* between 3 and 24 March. Only two candidates – Putin and Yavlinsky – received a very small amount of positive coverage. Altogether, *Novye Izvestiya* published 1,308 sq. cm of positive coverage. Some 57.1% of this were about Yavlinsky, whereas the remaining 42.9% focused on Putin's campaign.

The amount of negative coverage was only slightly smaller than the amount of positive coverage in terms of space (1,263 sq.cm compared to 1,308 sq.cm). However, it was distributed between a larger number of candidates (nine out of twelve). The largest share of negative coverage in *Novye Izvestiya* focused on Zyuganov (31.7%) and Yavlinsky (23.8%). Dzhabrailov also took a large share of the negative coverage in *Novye Izvestiya* (13.4%), followed by Zhirinovskiy (9.9%). Putin did considerably better, with only 5% of the negative coverage. Skuratov got 4.4% of the negative coverage, whereas Titov, Savostyanov and Pamfilova each got 4% of the newspaper's negative coverage.



If we look at the proportions of negative, neutral and positive coverage for each candidate, it becomes clear that a higher percentage of Yavlinsky's overall coverage was positive than for Putin. However, Yavlinsky's negative share was also higher. Dzhabrailov, Skuratov and Zhirinovskiy had the highest proportions of negative coverage.

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N (sq.cm) =
Putin	0.4	96.2	3.4	16 279
Yavlinsky	5.1	82.2	12.7	5 889
Zhirinovskiy	7.5	92.5	---	1 670
Zyuganov	6.7	93.3	---	5 957
Titov	3.9	96.1	---	1 270
Dzhabrailov	8.3	91.7	---	2 034
Pamfilova	6.7	93.3	---	75.0
Savostyanov	2.9	97.1	---	1 740
Skuratov	7.7	92.3	---	723


Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq. cm. Candidates who received only neutral coverage in *Novye Izvestiya* are not included in the table.

Yavlinsky received the largest proportion of his positive coverage between 11 and 18 March (83.3%). He also received some positive coverage during the last week of the election campaign (16.7%), though none between 3 and 10 March. Neither Putin received any positive coverage during the first week of monitoring. Putin's positive coverage was spread evenly over the two last weeks of the election campaign (51% and 49% respectively).

A majority of those candidates who were referred to in negative terms in *Novye Izvestiya*, received all their negative coverage during the first week of monitoring (3-10 March). These candidates were Dzhabrailov, Titov, Savostyanov and Pamfilova. Zyuganov and Putin received all their negative coverage between 11 and 18 March, whereas Zhirinovskiy and Skuratov had theirs reserved for the last week of the election campaign. Yavlinsky's negative coverage was spread over the first week (16.7%) and last week (83.3%) of the monitoring.

PRAVDA

Putin (39%) and Zyuganov (38%) got more than 2/3rds of *Pravda's* coverage of the various presidential candidates. All other candidates got 6% or less of the coverage. Two candidates, Dzhabrailov and Savostyanov, failed to get any mentions in *Pravda*.




Zyuganov's share of the candidates' coverage in *Pravda* dropped as the election day came closer. Putin, in contrast (although his share dropped by almost 20% in week 2, compared with week 1), increased his share of the coverage somewhat during the last week of the election campaign. *Pravda* did not refer to Yavlinsky during the first week of the monitoring. His share of the coverage remained low between 11 and 24 March, though it doubled during the last week of the election campaign.

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	39	51	33	41

Zyuganov	38	48	42	34
Yavlinsky	6	---	4	8
Tuleev	5	1	4	6
Skuratov	4	---	4	5
Zhirinovskiy	3	0	4	2
Govorukhin	2	---	4	1
Titov	1	---	1	2
Podberezkin	1	---	4	0
Pamfilova	1	---	---	1
N (sq.cm) =	43,497	5,214	12,548	25,735

Perhaps not surprisingly, *Pravda* gave all its positive coverage to Zyuganov – the newspaper’s preferred candidate. The amount of positive coverage made in *Pravda* was considerably larger (8,256 sq.cm) than for most of the other newspapers included in the monitoring exercise. Zyuganov’s main rival, Putin, received almost all of *Pravda*’s negative references. His share was as high as 82.1% of the total, compared to Yavlinsky’s 5.2%. Four other candidates – Govorukhin (4%), Podberezkin (4%), Tuleev (3.4%) and Titov (1.2%) – were given some negative coverage in *Pravda*. Altogether *Pravda* printed 12,386 sq.cm of negative coverage. Each candidate’s mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.



Zyuganov received an almost equal mix of neutral and positive coverage in *Pravda*. No negative references were made to this candidate. In contrast, Putin received more negative than neutral coverage – and no positive mentions. Three candidates were referred to only in neutral terms: Zhirinovskiy, Pamfilova and Skuratov. Apart from Putin, two other candidates – Podberezkin (81.8%) and Govorukhin (57.1%) - received most of their coverage in the form of negative references.

Table XXX: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage in the National Press. Pravda. 3-24 March 2000				
	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N (sq.cm) =
Putin	59.9	40.1	---	16 990


Yavlinsky	25.1	74.9	---	2 545
Zhirinovskiy	---	100.0	---	1 139
Zyuganov	---	50.2	49.8	16 569
Titov	27.5	72.5	---	545
Tuleev	20.5	79.5	---	2 083
Govorukhin	57.1	42.9	---	875
Pamfilova	---	100.0	---	250
Podberezkin	81.8	18.2	---	611
Skuratov	---	100.0	---	1 889

Note: Dzhabrailov and Savostyanov are not included in the table as they did not receive any coverage in Pravda. Candidates who received only neutral coverage in Pravda are not included in the table.

A week-by-week comparison of Zyuganov's positive coverage shows that more than two thirds of this was made during the last week of the election campaign (69.7%). The rest was evenly distributed between the first (14.9%) and the second (15.4%) weeks of monitoring. Putin's negative coverage during the first two weeks of the monitoring was fairly evenly distributed (16.8% and 16.6% respectively). Some two thirds of all negative references to the incumbent were made during the last week of the election campaign (66.6%). Most of Yavlinsky's negative references were recorded by the monitors between 11 and 18 March (76.5%). The remaining negative references were made on the eve of the elections (23.5%). Tuleev received the lion's share of his negative references during the last week of the election campaign (87.8%) and the rest (12.2%) between 3 and 10 March. All negative coverage of Govorukhin and Podberezkin was made between 11 and 18 March, whereas Titov was criticised only during the last week of the election campaign.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA

Most of the coverage of the presidential candidates in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* was also given to Putin (23%). Yavlinsky and Zyuganov received almost an equal share of the coverage (13% and 12% respectively), followed by Podberezkin (7%), Skuratov (7%), Titov, Tuleev and Savostyanov (6% each), Govorukhin (5%), Dzhabrailov (5%), Pamfilova (5%), Zhirinovskiy (5%), and Zhirinovskiy (5%).




Putin's share of the coverage of the presidential candidates in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* increased rather sharply from 16% in week 1, to 23% in week 2 and 32% in week 3. Yavlinsky's coverage also increased considerably towards the end of the election campaign, rising from 10% (week 2) to 27% (week 3). Five candidates (Skuratov, Podberezkin, Dzhabrailov, Govorukhin and Pamfilova) who all received coverage during week 2, were not mentioned by *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* during the last week of campaigning. Zyuganov's coverage during the three weeks of monitoring remained stable. No references were made to Zhirinovskiy during the first week of monitoring.

Table XXX: Candidates' Share (in %) of Coverage in the National Press. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 3-24 March 2000				
	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	23	16	23	32
Yavlinsky	13	9	10	27
Zyuganov	12	10	13	13
Skuratov	7	8	8	---
Podberezkin	7	8	7	---
Titov	6	8	5	10
Tuleev	6	9	5	0
Savostyanov	6	8	5	11
Zhirinovskiy	5	---	9	7
Dzhabrailov	5	8	5	---
Govorukhin	5	8	5	---
Pamfilova	5	8	5	---
N (sq. cm) =	111,979	38,833	61,960	11,186

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm

Putin was the only candidate to receive some positive coverage in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. Altogether, he received 3,567 sq.cm of positive coverage. The newspaper printed a considerably larger amount of negative coverage of the candidates (10,500 sq.cm). Zyuganov received the largest share of this (38.1%). Yavlinsky's and Putin's shares were more or less equal (28.6% and 26.2% respectively), whereas Zhirinovskiy came a distant fourth with 7.1% of the newspaper's negative candidate coverage. The distribution of negative, neutral and positive coverage for each of the candidates is depicted in the chart below.



Although Putin was the only candidate to receive some positive coverage in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, his positive coverage (14.2%) was almost matched in amount by negative coverage (11%). Putin's main rivals Zyuganov and Yavlinsky, received quite a large share of negative mentions (29.3% and 23% respectively), as did Zhirinovskiy (12.3%). Coverage of all other candidates was 100% neutral.

Table XXX: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage in the National Press. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. 3-24 March 2000


	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N (sq.cm) =
Putin	11.0	74.8	14.2	25 037
Yavlinsky	23.0	77.0	---	13 020
Zhirinovskiy	12.3	87.7	---	6 074
Zyuganov	29.3	70.7	---	13 650

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm. Candidates who received only neutral coverage in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* are not included in the table.

All positive references to Putin in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* were made between 11 and 18 March. In the course of this week, Yavlinsky and Zhirinovskiy also got all their negative coverage. Zyuganov and Putin received the largest share of their negative coverage during the second week of the monitoring (75% and 63.6% respectively). The remaining amount was printed during the following week.

SEGODNYA

More than a third of *Segodnya's* coverage of the presidential candidates between 3-24 March was given to Putin (43%). Zyuganov came second, with 14% of the coverage, followed by Yavlinsky (10%) and Zhirinovskiy (7%). The other candidates received 5% or less each.



Coverage of most candidates remained fairly stable during the three weeks of monitoring – though Putin saw his share of the coverage decrease from 49% during the second week to 37% during the third week. Further, Zhirinovsky lost 5% of his coverage from week 2 to week 3.


Table XXX: Candidates' Share (in %) of Coverage in the National Press. Segodnya. 3-24 March 2000

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	43	46	49	37
Zyuganov	14	11	14	14
Yavlinsky	10	10	8	11
Zhirinovskiy	7	7	10	5
Titov	5	4	5	5
Govorukhin	4	4	3	5
Pamfilova	4	4	3	4
Tuleev	3	2	0	5
Dzhabrailov	3	4	2	5
Savostyanov	3	4	2	3
Skuratov	3	4	2	4
Podberezkin	1	0	2	2
N (sq. cm) =	80,588	17,091	29,781	33,714

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm The totals for each week added together therefore do not match the total for the whole period.

Although coverage of the presidential candidates in *Segodnya* was overwhelmingly neutral, all major candidates had to put up with some negative references. Altogether, the newspaper printed 3,388 sq.cm of negative coverage. Putin received

the largest share of these (42.9%), followed by Yavlinsky (31.6%) and Zyuganov (14.3%). Zhirinovskiy and Titov each received less than 10% of *Segodnya's* negative coverage of the candidates (9.2% and 2% respectively). Only one candidate – Putin – was given some positive coverage. Such coverage amounted to 2,819 sq.cm. Each candidate's distribution of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.



Although Putin received the largest share of all negative coverage in *Segodnya*, it was Yavlinsky who received the highest proportion of negative coverage (13.4%). Other candidates received 5% or less of their total coverage as negative references.

Table XXX: Candidates' Distribution (in %) of Negative, Neutral and Positive Coverage in the National Press. Segodnya. 3-24 March 2000

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N (sq.cm) =
Putin	4.1	87.9	8.0	35 238
Yavlinsky	13.4	86.6	---	7 991
Zhirinovskiy	5.4	94.6	---	5 754
Zyuganov	4.4	95.6	---	10 946
Titov	1.7	98.3	---	3 862

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm. Candidates who received only neutral coverage in Segodnya are not included in the table.


In terms of weekly distribution, Putin received slightly more positive mentions between 11 and 18 March (57%) than during the last week of the election campaign (43%). A majority of the candidates who were referred to in negative terms by *Segodnya*, received more than half of their negative coverage during the last week of the election campaign. During this week Zyuganov received 58.8%, Putin 54% and Yavlinsky 50.1% of their negative coverage. In contrast, Zhirinovskiy was given some two thirds of his negative coverage (64.3%) during the first week of the monitoring. Titov received all his negative coverage between 11 and 18 March.

Table XXX: Candidates' Weekly Distribution (in %) of Negative Coverage in the National Press. Segodnya. 3-24 March 2000.				
	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N (sq.cm) =
Putin	---	46.0	54.0	1,455
Yavlinsky	18.7	31.2	50.1	1,069
Zyuganov	41.2	---	58.8	486
Zhirinovskiy	64.3	35.7	---	311
Titov	---	100.0	---	67

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm.


TRUD

Trud also focused its coverage of the presidential election campaign on the incumbent. Putin received 37% of the coverage in this newspaper, followed by Zyuganov and Tuleev (13% each) and Yavlinsky (12%). Coverage of Podberezkin accounted for 6%. All other candidates received 4% or less each.



Most candidates received fairly even coverage during the monitoring period, though coverage of Putin peaked at 43% during the second week. Zyuganov received the largest share of the coverage during week 1, as did Yavlinsky and Podberezkin.

Trud printed a very small amount of positive coverage of the candidates (713 sq.cm). Putin received the largest share of positive mentions (64.9%) whereas Yavlinsky got the rest (35.1%). Although *Trud* did carry a rather large amount of negative references to various candidates (5,334 sq.cm), only three candidates were unfortunate enough to get them. Yavlinsky received half of these (50%). Zyuganov (37.5%) and Putin (12.5%) were also referred to in negative terms. Each candidate's distribution of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.




Yavlinsky got the highest proportion of negative coverage in *Trud*. Almost half of the newspaper's references to Yavlinsky (41.2%) were negative. A large proportion of all mentions made of Zyuganov were also negative (29.4%). In contrast, coverage of Putin was overwhelmingly neutral. Negative and positive coverage accounted for less than 6% of his overall coverage. Coverage of all other candidates was 100% neutral.

All positive coverage of Yavlinsky in *Trud* was made between 11 and 18 March. Putin received most of his positive coverage the same week (93.3%), though *Trud* also made some positive references to the incumbent at the beginning of the month (3-10 March). All negative coverage of Zyuganov and Putin was made during the first and the last week of monitoring respectively. Yavlinsky's negative coverage was spread over the first week (75%) and the last week (25%).

ZAVTRA

Almost 50% of *Zavtra's* coverage of the presidential candidates focused on Putin (48%). Zyuganov trailed far behind at 18%, whereas other candidates took 5% each or less of the newspaper's coverage.




Putin's share of *Zavtra's* coverage was highest during weeks 1 and 2 (60% and 61% respectively), dropping rather sharply to 38% during the third week of monitoring. Zyuganov took 32% of the coverage during week 1, saw his share of the coverage drop to only 9% during week 2, though it did increase somewhat during week 3, to 17%. Yavlinsky received no coverage at all in *Zavtra* during the first and second weeks of monitoring – and received a modest 6% of the coverage during week 3. Rather surprisingly, Skuratov's share of the coverage accounted for 24% during week 2. He received no coverage in either week 1 or week 3. Few of the candidates were mentioned in *Zavtra* during the two first weeks of monitoring: only 3 candidates in week 1 (Putin, Zyuganov and Tuleev) and 4 candidates during week 2 (Putin, Zyuganov, Skuratov and Zhirinovsky).

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	48	60	61	38
Zyuganov	18	32	9	17
Titov	5	---	---	9
Skuratov	5	---	24	---
Pamfilova	5	---	---	9
Yavlinsky	4	---	---	6
Govorukhin	4	---	---	6
Zhirinovsky	3	---	6	3
Tuleev	3	8	---	3
Savostyanov	3	---	---	6
Dzhabrailov	2	---	---	3
Podberezkin	---	---	---	---
N (sq. cm) =	35,871	7,302	7,100	21,469

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm.

Zavtra was, like *Pravda*, favourable only to one of the candidates. Zyuganov received a total of 1,151 sq.cm of positive coverage between 3 and 24 March. Altogether the newspaper printed 10,873 sq.cm of negative coverage. The largest

share of this (69.4%) was reserved for Putin. Six other candidates – Zhirinovskiy, Titov, Tuleev, Dzhabrailov, Savostyanov and Pamfilova – each received 5.1% of all negative references in *Zavtra*. It is interesting to note that *Zavtra* made no critical comments about Yavlinsky’s election campaign. Each candidate’s mix of negative, neutral and positive coverage is depicted in the chart below.



Altogether, 43.9% of all references made to Putin were negative in tone. The newspaper was also very critical of Tuleev (58.1%) and Savostyanov (45.4%). All coverage of Dzhabrailov was negative, as were more than half of Zhirinovskiy’s (58.1%) and nearly a third of all mentions of Titov and Pamfilova. *Zavtra* referred to Yavlinsky, Govorukhin and Skuratov only in neutral terms.

	Negative	Neutral	Positive	N (sq.cm) =
Putin	43.9	56.1	---	17 163
Yavlinsky	---	100.0	---	1 375
Zhirinovskiy	58.1	41.9	---	955
Zyuganov	---	82.3	17.7	6 516
Titov	28.8	71.2	---	1 930
Tuleev	48.3	51.7	---	1 150
Dzhabrailov	100.0	---	---	555
Govorukhin	---	100.0	---	1 375
Pamfilova	28.3	71.2	---	1 930
Podberezkin	---	---	---	---
Savostyanov	45.4	54.6	---	1 222
Skuratov	---	100.0	---	1.700

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm. Candidates who received only neutral coverage in *Zavtra* are not included in the table

Zyuganov received some two thirds of his positive coverage during the last week of the election campaign. No positive references were made to the leader of the

Communist Party during the first week of monitoring (3-10 March). Negative coverage of Putin appeared during each of the three weeks the monitoring lasted, though most (47%) criticism of this candidate appeared between 11 and 18 March. Other negative references to Putin were evenly distributed between 3 and 10 March and 19 and 24 March. All other candidates (Zhirinovskiy, Titov, Tuleev, Dzhabrailov, Savostyanov and Pamfilova) referred to in negative terms by *Zavtra*, received all their negative coverage during the last week of the election campaign.

Advertising

There was very little advertising in the Russian national press during the presidential election campaign. *Rossiyskaya gazeta* and *Trud* carried the largest share of adverts. *Kommersant Daily* came third (6.2%). *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, *Novye Izvestiya* and *Segodnya* did not print paid political adverts during the monitoring period.

Table XXX: Share (in %) of Articles and Advertising in the National Press. All Newspapers. 3-24 March 2000.

	Articles %	Adverts %	N (sq.cm) =
Rossiyskaya Gazeta	80.4	19.6	111,979
Trud	84.9	15.1	53,156
Kommersant Daily	93.8	6.2	64,539
Izvestiya	97.3	2.7	120,812
Pravda	98.0	2.0	43,497
Argumenty i Fakty	98.5	1.5	83,465
Komsomolskaya Pravda	98.6	1.4	139,084
Zavtra	99.3	0.7	35,871
Moskovskiy Komsom.	99.8	0.2	114,201
Nezavisimaya Gazeta	100.0	---	200,488
Novye Izvestiya	100.0	---	40,637
Segodnya	100.0	---	80,588

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm.


The monitors recorded articles and advertising of the presidential candidates in the national press. By looking at the mix of advertising and articles, we found that the candidate with the largest share of coverage as advertising was Podberezkin. Some 10.3% of his coverage were done in the form of adverts. He was followed by Yavlinsky (7.6%), Zyuganov (6.2%) and Tuleev (4.5). The amount of adverts for the other candidates was less than four percent of their total coverage. Three candidates – Govorukhin, Dzhabrailov and Pamfilova – did not advertise in the national press from 3 to 24 March.

Table XXX: Advertising (in %) by Candidate in the National Press. All Newspapers. 3-24 March 2000

	Advert	N (sq.cm) =
Podberezkin	10.8	41,557
Yavlinsky	7.6	134,078
Zyuganov	6.2	154,271
Tuleev	4.5	72,205
Skuratov	3.9	44,702
Savostyanov	2.7	37,058
Putin	2.6	348,485
Zhirinovskiy	2.0	75,798
Zyuganov	1.8	55,227
Dzhabrailov	---	40,019

Govorukhin	---	43,700
Pamfilova	---	41,222
Note: Only articles and advertising were recorded during monitoring.		

Each candidate's mix of articles and advertising is depicted graphically in the chart below.



Rossiyskaya Gazeta carried adverts for the largest number of candidates (eight), followed by *Kommersant-Daily* and *Trud* (four candidates each), *Argumenty i Fakty* and *Izvestiya* (two candidates each) and *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, *Pravda* and *Zavtra* (one candidate each).

	AiF	Izvest	Kom. Daily	Kom Prav	Mosk Koms	Nez Gaz	Nov Izvest	Prav	Ross Gaz	Seg	Trud	Zavtra
Putin			X		X				X		X	
Yavl	X	X	X	X					X		X	
Zhir									X			
Zyug			X					X	X		X	X
Titov									X			
Tuleev	X	X										
Dzhab												
Govor												
Savost									X			
Skurat									X			
Pamfil												
Podb			X						X		X	

The most active advertisers were Yavlinsky, Zyuganov and Putin. Yavlinsky advertised in six of the twelve newspapers included in the monitoring (*Argumenty i Fakty*, *Izvestiya*, *Kommersant Daily*, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* and *Trud*), Zyuganov advertised in five (*Kommersant Daily*, *Pravda*, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, *Trud* and *Zavtra*) and Putin in four (*Kommersant Daily*, *Moskovskiy*

Komsomolets, Rossiyskaya Gazeta and Trud). Podberezkin advertised in three papers, Tuleev in two and Zhirinovskiy, Titov, Savostyanov and Skuratov in one newspaper each.

One might expect the candidates to advertise themselves most actively during the very last days of the election campaign. Table XXX, however, shows that of those three candidates who advertised during every week of the monitoring (Yavlinsky, Putin, Zyuganov), all did most of their advertising during week 2 (11-18 March). They actually did the least advertising during the last week of the campaign (19-24 March).

Table XXX: Candidates' Weekly Distribution (in %) of Advertising (in %) in the National Press. All Newspapers. 3-24 March 2000				
	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)	N (sq.cm) =
Yavlinsky	31.5	58.7	9.8	10,217
Putin	36.1	52.8	11.1	9,000
Zyuganov	31.2	58.4	10.4	9,617
Podberezkin	66.7	33.3	---	4,500
Tuleev	38.5	61.5	---	3,250
Skuratov	---	100.0	---	1,750
Zhirinovskiy	---	---	100.0	1,500
Titov	---	---	100.0	1,000
Savostyanov	---	---	100.0	1,000
Pamfilova	---	---	---	---
Dzhabrailov	---	---	---	---
Govorukhin	---	---	---	---

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm.


In terms of share of coverage, Putin, Yavlinsky, Zyuganov and Podberezkin, whose shares of that week's advertising were almost equal, dominated advertising during the first week of the monitoring. Tuleev trailed somewhat behind, with 9.1% of the coverage. The second week saw a continuation of this trend: Yavlinsky, Zyuganov and Putin's shares of the advertising were considerably bigger than those of Skuratov, Tuleev, Podberezkin and Zhirinovskiy. The five candidates who advertised during week 3 held 20% of the total advertising each.

Table XXX: Candidates' Share of advertising (in %) in the National Press. All Newspapers. 3-24 March 2000.			
	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	23.7	20.5	20.0
Yavlinsky	23.5	26.0	20.0
Zyuganov	21.9	24.3	20.0
Podberezkin	21.9	6.5	---
Tuleev	9.1	8.7	---
Zhirinovskiy	---	6.5	---
Skuratov	---	7.6	---
Titov	---	---	20.0
Savostyanov	---	---	20.0
Dzhabrailov	---	---	---
Govorukhin	---	---	---
Pamfilova	---	---	---
N (sq.cm) =	13,717	23,117	5,000

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm.


ARGUMENTY I FAKTY

Only two of the candidates – Yavlinsky and Tuleev – advertised in *Argumenty i Fakty* during the three weeks this newspaper was monitored. Tuleev’s adverts accounted for 82.2% of the total advertising (1,217 sq.cm). Yavlinsky’s advert appeared during the first week of monitoring (3-10 March), whereas Tuleev did his advertising during week 2 (11-18 March).




IZVESTIYA

Yavlinsky and Tuleev were the only two candidates to advertise also in *Izvestiya*. Again, Tuleev purchased the largest share of advertising (2,250 sq.cm), compared to Yavlinsky’s 1,000 sq.cm. Yavlinsky advertised during week 2, whereas Tuleev spread his advertising over week 1 (1,250 sq.cm) and week 2 (1,000 sq.cm).




KOMMERSANT DAILY

The four candidates who advertised in *Kommersant Daily* (Putin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky, Podberezkin) each purchased 1,000 sq.cm of advertising. It is also interesting to note that all candidates chose to advertise during the last week of the election campaign (19-24 March).




KOMSOMLSKAYA PRAVDA

Only one candidate – Yavlinsky – advertised in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. He purchased 2,000 sq.cm during week 2 of the monitoring (11-18 March).




MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS

Moskovskiy Komsomolets carried adverts only for the incumbent. He purchased 250 sq.cm of advertising during week 1 of the monitoring (3-10 March).



PRAVDA

Pravda advertised only one of the presidential candidates – Zyuganov. The amount of advertising printed for this candidate was rather modest at 867 sq.cm All advertising appeared during week 2 of monitoring (11-18 March).



ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA


Rossiyskaya Gazeta was the most popular among those newspapers included in the monitoring, in terms of advertising. Eight candidates advertised in the paper, and the adverts of three of these (Putin, Zyuganov and Yavlinsky) appeared both in week 2 and week 3. None of the candidates advertised during week 1. Putin and Zyuganov were the most active advertisers, with Yavlinsky trailing slightly behind. The other candidates (Skuratov, Zhirinovskiy, Podberezkin, Titov and Savostyanov) purchased rather modest amounts of advertising.

Table XXX: Candidates' Share (in %) of Advertising in the National Press. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 3-24 March 2000

	Whole period (3-24 March)	Week 1 (3-10 March)	Week 2 (11-18 March)	Week 3 (19-24 March)
Putin	26.1	---	27.9	20.0
Zyuganov	25.0	---	26.5	20.0
Yavlinsky	18.2	---	17.6	20.0
Zhirinovskiy	6.8	---	8.8	---
Titov	4.5	---	---	20.0
Podberezkin	6.8	---	8.8	---
Skuratov	8.0	---	10.3	---
Savostyanov	4.5	---	---	20.0
N (sq.cm) =	22,000	---	17,000	5,000

Note: Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest sq.cm.


Each candidate's mix of adverts and articles is depicted in the chart below.



TRUD

Four candidates (Putin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky and Podberezkin) advertised in *Trud*. Each candidate purchased a total of 2,000 sq.cm and their adverts appeared during the first week of monitoring (3-10 March).


**Coverage of Candidates in the National Press:
Trud, March 03 - March 24 2000.
Articles and Advertising**



ZAVTRA

Zyuganov was the only candidate to advertise also in *Zavtra* – and again with a very modest amount (250 sq.cm) Zyuganov’s advert appeared in print during week 2 of the monitoring (11-18 March).

**Coverage of Candidates in the National Press:
Zavtra, March 03 - March 24, 2000.
Articles and Advertising**



6 Vladivostok²

6.1 Political background and the authorities

In 1995, the president of the insurance company Dalrosso, Vladimir Shakhov, was deputy of the State Duma for Vladivostok. In 1999 he was not re-elected because of the large proportion of the electorate which voted "against all". In 1995 in the Arsenyevsk constituency, 10.6 per cent of the electorate voted "against all", in Ussuriisk constituency, 11.4 per cent and in Vladivostok, 7.3 percent. In 1999, in Arsenyevsk constituency, 16.61 per cent of the electorate voted "against all", in Ussuriisk constituency, 13.65 per cent, and in Vladivostok, 19.47 per cent.

Regional Governor of Vladivostok E. Nazdratenko has attempted to influence and control local self-government, the federal authority, and all branches of business. For this reason the governor has had major conflicts with his political oponents.

The main economic problem of the region is the energy shortage. The energy producing companies are not paid in full for their services and as a result, the electric power supply and central heating are regularly cut off in residential blocks. Primorskii Krai is one of the three most subsidised regions of the Russian Federation.

The main social problem is the shrinking of jobs in traditional areas: the defence industry, agriculture, mining, fishing and fish processing. The resulting social tension manifests itself in soaring criminality and the spread of drugs (Manchuria hemp grows in Primorskii Krai).

The Krai administration always supports its own candidates on the elections and administration resources are used for their promotion. The election campaign is controlled at meetings in special headquarters, which include all the leading officials of the Krai administration. The district-level officials are warned that they are "responsible" for the results of the elections. In December 2000, during the elections of the regional Governor, a group of the deputies of the Krai Duma distributed a statement. This contained information to the effect that a meeting was held of the election team of E. Nazdratenko in the Krai administration, who was running for re-election. The representative of the president in the Krai, V. Kuzov, chaired the meeting. The heads of local law-enforcement bodies were invited to the meeting.

The deputy governor Evgenii Krasnov and the Governor's press secretary Natalya Vstovskaya were in charge of contacts with the press.

The press service of the local administration prepares materials in support of "approved candidates" and against their contenders, which are then dispatched to the local media. This is the explanation for the fact that major newspapers published the same material.

² All reports on the media in the regions were provided by the local branches of the Moscow-based non-governmental National Press Institute.

Governor Nazdratenko avoided making public statements in support of “his” candidates. Speaking about the presidential hopefuls he stated: “Zyuganov’s program is traditionally strong, the industry and tax proposals are not bad in Yavlinsky’s programme, Zhirinovskiy is right about the federal structure. Putin seems to be a proponent of the strong state (derzhavnik)”.

The head of the Vladivostok city administration, Yuri Kopylov, in his statement on state radio repeatedly called listeners to vote for certain candidates. The editors of media outlets were invited by the governor to talk about the observation of law during the election campaign. Then the talk developed into the assignment of tasks and ended by including the editors in the election team. Representatives of national publications who have not demonstrated strong loyalty to local authorities were also invited to speak to the governor. They were advised to “maintain neutrality” during the elections.

The loyalty of the media is reinforced with significant financial infusions. This is implemented usually in the form of an agreement “concerning information cooperation for covering activities of the Krai administration”.

During the election campaign disloyal correspondents of the national media were called to Moscow or sent on business trips to other regions. The broadcasting of the radio station Lemma was cut off, and the station was evicted from the office without a court decision. Nazdratenko managed to get the editor-in-chief of the regional supplement to the newspaper *Moskovskii Komsomolets* dismissed. After the elections the head of the ORT Far-Eastern bureau was also dismissed.

In Primorskii Krai there is a pool of publications financed from the Krai budget. These are mainly district newspapers, and also the publication of the Vladivostok administration *Primorskii Vesti* (Primorskii Krai News), and the newspaper *Krasnoe Znamya Primorya* (Primorskii Krai Red Banner), published by the Primorye Public TV holding. They are financed from the Krai budget as a “support to the media”. The draft Krai budget for 2000 stipulates the allotment for this purpose of 32.3m roubles, one-and-a-half times more than in 1999.

6.2 Media

Newspapers

Vladivostok, daily circulation 53,000 copies, on Fridays, 73,000. The newspaper is owned by the JSC Vladivostok-Novosti (Vladivostok-News). Major shareholders are the Far-Eastern Sea Line and the owner of the meat-processing company Algos. The newspaper tends to maintain a serious and balanced style without indicating political preferences. No criticism of the governor or any comprehensive analysis of his activities are published. The newspaper regularly publishes materials supplied by the Krai administration press service. For this publication, the election campaign is seen as a source of revenue.

Novosti (News), circulation 43,000 copies. The newspaper is published by the JSC Izdatelskii Dom “Konkurent” (“Competitor” Publishing House). The editor-in-chief and the owner of this tabloid edition is Oleg Karpilov, who boasts solid relations with the Krai administration. The newspaper focuses on “unmasking” the governor’s foes.

Many candidates prefer not to place their advertising in the newspaper. Otherwise it is a professionally edited “yellow” (tabloid) newspaper targeting the youth market. The newspaper has no obvious political sympathies, however, it demonstrates antipathy towards communist-type parties.

Arsenevskie Vesti (Arsenyevska News), circulation 11,000 copies, was founded by individuals who proclaimed themselves to be “democrats and human-rights campaigners”. The editor-in-chief is Irina Grebneva. The newspaper takes an opposition stance with respect to the Krai authorities. The publication does not feature large on objectivity, impartiality or balanced coverage. It is aligned with the Union of Rightwing Forces. During the elections special issues were published devoted to “good candidates”, where the key figure was former Vladivostok Mayor V. Cherepkov.

TV Companies

Primorskoe TV belongs to the RTR holding company. The broadcaster is considered to be, at least in Moscow, a “state-owned TV company”. The company’s general director is Valerii Bakshin, the founder and the former editor-in-chief of the *Vladivostok* newspaper. His nomination to the office was effected by Governor Nazdratenko.

The audience – the largest in the region – makes up 75 per cent of the 2m population of the Primorskii Krai.

The daily information program “Mestnoe Vremya” (Local Time) is politically neutral, however the governor’s opponents do not get access to the programme. During the campaign the channel aired advertising of all candidates and provided free time for statements.

Radio

VBC is the most popular broadcaster in the FM/AM range boasting an audience of 1m listeners. The station is privately owned; the general director is Igor Shmakov. The station is focused on entertainment but it also produces news and analytical programming. It is loyal to the Krai administration. The company is financially independent but rents offices and studios from the local state radio company. During the elections the station supported the candidates of the Krai administration. In December of last year the station refused to advertise A. Kirillychev, Nazdratenko’s opponent. This was in spite of an agreement and advance payment.

6.3 Media and Elections

Local media covered the elections within the same sections and programmes as usual. Only interviews with the candidates were somewhat emphasised. As these materials were paid for, journalists tried to represent the candidates in a favourable perspective.

The presidential campaign had virtually no effect on the local media. Very little material was submitted by the candidates. Local TV aired the same slots as the national channels. The single novelty were statements of the “candidate’s proxy”. For example, Putin’s proxy in Primorskii Krai was V. Tarabarov, head of the Vladivostok

branch of the national railway company. He had met with Putin on three occasions, i.e. attended events which were also attended by Putin. The proxy's role was to describe in his own words Putin's statements on Chechnya, as well as adding "Putin will establish order in the country". While the presidential campaign was very low key in the local media, outdoor advertising appeared on the streets of Vladivostok. The poster campaign was for Putin alone; other candidates were absent.

Major local media outlets refrained from comments and analytical materials of their own.

Former General Prosecutor Yuri Skuratov was the only candidate who visited Vladivostok during the presidential campaign. The one-day visit included a press conference at the airport and a meeting with the voters. Almost all the media quoted some of his statements. *Novosti* newspaper called Skuratov the "prostitutes' idol".

The newspaper *Vladivostok* reprinted an article from Khabarovsk-based newspaper *Tikhookeanskaya Zvezda* (Pacific Star) in which the author alleged that Zyuganov looked more like "a Bavarian pumped with beer" than a Russian man, with allusions to the notion that Zyuganov's real father was a German occupier.

Putin was mentioned more often than other candidates but in news rather than election related materials. Yavlinsky, Zyuganov, and Zhirinovskiy were also present in the press. Titov was mentioned in rare instances, while such candidates as Govorukhin, Savostyanov, and Dzhabrailov were not mentioned at all. It should be noted that the local population gets information mainly from the programmes of the national channels ORT, RTR, and NTV.

Assessments of the candidates were present only in interviews with Vladivostok residents. Opinions were aired which focused on the major hopefuls: Putin "will bomb not just Chechnya, but everyone"; Zyuganov "will again rob us of everything, will divide everything up, and once again sausages will be rationed"; Yavlinsky has "lost all his support and done nothing".

Rates for political advertising were usually 1.5 times higher than regular rates. The prices were published in advance and there was no substantiation of claims that any of the candidates enjoyed discount rates.

Judging by the poster campaign on the streets of Vladivostok, Putin was the top spender on outdoor advertising. Yavlinsky appeared to lead in terms of media advertising spending.

The candidates' election teams thoroughly monitored advertising of the contenders and calculated their expenses. There was virtually no hidden advertising in the local media. The regional editions of the Moscow-based newspapers *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, *Izvestiya*, and *Argumenty i Fakty* contained a lot of material which did appear to be hidden advertising, however this was concentrated in that part of the newspapers which was produced in Moscow.

Wars between media outlets because of support for one or other of the candidates were a specific feature of the national TV channels. The local media confronted each other on more straightforward issues: advertising, money, and support of the owners.

Heads of the local election committee in charge of organising the presidential elections locally had a series of meetings with editors and journalists. The meetings were devoted to the observation of the law. Editors and journalists were advised not

to publish forecasts on the voting. During the December elections to the Duma and of the Krai Governor a number of media outlets were warned or fined for presenting their own opinions of the candidates. The voter could not rely on finding analytical material about the candidates in newspapers and had to make a decision on information provided in advertising material.

7 Novosibirsk

7.1 Political background and the authorities

At the Duma elections of 1995 in Novosibirsk region 21.26 per cent of the voters voted for the CPRF, 18.06 per cent for the LDPR, 7.18 per cent for NDR, and 7.18 per cent for Yabloko.

The Novosibirsk region is divided into four one-mandate constituencies: No. 124 ("rural"), No. 125 ("urban"), No. 126 ("urban"), No. 127 ("urban + rural"). In the 124th constituency Nikolai Kharitonov (Agrarian Party) won 36 per cent of votes. In the 125th constituency Nikolai Anichkin was the first among twelve candidates (14.27 per cent, Narodovlastie -- Power of People). In the 126th constituency the winner was Arkadii Yankovsky (15.59 per cent, Yabloko). In the 127th constituency Evgenii Leonov was the first among fifteen candidates (24.88 per cent, LDPR). It is noteworthy that the 127th constituency is the only one-mandate constituency in Russia where the LDPR candidate won the elections.

During the 1999 elections the largest number of votes for the party lists went to the CPRF (28.28 per cent), followed by Yedinstvo (20.38 per cent), and by Yabloko (9.82 per cent) and the Union of Rightwing Forces (9.51 per cent).

For some time, the key political issue in the Novosibirsk region has been the confrontation between the municipal and regional authorities.

The average monthly salary in Novosibirsk region is 956 rubles, and the average pensions with extra payments equal 412 roubles. This means that 42 per cent of the population are living below the poverty level (as compared to 39.8 per cent in 1995). During March 2000, prices increased in the region by three per cent, more than in neighbouring regions. One of the major problems is environmental pollution, which is negatively affecting health of the population (especially of children). At the same time the number of medical institutions decreased in 1995-97, predominantly in rural areas.

The situation in the construction industry is worsening. While in 1995 638 square metres of new apartments were built, in 1998, this was reduced to 495 square metres. No fewer than 100,000 families are waiting for new apartments.

About 10% of the economically active population in the Novosibirsk region are unemployed.

In February 2000 the experts of the Centre for Analytical Research "Socium" carried out a poll to identify the social and economical problems which most alarmed Novosibirsk region residents. The first three were finances (28 per cent), unemployment (21 per cent), and accommodation (16 per cent). The least important problems were crime (five per cent), arrears with wage payments (three per cent), and drugs and alcoholism (three per cent).

Production output is shrinking each year. Many major enterprises in the region are actually bankrupt. The economic situation is aggravated by the high proportion of Soviet-era military-industrial and heavy industry plants making up local industry, which have basically collapsed. The volume of agricultural production also decreases from year to year.

The Governor of Novosibirsk region was elected in 1995 and 1999. During the Duma election of 1999 the Governor of Novosibirsk region (at that time Vitaly Mukha) supported his deputy Nadezhda Azarova who was nominated on the list of the Homeland movement. Mukha also supported the Homeland movement and was a member of the bloc's Federal Council. In 1996 Mukha supported presidential hopeful Gennady Zyuganov.

The Novosibirsk regional team of Vladimir Putin and the election team of the candidate for the mayor's office V. Gorodetsky are headed by one and the same person, the deputy of the regional Soviet Viktor Ignatov. It was he who brought present Governor V. Tolokonsky to office. This is an indirect sign that the governor supported Putin. Indirect evidence of support for Putin was Tolokonsky's election to the political council of the Unity (Yedinstvo) bloc. No direct statements of the support were made.

Media coverage of the elections is controlled by the regional election committee incorporating an "Expert Working Group". If an appeal is made concerning a violation of election legislation, the regional general prosecutor's office can also be involved. This was the case when the RF President's representative I. Shmidt appealed to the regional election committee and concurrently to the regional general prosecutor's office with a complaint on the activities of the newspaper *Za Narodovlastie* (For Power of the People), the publication of the CPRF regional committee. The newspaper provided pages of free advertising for only one candidate, Zyuganov, and made unsubstantiated attacks on Putin. Both the general prosecutor's office and the election committee restricted themselves to making a warning to the newspaper.

The city and regional administration issued no instructions on media activities during the elections. The city and regional election committees in cooperation with public associations and the National Press Institute carried out training seminars for monitors and journalists.

The Novosibirsk city and regional authorities occasionally met with the heads of media outlets to make a statement about their position. There were no complaints about "telephone" instructions or repression.

Former Governor Mukha engaged in "special operations" on the eve of the Duma elections. Together with the chairman of VGTRK M. Shvydkoi he nominated the local TV "tycoon", Yakov London, the general director of GTRK, the most influential local TV channel. Some journalists had to leave the channel to work for lower salaries at other TV channels (NTN-12, RTV) for Mukha's main competitor in the gubernatorial elections Tolokonsky.

No other conflict took place. During the gubernatorial elections, publishing of the free newspaper *Gorodovoi* (Gendarme) was suspended at the request of the regional prosecutor's office. The edition was openly attacking Novosibirsk Mayor Tolokonsky and was charged with inciting national hatred.

7.2 Media

It should be stressed that noticeable divisions in the Novosibirsk media can be observed only during preparations for local elections such as the recent elections for

the head of the Novosibirsk regional administration (December 1999 – January 2000) or forthcoming elections of the municipality head (March 26, 2000). The political orientation of the local media and regional supplements to the national editions is most often either “pro-mayor” or “pro-governor”.

As to the federal election campaigns, the Novosibirsk media pay attention to them only if a local branch of a party or other Russia-wide political movement is involved (as it was during the Duma elections). During the presidential elections, the local media generally maintained a neutral stance.

Newspapers

Vechernii Novosibirsk (Evening Novosibirsk) is published five times a week with a circulation of 10,000 copies (Friday issue, 31,000 copies). The newspaper was founded by the editorial staff; the editor-in-chief is Nikolai Zaikov. The newspaper is controlled by the Novosibirsk mayor’s office which publishes its own page, “Krasnyi Prospekt, 34”, inside the paper.

Molodost Sibiri (Youth of Siberia) is a weekly is published with a circulation of 16,000 copies. The newspaper was founded by the JSC Izdatelskii Dom “Molodost Sibiri” (“Youth of Siberia” Publishing House). The editor-in-chief is Boris Konovalov. The newspaper maintains a politically neutral position frequently publishing results of polls and sociological research.

Novosibirskie Novosti (Novosibirsk News) is a weekly, circulation 15,000 copies. The newspaper was founded by the JSC Pik System, JSC insurance company Stif, JSC Vneshtorgsib M, JSC Editorial Board of the Newspaper “Doska Obyavlenii”, and the journalistic staff. The editor-in-chief is Andrei Kamensky. The newspaper expresses the interests of this group of enterprises, in particular, the JSC Pik System. This company is headed by the deputy of the regional Soviet S. F. Kibirev, who ran for the mayor’s office.

Novaya Sibir (New Siberia) is a weekly, circulation 5,000 copies. The newspaper was founded by the JSC Otkrytaya Sibir and is subsidised by businessman Mikhail Kamkha. The editor-in-chief is Vyacheslav Dосychev. The motto of the publication is: “For Smart Authorities and Fair Business”. The editor-in-chief stated: “We have chosen the niche not of a popular newspaper, but of an influential publication. *Novaya Sibir* is a lobbyist newspaper”.

Sovetskaya Sibir (Soviet Siberia) is published five times a week. The circulation is 23,477. The newspaper is published by the regional Soviet of deputies, the administration of the Novosibirsk region, the staff, and by the Publishing and Printing Enterprise Sovetskaya Sibir. The editor-in-chief is Aleksei Zharinov. The newspaper is controlled by the regional Soviet of deputies and the administration of the Novosibirsk region and is subsidised from the regional budget. Currently this is the only newspaper allowed access to all the events carried out by the regional authorities.

Chestnoe Slovo (Word of Honour) is a weekly with a circulation 50,000 copies. The newspaper was founded by the JSC Obscherossiiskaya gazeta “Chestnoe Slovo”. The editor-in-chief is Leonid Kaurdakov. The newspaper is indirectly controlled by the regional administration via the group of enterprises that founded the JSC Obscherossiiskaya gazeta “Chestnoe Slovo”.

Newspapers of the Publishing House Russkii Kharakter (Russian Character): *AiF na Obi* (20,000 copies; weekly supplement to the newspaper *Argumenty i Fakty*), the

newspaper *Kommersant – Sibir* (weekly supplement to the newspaper *Kommersant*, 8,535 copies). The company was founded by a group of individuals. A major investor is the JSC Vinap (monopolist in the alcohol market). The publishing house's policies are directed mainly by investors. Up to the recent gubernatorial elections the newspapers were expressing the interests of the regional administration. Now, after the gubernatorial elections, the investors and, hence the Publishing House *Russkii Kharakter*, appear to be in a state of temporary political uncertainty.

TV companies

GTRK Novosibirsk The TV company is incorporated in the VGTRK holding company. During the gubernatorial elections the channel openly supported the then Governor V. P. Mukha (45 per cent of election advertising materials were devoted to his person) but no obstacles were made to advertising of other candidates. During the presidential elections, the channel did not show any strongly pronounced political preferences. The channel did not refuse to air any advertisements of political figures or organisations.

NTN-4 is a private, formerly independent, company. Advertising is controlled by the advertising group Video International – S. From 1997 the company has been re-transmitting the programmes of the Ren-TV network, and, hence, some influence of Moscow partners on the TV channel is possible. The company covers political events in a neutral way.

NTN-12 is a private company cooperating with the TV-6 channel frequency. Lately NTN-12 has made progress in the quality of programmes, increasing as a result the channel's audience figures. The most popular is the "Geometriya" (Geometry) information and analytical programme of Andrei Lavrushenko (former journalist of the GTRK Novosibirsk). The programme covers political events in the city and the region quite objectively.

RTV is a private TV company headed by the director Dmitrii Petrov and the editor-in-chief Anastasiya Zhuravleva (previously one of the leading journalists of the GTRK Novosibirsk). This is the youngest TV company in the region. Currently it does not have a frequency of its own, instead placing programmes in the air of basically all channels operating in the metre band. The most interesting programme seems to be "Press-Razrez" (Press Cut) presenting an analytical review of the local press and discussions of the key events in the city with journalists and newspaper editors. The company's best product is the informative and optimistic programme "Khorosho" (an allusion to the NTV Shenderovich's programme "Itogo"). This is devoted to political events in the city and the region. During the gubernatorial elections the programme expressed discreet sympathy towards V. Tolokonsky, the then Novosibirsk mayor, and antipathy towards V. Mukha, the then governor. The programme does not have any "favourites" among the Moscow political figures, although antipathy to the CPRF and personally to Zyuganov is strongly pronounced.

TSM is a private TV company cooperating with NTV. During the last few years the TSM audience has declined because of NTV programmes competing with local ones.

Previously, the TV station *Mir* was the most popular among the Novosibirsk companies but then lost its influence. Currently it is still producing news programmes, a daily morning entertainment programme and the political review programme "Litsa" (Faces).

7.3 Media coverage of the elections

Television

From March 19 through March 23 2000, four local channels were monitored (NTN-4, TSM, NTN-12, and NST). The total duration of local programmes in the TSM channel for five days was 11 hours and 50 minutes. Of this, information on the presidential elections occupied 15 minutes and 45 seconds (2.27 per cent of the total amount). The duration of programmes on NTN-12 was 19 hours and 10 minutes. Of this, information on the presidential elections occupied five minutes and 10 seconds (0.44 per cent of the total amount). The duration of programmes on NTN-4 was 24 hours and 30 minutes. Of this, information on the presidential elections occupied five minutes (0.3 per cent of the total amount). The duration of programmes on NST (State TV) was about 30 hours. Of this, information on the presidential elections occupied 1 hour and 45 minutes (12.4 per cent).

As a whole the local media remained neutral towards the majority of the candidates.

Typical programming covering the presidential campaign was that of news programmes with elements of analysis (on average, from five to 30 seconds); in addition, NST was airing information submitted by the candidates' teams (10 minutes for each candidate). Though these slots were incorporated into the programme of local TV, this was done on the back of the RTR frequency. Some candidates (e.g. Titov, Putin, and Govorukhin) opted not to use free time on local TV.

A novelty was the debates between the representatives of the candidates' hopefuls shown on the state channel (NST), and also daily polls done in the streets devoted to the forthcoming elections (NST's new programme "Panorama").

There were no debates between the candidates on local TV; they were replaced by debates of their regional representatives. However, these programmes were potentially interesting for voters since the representatives (E. Loginov representing Zhirinovskiy; L. Shvets, representing Zyuganov; D. Kazarinov, representing Yavlinskiy) boast numerous supporters in the region.

More attention was paid to candidates already enjoying popularity. Dzhabrailov, Govorukhin, and Savostyanov were marginalised. The most often mentioned candidates were Putin (as acting president) and Yavlinskiy, Zyuganov, and Zhirinovskiy (as leaders of their parties).

Putin was mentioned in connection with the candidate for the Novosibirsk mayor's office Vladimir Gorodetskiy. It was stressed that both were already acting officials and the issue of the election contest was allegedly predetermined for both (on programme Panorama of the GTRK Novosibirsk and Geometriya in NTN-12).

Only Putin was praised; this was done in connection with his activities in Chechnya (on TSM).

Lyubov Shvets (CPRF member and Zyuganov's representative in the region) strongly criticised Vladimir Putin on issues of social policy in a live broadcast provided to her on NST as a deputy of the State Duma from Iskitim constituency.

Journalists of the local channels tended to refrain from election assessments. They did venture to speak about visits of some deputies and about their proposals in an

ironic tone however. During the election period only Titov, Zhirinovskiy, and Skuratov visited Novosibirsk. The residents of the region obtained key information the national TV channels (ORT, NTV, and RTR).

Rates for political advertising, as in the previous campaign, exceeded the regular ones threefold.

Apparently, there was no hidden advertising. On the local level, in contrast to the national channels, no confrontation between the media was observed.

As a whole the election agitation of the presidential hopefuls can be assessed as feeble and insufficiently represented on the local channels.

Newspapers

Little interest in the presidential elections was registered in the print media. In some newspapers new columns were introduced for election coverage, which was also related to the election of the city mayor, which was held on the same day as the presidential elections. The political promises of the candidates for the mayor's office were of much greater interest to the local press. Journalists were even prone to draw analogies between the two election campaigns.

"Two Vladimirs – one fate" wrote *Molodost Sibiri* in the issue of March 16. The sociologist Igor Darvin found a great deal in common between V. Putin and V. Gorodetsky (acting mayor): "Both are Vladimirs – Red Suns³, both are acting officials, and both are workaholics...".

There were various mentions of the presidential hopefuls however, and special attention towards Konstantin Titov was also noteworthy. His visit caused the strongest response in the press, which seemed to be related to generous campaign spending. *Chestnoe Slovo* (No. 11) called him a "Samara miracle". Skuratov's visit was covered by the media in the context of his work as the general prosecutor; he was neither criticised, nor praised. During Zhirinovskiy's visit, a disco organised by his campaign staff was mentioned in passing.

In contrast, Putin enjoyed the whole-hearted interest of the local press. The media covered his several visits to Siberia. Putin attended meetings of Siberia Agreement twice and journalists were generous in their coverage of his visits. "Putin has conquered Siberia faster than Yermak", stated one headline in *MK* in Novosibirsk. Newspapers stressed that Putin enjoyed the support of the governors of Siberia Agreement, and that its head had even wished him "victory in the first round" (*Chestnoe Slovo*, No. 8).

Zyuganov was mainly an object for criticism. Two different newspapers accused him of one and the same sin – abandoning his former principles (*Molodost Sibiri* No. 9 and *Chestnoe Slovo* No. 11): "neither fish, nor meat ... and a unique skill to move backwards". They concluded: "He does not want to be president".

Two articles which criticised Putin were published by *Molodost Sibiri* (No. 10) and *Novaya Sibir* (No. 9). The first article was defending Yavlinsky, whose statement about his wish to stop the war in Chechnya was called "snivelling" on "Odnako". In the second article K. Borovoi spoke about Putin's "police state".

³ Allusion to Vladimir Red Sun (Vladimir Krasno Solnyshko) – a famous Russian prince.

8 Yekaterinburg

8.1 Political Background and Authorities

The results of the 1999 Duma campaign were somewhat unexpected with elections being declared invalid in two city constituencies because the number of votes against all candidates was greater than the number of votes for one candidate. In general however, the new blocs, particularly Unity (Yedinstvo) and the Union of Rightwing Forces did particularly well in Yekaterinburg.

The victory of A. Chernetsky in the mayorial elections held at the same time was clear cut in advance due to the absence of real alternative contenders in the race.

Currently in both the city and the region there are two main central forces which affect events. The first is represented by Governor E. Rossel, who has consolidated around him the directors of the military and industrial complex as well as the heads of virtually all of the regional municipal units. The second is represented by A. Chernetsky, who is supported by the trading and financial community of Yekaterinburg. Recently the movement Mai (A. Burkov, A. Bakov) made attempts to become a third force. However, circumstances (redistribution of property in favour of pro-gubernatorial quarters in Kachkanar mining and processing plant, in Serov metallurgical plant, etc.), such as the absence of real financial resources and increasing administrative pressure have not allowed the movement to continue its activities as before.

National parties do not noticeably influence local issues.

8.1.1 Economic background

The situation is stable. For the first time for several years a growth of industrial output has been observed. The physical volume of production increased due to an increase of industrial output in non-ferrous metallurgy (by 9.9 per cent) and in food-processing (by 2.3 per cent).

In 1999, according to statistical data 48.6 per cent of the population of the region (2,253,300 people) were below the poverty line.

In the first six months of 1999, strikes were held in 148 organisations involving 5,800 people.

8.2 Media

All election materials were controlled by the Sverdlovsk region election committee headed by Vladimir Mostovschikov. During the presidential elections, interference of the regional election committee was unnecessary since the presidential campaign was carried out almost exclusively through the national TV channels and press. The only exception was Yabloko. This bloc conducted vigorous advertising in the region.

However, this advertising was conducted quite correctly, without “black” PR. In the region, there are no efficiently operating independent institutions for public control and monitoring of the electoral ethics. There is a public Council affiliated with the regional election committee, there is also the Expert (journalist) Council under the Yekaterinburg mayor and a similar body under the regional governor, however, they were not active during the elections.

The overall picture is as follows: the local media paid little attention to the presidential elections, far less than during previous presidential elections. The reason for this is that Yekaterinburg media are deeply involved in the local electoral battles of their “owners”.

8.2.1 Major media outlets

Television

Name: Telezionnoe Agentstvo Urala (Ural TV Agency), news programme 9½ hosted by Innokentii V. Sheremet
Audience: about 300,000 viewers daily
Founders: Telezionnoe Agentstvo Urala
Individuals or groups actually financing the media outlet: Innokentii V. Sheremet, Sverdlovsk region government (Governor E. Rossel)
Editor-in-chief/General director: Innokentii V. Sheremet
Political position: anti-Chernetska and pro-Rossel
During the presidential campaign the news programme took a fairly neutral stance, sometimes ridiculing the communists. Virtually no attention was paid to Yavlinsky. Candidates’ election teams preferred not to respond to the programme’s statements.

Name: 4th Channel News
Audience: 400,000 viewers daily.
Founders: majority vote of the 4th Channel belongs to the banking group Most (V. Gusinsky), Igor Mishin
Editor-in-chief: Anna Titova
Political position: emphatically neutral; however, depending on the interests of the Most group it will shift to more positive with respect to some candidates and more negative to others. The channel focused on the positive features of Chernetsky and the negative ones of Rossel during gubernatorial elections in Sverdlovsk region in 1999.
Election coverage features hidden pro-Yabloko position. Everything directly or indirectly related to Yabloko is covered in detail, but in news programmes only in a very reserved way. The activities of Putin and Zyuganov were virtually not covered with the formal explanation that this is beyond the news of Ural. The quality of programmes is high.

Newspapers

Name: newspaper *Vechernie Vedomosti* (Evening News)
Circulation: 50,000 copies 4 times a week; during the elections the circulation of the VV digest is about 300,000 copies.
Founders: company Armag, Dmitrii Polyanin
Individuals or groups actually financing the media outlet: Sverdlovsk region government (Governor E. Rossel)
Editor-in-chief: Anton Stulikov
Political position: anti-Chernetsky and pro-Rossel

The newspaper was hardly involved in covering the presidential elections as it was focused almost completely on covering the local elections. In between campaigns the newspaper covers events in the city and in the region: news of policy and culture, analytical papers. The tabloid edition is popular. The electoral headquarters of the Yekaterinburg Mayor A. M. Chernetsky launched eight criminal suits against this newspaper defending his honour and dignity.

Name: newspaper *Glavnyi Prospekt* (Main Avenue)

Circulation: daily, about 34,213 copies

Founders: JSC Editorial Staff of the newspaper Glavnyi Prospekt

Individuals or groups actually financing the media outlet: city administration of Yekaterinburg

Editor-in-chief: Vladislav Ivanov

Political position: pro-Chernetsky, anti-Rossel

The newspaper virtually did not cover the presidential elections being involved in covering the local events. Officially the newspapers supported, as does Chernetsky, Vladimir Putin.

The newspaper is often in conflict with the pro-Rossel publications.

Name: newspaper *Vechernii Yekaterinburg* (Evening Yekaterinburg)

Circulation: daily, about 10,533 copies

Founders: Media holding Uralskii Rabochii

Individuals or groups actually financing the media outlet: city administration of Yekaterinburg

Editor-in-chief: Vadim Averyanov

Political position: pro-Chernetsky, anti-Rossel

The newspaper coverage of the presidential elections was restricted to news from Chechnya (showing Putin as a strong and determined politician). Zyuganov and Yavlinsky were virtually not mentioned.

Name: newspaper *Podrobnosti* (Details)

Circulation: 100,000 copies (actually from 25,000 to 30,000)

Founder: Igor Mishin

Individuals or groups actually financing the media outlet: Igor Mishin

Editor-in-chief: Sergei Panasenko

Political position: neutral

This newspaper publishes "hot" and exciting material. It is not involved in the conflict between the city and the region. During presidential elections the newspaper takes a pro-Yabloko stance covering in detail all the political, economic and strategic initiatives of Yavlinsky.

The newspaper is the most independent and non-aligned edition in the city.

9 Samara

9.1 Political background and the authorities

The past elections showed a lowering of activity in Samara region voting as compared to 1995. While in 1995 63.6 per cent of the Samara region residents took part in the elections, this year slightly over 61 per cent did (see table 1). At the same time the differences in the voters' activity level within the region proved to be less significant than in 1995.

Table 1. Comparative data on the electorate's activity

Electoral constituencies	Participated in voting			
	number of voters		percent	
	1995	1999	1995	1999
Samara region as a whole	1,546,093	1,520,392	63,59	61,8
Novokuibyshevskii constituency	344,137	328,372	69,11	66,1
Promyshlennyi constituency	308,719	298,290	60,63	58,1
Samara constituency	285,457	276,183	62,51	60,8
Syzran constituency	310,344	314,392	67,06	66,6
Togliatti constituency	297,436	303,155	58,90	57,8

Comparison of the results of the electoral blocs that got into Duma in 1999 with similar data from 1993 and 1995 shows that some parties lost a part of their electorate, while some managed, in contrast, to keep or even increase the number of supporters. The LDPR and the Yabloko movement were losing supporters from one election to another. The CPRF, in contrast, obtained more votes than both in 1993 and 1995 (see table 2).

Table 2. Comparison of the national ballot results for the electoral association on the RF State Duma elections 1993, 1995, and 1999

Electoral associations	Percent of ballots for the electoral associations		
	1993	1995	1999
Women of Russia	8.13	4.61	2.04
Communist party of the RF	12.40	22.30	24.16
LDPR*	22.92	11.18	6.02
Yabloko**	7.86	6.89	6.09
Agrarian party of Russia	7.99	3.78	-
Communist, workers of Russia – for the Soviet Union	-	4.53	2.22
NDR	-	10.13	1.20

* In 1999, Zhirinovskiy block

** In 1993, Yavlinsky – Boldyrev – Lukin block

Though the CPRF attained the highest ballot result in 1999 it will not enjoy the same influence in the current Duma. The reason is, first of all, that many votes "for" were

balloted for the democracy-oriented parties: the interregional movement Unity (23.17 per cent) and the Union of Rightwing Forces (8.65 per cent).

The results of voting for the party lists in the Samara regions somewhat differ from the national figures. Not all associations that managed, according to CEC data, to surmount the five-per cent barrier nation-wide were as successful in the region. The top three positions in the election results in the Samara region were occupied by the CPRF, the Union of Rightwing Forces and Unity.

In the last elections the Communist party garnered 26.1 per cent of the votes. This result is higher than the nation-wide index (where the CPRF obtained 24.38 per cent) and higher than the number of votes obtained by the communists in the Samara region in 1995.

The Union of Rightwing Forces (SPS) came second. The victory of this bloc, one of whose leaders is Governor K. A. Titov is especially impressive if one compares the results of voting in the Samara region to the nation-wide results. In no one region of the country did the Union of Rightwing Forces manage to win with such a large margin as in the Samara region.

Unity was supported by almost 20% of the residents of the region. In addition, the five-per cent barrier was surmounted in the Samara region by Zhirinovsky bloc.

Table 3. Comparison of the results of the electoral associations in the Samara region at the elections to the State Duma in 1993, 1995, and 1999

Electoral associations	Percent of ballots for the electoral associations		
	1993	1995	1999
Women of Russia	10.09	3.99	1.97
Communist party of the RF	16.44	22.27	26.13
LDPR*	19.67	12.26	5.42
Yabloko**	8.75	5.05	3.57
Agrarian party of Russia	-	3.91	2.72
NDR	-	11.94	0.82

* In 1999, Zhirinovsky bloc

** In 1993, Yavlinskii – Boldyrev – Lukin bloc

The block Otechestvo – Vsya Rossiya (Fatherland – All Russia), supported mainly by residents of the major cities, obtained about 5 per cent of the votes.

One more specific feature of the past elections in the Samara region was the failure of the Yabloko bloc, which managed to garner only 3.6 per cent of the votes. In 1995, the bloc managed to surmount the five-per cent barrier.

9.1.1 Political background

Samara region is relatively stable economically, socially and politically. Governor Titov and the reforms carried out in the region are supported by the majority of the population. During the eight years of Titov holding the governor's office the region moved from 68th to 5th position in terms of living standards in Russia. Traditionally the main opponents of the governor and of his administration are the mayor of Samara and, even more so, the mayor of Togliatti. At the same time the

mayors themselves in their public statements claim that the confrontation seems to be invented by the press. In their opinion it would be relevant to talk about ordinary differences of opinion on various issues, in particular, the distribution of the regional budget. The self-sustaining cities attempt to get a larger “slice of the pie”.

9.1.2 Economic background

The economic situation for industry in the region features a number of problems, both national and local. They are as follows:

- a structural imbalance of the regional economic sectors;
- a mismatch between the available production potential of the region and limited demand for the produced goods;
- sales problems due to high costs of production;
- low utilisation of production, research and labour potential;
- high consumption of resources in the production branches;
- high demand in investments;
- shortage of assets of enterprises and organisations for boosting production against a background of high bank interest rates.

The situation in the region is aggravated by the specific features of the local production sector. While in Russia as a whole the energy and fuel producing industry and metallurgy dominate (43 per cent), the leading industry in Samara region is machine building (about 54 per cent, while nation-wide this index is about 14 per cent). The depression of industrial production reached bottom in 1994 in relation to the restructuring of the industry. This majorly affected the defence sector in the region, which was deprived of state orders.

Samara region is very attractive for investors first of all because laws were adopted here that protect and support investment. The Samara region stock market features a disproportion between the state and corporate sectors. The market of corporate securities is the least developed segment of the stock market in the region. In the period after the financial crisis, mechanisms are becoming increasingly important that would allow the selling of debts of industrial enterprises by converting them into securities.

9.2 Media

More than 650 media outlets are registered in the Samara region of which about a quarter are broadcasters. Each media outlet has a founder with his own political and financial interests. Nevertheless, the large number and diversity of the Samara media are convincing arguments in favour of the existence of freedom of press.

This does not mean, however, that there are no problems. After publishing or airing critical information there may be a phone call “from above”. However, most often this will be a confidential talk, rather than a brute interference. Conflicts are resolved, as a rule, in the courts and not through administrative channels.

This notwithstanding the journalists of the newspaper *Novaya Gazeta v Samare* say that in the Samara region there is no freedom of expression, and that all the media are controlled by the governor or mayor.

One of the most recent examples of conflict is the dispute between the TV company RIO and the regional administration. The latter owns a small package of shares in this company and on this basis insists on treating RIO as a state TV channel. This means that according to election legislation the channel had to provide free airtime to the candidates. RIO has defended its independence in the courts as well as the right to deny candidates free airtime.

Some of the 650 media outlets mentioned above appeared on the eve of the elections and ceased their existence after voting. For example, Aleksandr Belousov (elected to the Duma in December 1999) took care about his image in advance. His supporters found resources for establishing the new newspaper *Samarskii Kuryer* (Samara Courier) which was publishing city news and contained a special column devoted to the stories about who helped the then deputy of the regional Duma Belousov.

In Samara region, as in other regions, there are publications which are financed from the municipal and regional budgets (newspapers *Volzhskaya Kommuna* and *Samarskie Izvestiya*).

Conflicts with owners/sponsors appear from time to time, however they do not develop into "information wars". Some time ago the editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Samarskoe Obozrenie* (Samara Review) was dismissed after he had lost standing with the company Volgapromgaz which supported the newspaper. Several months later he found new sponsors and founded and began publishing the newspaper *Reporter* (Reporter).

9.3 Media coverage of the Elections

The elections were covered mainly within traditional columns and sections. Electoral issues became dominant, though the relative weight of the political issues in the total size of the publication or broadcasting volume did not change. The only exception was the regional newspaper *Volzhskaya Kommuna* (founded by the Samara regional administration), which published not only paid political advertising of the candidates but also the documents submitted by the election committee. For this reason the newspaper doubled in size for the period of the parliamentary election campaign.

The current presidential campaign affected the local media much less. Analytical materials were devoted mainly to the chances of the Samara governor to obtain more than five per cent of the votes Russia-wide. In addition, the post-election fate of Titov and of the Samara region was discussed. There were very few materials published by the candidates' headquarters. Agitation was mainly carried out with outdoor advertising, leaflets, and publications and programmes in the national media.

Samara media outlets assessed the election campaign variously as follows: "The election campaign develops very feebly as if each of the candidates had submitted to the predetermined nature of the struggle" (*Samarskoe Obozrenie*, No. 12, March 20, 2000). "Four years ago we were insistently called to vote for the president according to our hearts. Judging by the results the majority of the voters proceeded in this way. Nowadays different calls are in fashion: for example, to abstain from voting or to ballot against all the candidates. The elections will take place allegedly without a real choice, and hence will be undemocratic. But in any event it will be necessary to vote

next Sunday, perhaps by forgetting for a moment democratic principles and clenching our teeth. Maybe because this will be cheaper in both direct and indirect senses. Russia may not withstand one more presidential election..." (*Delo*, No. 11, March 21, 2000)

Comparing the presence of presidential hopefuls in the local press one can conclude that the absolute leaders were Putin and Titov. Since Putin dominated on the national channels and newspapers, the balance of the agitation materials was obviously in his favour.

The media actively discussed the issue in what way the Samara region voters have to support Konstantin Titov. For example, as Putin's victory was obvious, it was necessary to vote for Titov not as for a potential president but as for the incumbent governor. Titov had to obtain the maximum percentage of votes in the Samara region to prove to the entire country that he is a key political figure and a successful governor.

It's was notable that journalists virtually did not discuss the candidates and their programmes. Attention focused on "political social life" – who supports whom and how the election campaign is mirrored in the national media.

Political advertising in TV and in the newspapers was significantly less than during the elections to the state Duma in December 1999. Far fewer newspapers announced participation in the campaign and their advertising rates.

The regional election committee in cooperation with the Samara branch of the National Press Institute regularly carried out, starting from September 1999, seminars and "round tables" for journalists and heads of the media outlets where the new legislation and the position of the election committee in conflict situations are explained in detail. Unfortunately, the media laws and the election legislation in many cases were seen to contradict each other thus creating conditions for "interpreting" and "extending". Many editors, especially of small newspapers, were afraid to publish anything about the elections as this might be considered as agitation and they were concerned that they would be forced to pay fines.

10 St Petersburg

Results of Duma elections in the city, oblast in 1995 and 1999.

Duma Elections in St. Petersburg - 1999

Unity (Medved)	17.68%
Right Forces' Union	17.42%
Fatherland - All Russia	15.72%
Communist Party of Russian Federation	14.14%
Yabloko	11.21%
Party of Zhirinovsky	4.22%
(votes against all)	4.06%
Russian Communities Congress and Yury Boldyrev's Movement	3.49%
Pensioners Party	2.99%
Communist Working Party for the USSR	1.38%
Women of Russia	1.28%
For the Army	0.93%
Party of General Andrey Nikolayev and academician Svyatoslav Fyodorov	0.77%
Our Home - Russia	0.76%

10.1 Political background and the authorities

The political situation in St. Petersburg radically changed in 1999. The leaders of the Duma election campaign became three new parties: Unity (Yedinstvo) became the leader with just under 18 per cent, followed by the Union of Rightwing Forces with just over 17 per cent and Fatherland -- all Russia with 15 per cent. None of these parties existed in 1995. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation was sitting fourth with 14 per cent. Just behind the Communists was Yabloko with 11 per cent.

Leningrad oblast also voted for Unity – 30 per cent in 1999 , follwed by the Communists with 17 per cent. Meanwhile Yabloko moved to the bottom of the list in 1999. Voters in 1999 were as active as in 1995: 52,7 per cent in 1995; 54,29 per cent in 1999.

10.1.1 Economic situation

According to data provided by the St. Petersburg city government, its exports grew by 30 per cent in 1999. Investments in St.Petersburg ammount to 24.732 million rubles and in Leningrad oblast-11.284 million rubles.

There is foreign investment in industry, telecommunications, transportation, trade, construction and other sectors. Machine building is the largest export-oriented industry in the city. This industry requires modernisation which is not possible without investment. Major investors are Finland, Germany and the USA. One of the reasons that Leningrad oblast has been successful in attracting foreign companies is the

investment tax concessions it offers. But much is still to be done to create a truly favorable atmosphere for investments.

10.1.2 Social issues

Substantial unemployment is one of the biggest social problems. There is no effective social security, a lack of money for health care, low salaries for those lucky enough to be employed and inadequate pensions for pensioners. This combined with a high crime rate contributes to the poor quality of life in St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast.

10.1.3 Local regulation of media coverage of the elections

Local regulations do not differ greatly from federal ones. The Local Election Commission was not very strict: those media which engaged in hidden political advertising got away with it.

10.1.4 Media and local authorities

While all the chiefs of the major media companies remained in office during the 1999 Duma elections, there were some controversial appointments to the TV-Radio company Petersburg. Petersburg TV is a joint stock company in which the city administration is the main shareholder. Sergei Chernyadev was appointed deputy-director of the company prior to the presidential elections. His appointment caused controversy within the station as his commitment to objectivity and balanced coverage was in serious doubt. Three TV presenters -- Innokenty Ivanov, Svetlana Agapitova and Irina Smolina refused to continue as presenters of Inform-TV. Their protest reflected pre-election tension in the company.

10.2 Media

Major Newspapers and TV Stations

Title	Circulation / Audience Reach	Founder and Publisher (Financer)	Editor/ Director	Political Orientation; Political Preference; Election Coverage; Election-related Conflicts
<i>I. Daily</i>				
<i>St. Petersburg Vedomosti</i>	in 1996 – 114 988 in 2000 – 100 028	The newspaper staff and St. Petersburg Administration	Oleg Kuzin	Pro-governor, tries to maintain balanced coverage, the only newspaper which clearly marks political ads. Conservative in its approach
<i>Vecherny Peterburg</i>	in 1996 – 40 000 in 2000 – 7 150	The Daily Vecherny Petersburg Newspaper Joint Stock	Vladimir Gronsky	Reflects the stance of the city administration on all issues. Baltoneksim Bank which supports the newspaper cannot secure its survival. VP loses its

				staff and readers.
<i>Nevskoye Vremya</i>	2000 – 19 500	The Nevskoye Vremya Newspaper Joint Stock Company	Alla Manilova	NV was supportive of Sobchak, later Yakovlev. Recently it started reflecting the anti-governor policy of the federal government. The editor is the President of the League of Journalists. Recently unidentified financial support for NV increased and NV has become the opposition newspaper.
<i>Smena</i>	2000 – 23 672	St. Petersburg , City Duma and The Smena Joint Stock Company	Leonid Davidov	Once the most popular newspaper in the city, Smena is the least influential today.

Television

<i>Petersburg</i>	80 000 000- in 1996 2000: - 5 000 000	City Administration - 38%, Leningrad region Administration - 13%, The Industrial Machines - 17.5%, BaltOneximBank - 17.5%.	Irina Prudnikova- General director	City administration admits having full control of the company.
<i>Channel 6</i>	1996: 12 500 2000: 4 000 000	Story First Communications Ltd.	Acting director Vladimir Lopashev (Alexander Fillipov)	Former director Alexander Fillipov who was relatively independent and asserted the position of the Channel as such was fired by the shareholders on the eve of presidential campaign.
<i>Channel 11 - TNT</i>	4 500 000	Channel 11/ Media International	Andrey Mokrov- president (Alexander Secretaryov)	One of the most recent (March20) changes is new president of Channel 11. It is too early to draw conclusions but considering his former experience we can expect that Channel 11 will be the channel of the opposition.

10.3 Media coverage of the elections

Some existing programmes were transformed during the elections: "Sobitie" (Event, Sergei Chernyadev as the host) became "Point of view" - a combination of interview, political comment and phone-ins. "Politics - Petersburg Style" was so unethical that Petersburg TV was switched off by the Press Ministry for two days. "Dialogues" on Channel 11 is returning with Peter Godlevsky as the host and during the elections only politicians and officials were guests.

Presidential campaign coverage was practically nonexistent in the city. Political advertising for the runners was shown but was imported rather than being done within Petersburg for a local flavour. As such it was perceived as dull and therefore ineffective. Moscow-based newspapers and electronic media were the main sources of information and political advertising.

Yavlinsky, Titov, Zyuganov and Skuratov visited the city but gained only limited coverage. The city and oblast media expressed loyalty, admiration and willingness to vote for Putin. *Novii Peterburg* (weekly, circulation 50 000) is the only newspaper which dared run negative articles about Putin. City Duma deputy Yury Shutov, one of the authors of the offending articles, was arrested shortly after they appeared and charged with numerous murders and other crimes. There has been no trial as yet but Shutov ran anyway for the State Duma in the constituency which voted "None of the Above".

Putin's visit to Petersburg with British Prime Minister Tony Blair was widely covered by the press. Vladimir Putin and Tony Blair attended the premiere of *War and Peace* at Mariinsky opera and ballet house. Putin and Blair appeared with their wives in the Tsar's box which can accommodate 30 people (while all the other VIPs including the governor of St. Petersburg Vladimir Yakovlev were not permitted to sit near). The rumour was that the press was instructed not to show any of the VIPs but Blair and Putin. Judging by the amount of advertising in local media, it seemed clear that Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinsky spent more than other presidential candidates on his campaign in St. Petersburg.

The local election commission was not visible during the election campaign.

11 Conclusion and Recommendations

After the 1996 presidential elections and the 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia, the European Institute for the Media made a series of recommendations for the improvement of media performance during elections. These mainly concentrated on the issue of restructuring of existing state-controlled networks and papers to guarantee their editorial independence, the creation of public-service broadcasting organisations and the proper implementation of media and elections legislation. All of these issues remain pertinent today, four years later. Some new troublesome developments have taken place as well - particularly the control which financial and political interests exert on the media, including those that are partly or fully owned by the state. The amalgamation of private interests with state power has continued repercussions for the Russian media landscape.

The preliminary report of the EIM on the presidential elections of 2000 warned that the black PR tactics used during the elections and warning signals from Putin's campaign team indicated that media autonomy in Russia could be about to encounter new tests in the near future. Indeed, in June 2000, Media-Most head Vladimir Gusinsky was arrested by state security forces and held for three days on charges of embezzlement of state funds. The action was widely interpreted as being part of a government crack-down on independent media. In July, Berezovsky made headlines by quitting parliament and offering a deal to the state over his shares in ORT to either buy them back or sell the remainder to give him full control. Since the elections, the oligarchs and the government have gradually been taking further steps away from détente, creating rifts in the financial power structures in place in the RF, with potentially disastrous results for the media dependent on oligarchal support.

New opinion polls suggest that public trust in the media has hit an all time low at only 13%, although levels of trust have been sliding since the mid 1990s. While the media depend on financing from the state or from major capital investors to survive, the opinion of the public will continue to have little impact on the media's agenda. Should, however, the media arrive at crisis-point with this financial dependence on benefactors, it may finally be time to observe these changes in the public's expectations and concentrate on producing well-researched and objective news. If the Russian media eventually have to turn to the public to fund their survival, they will have to consider how to woo back the public's trust.

The autonomy of the media and the quality of their performance remains a reliable indicator of the state of democracy in a country. The EIM is certain that both Russian civil society and the international community will continue monitoring the state of the Russian media, an activity which the EIM itself will continue to foster and support.

The EIM's recommendations follow below:

Legislation

A key problem in Russia with existing legislation is its interpretation and the culture of implementation.

Discrepancies between the laws “On Elections” and “On Mass Media” should be discussed and documented by media legal professionals and rectified as soon as possible. It should be emphasised that there does not appear to be a need for more law, rather a fair and realistic implementation of the existing law, although the lack of any regulation of political advertising is an important exception.

The Russian Federation is party to several pertinent international agreements including Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (99) 15 “Of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Measures Concerning Media Coverage of Election Campaigns”, which was adopted at the 678th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies in September 1999.

Russian public authorities should make this recommendation and other international agreements known to government outlets. The authorities, media organisations and associations of media professionals should disseminate information about the content of such agreements.

Right to reply

The CEC should urgently consult the directors and editors at major broadcasters and newspapers to work out a method of allowing politicians and parties a swift right of reply to attacks or what they consider unfair coverage during election campaigns.

Independent board for state-controlled broadcasters

The government should consider the creation of special advisory boards for state-controlled broadcasters, given the importance of the state broadcasters particularly during electoral campaigns. Such a board could comprise independent media experts and representatives of sections of civil society, to work together with the management of the companies involved to achieve a more balanced editorial policy. The link to government and government-oriented editorial policies demonstrated once again by Russian state-controlled television in these elections is out of place in a democratic environment. Such links should be devolved to create independent policies more in keeping with what the viewers might require, rather than what seems necessary to the government.

Clear labels for advertisements

One of the most critical issues in this campaign as in previous ones was the practice of hidden advertising in the media. Perhaps the clearest step which should be taken following these elections is that of labelling political advertising as such in all media. Broadcasters should make it absolutely clear, not just in advertising slots, but also during other programming, if the participants have paid to appear.

For newspapers, all political advertising or articles which are offered by parties should be clearly labelled as such. Ideally, they should be labelled 'Advertisement', or way at the beginning of the text that the material comes from the parties or politicians themselves, whether or not they have paid for it.

Discrimination

Newspapers should drop the practice of discriminating between parties as to whether they accept their advertisements. Every party and candidate should have equal access, on the same conditions and rates of pay, to all newspapers. The only reason for refusing an advertisement should be if its contents are libellous or in some other way seems to break the law.

Broadcasting in the regions

Anecdotal information shows that local governors and other officials are interrupting or shutting down television broadcasts of some private channels if they disagree with the regional political line. This is an unacceptable interference in the dissemination of information, putting some citizens at a serious disadvantage in the type of television they may watch. The EIM recommends far stronger support for the maintenance and even increase in the variety of television programming, especially non-state television, available to viewers outside of the central broadcast areas of Russia.

Lack of journalistic ethics

There is a worrying trend that some journalists themselves have abandoned even the pretence of free and fair coverage of elections. Part of this is due to the legal and logistical problems of covering the elections, but much of it is due to the enthusiasm with which Russian television broadcasters, for example, have embraced the airing of compromising material, or *kompromat*.

Kompromat serves two purposes. Its fast-paced and sensational style is popular with consumers and, when used to attack the political rivals of the company, it allows the company to toe the correct political line of its owners.

If this type of programme becomes the model of political programming, Russian voters may be titillated and entertained, but they will be unable to receive unbiased information with which to make informed choices. One cannot suggest banning sensational shows that are designed to shock rather than inform -- as they are a part of every society's television broadcasting -- but they should not form the cornerstone of serious political reporting. The EIM recommends that journalists pay more attention to national and international norms of fair reporting, remembering their critical role in disseminating information professionally and fairly during election campaigns.

Annex A

Newspaper Quotes

The Moscow Times, 24 March 2000, p. 1 **Yavlinsky comes under fire from Kremlin**

ORT reported Thursday night (23.3.) that "in the opinion of experts" Yavlinsky had spent about 10 times as much money as was in his official war chest. It said some of the extra money was coming from abroad, a practice prohibited by the law. ORT showed interviews from its archive with the heads of two German foundations that work actively in Russia. A representative of the foundation that ORT identified as the Freidrich Edberg Foundation was shown saying: "Our foundation works on the development of democracy, working with various public organisations and government structures". No date was given for the interview. "Only governments and parties hoping to come to power are involved in such state-building", an ORT correspondent said. "But Russia's government has no contact with the Freidrich Edberg Foundation, therefore it must be the opposition party, which right now is Yabloko".

Another undated interview marked "archive" was then flashed on the screen. Walter Klitz of the Freidrich Naumann Foundation said "We work with Yavlinsky, but not only with him". The next report on the station alleged that media mogul Vladimir Gusinsky is an Israeli citizen and is financing Yavlinsky's campaign. The station showed old footage of Gusinsky saying he likes Yavlinsky's policies. A final report was on a news conference held by a gay rights organisation called Blue Heart, which declared its support for Yavlinsky.

ORT speculation about Yavlinsky's ties with Gusinsky began on Wednesday (22.3.) evening. The station implied that Yevgenii Savostyanov's withdrawal from the race in favour of Yavlinsky late Tuesday (21.3.) during a live broadcast on NTV, which is owned by Gusinsky, was "staged" by Gusinsky: "The operation with Savostyanov's withdrawal...looks very much like one part of a well-planned action, which includes the endless appearances of Grigorii Yavlinsky on television screens and multiple interviews in newspapers and magazines", the ORT report said. RTR on Wednesday (22.3.) offered viewers its own anti-Yavlinsky analysis, in which it quoted a report from AiF-Novosti news agency that Yavlinsky had undergone plastic surgery. On Thursday (23.3.) Komsomolskaya Pravda employees said the newspaper received 98 telegrams at once against Yavlinsky and in support of Samara Governor Konstantin Titov."

The Moscow Times, 25.3.2000, p. 6 **Odd things happen to free media. Matt Bivens.**

Media-MOST - parent company of NTV television, among others - is the major alternative voice. And it is under siege. A major loan to state-owned Vheshekonombank has been held over its head. The tax authorities are a common sight. And one NTV reporter's son witnessed a purse-snatching by a friend - and

then became the target of seemingly hostile FSB attention, according to police investigating the crime.

Novaya Gazeta...has been pushing the idea that forces within the federal secret services could have been behind the terrorist attacks on apartment buildings that shook the nation in September and led to war in Chechnya. Last week their computer system was hacked into and an entire issue - one that included attacks on the Kremlin itself - was destroyed.

Moskovsky Komsomolets is another paper that has argued that the Kremlin conjured up the war. Its leading champion of that argument, reporter Alexander Khinshtein, was visited at home last year by police who said they wanted to take him to another city for a psychiatric exam, supposedly because he had failed to properly declare his mental health history on a 1996 driver's licence application. Khinshtein pleaded illness, the police left, he went into hiding and eventually, after much cat and mouse nonsense, the matter was casually dropped.

Sovershenno Sekretno, like Novaya Gazeta and MK, is the other national newspaper flogging the idea that someone in government might be behind the apartment bombings. Two weeks ago the paper's founder and leader, journalist Artyom Borovik, died when his small charter plane crashed at Sheremetevo seconds after take off."

Versia, 21-27 March, No 11, 2000, p. 2
Rustam Arifdzhanov. Editor-in-Chief of Versia. "Why I am against."

There are 20-30 million people in this country who do not trust Putin very much. And I am one of them. Is it not understandable why? I will answer: because it is not understandable. Whether Vladimir Vladimirovich is against the expansion of NATO towards the East, or in favour of Russian accession to NATO. Whether he is in favour of market relations, or in favour of state regulation of the economy. Now he is getting closer to the English premier, and the next day he destroys everything, having announced the arrest of an English spy. He speaks with a strong voice, and then is afraid of meeting Zyuganov in a debate. Or is he afraid that it will become clear that they think the same (i.e. that their opinions are the same)?

There are lots of questions as to whose side he is on. "And there is still a lot which is not understood".

We will think about this without haste. If for this reason we even do not go to vote on 26 March, nothing terrible will happen. They will only postpone the elections until the summer...There is no shame in thinking things over."

Moskovskii Komsomolets, 23.3.2000, p. 8
"The candidate cut off from air."

Article about ORT's decision not to show the programme "The way it was" about the 500 day economic programme. The article also points out that the programme 'S legkim parom!', in which Yavlinsky made some jokes was prevented from being broadcast due to censorship. It continued: "the most unacceptable expression of censorship is the ban on broadcasting on ORT of Grigorii Yavlinsky's advertising clip, paid from the account of his campaign staff. The leader of Yabloko sent the CEC...a complaint, but the reply, apparently, will not arrive until after the elections".

Also RTR did not broadcast a series of programmes in which Yavlinsky was to participate. Particularly, "My 20th century". But: "TV-6 turned out to be the champion of absurdity. On the evening of 21 March this channel was due to show the programme "The Unknown Yavlinsky", which was to be paid from Yavlinsky's campaign budget. The programme was well advertised in advance, though it turned out that Berezovsky was supposed to have called the leadership of TV6 with the following demand: Yavlinsky must under no circumstances appear on air. During the election campaign this is the first case of a programme advertised in advance not being aired for political reasons."

Kultura, 23-29 March 2000, p. 2
"Television through the sociology looking glass."

"Gallup-Media did a survey on the rating of programmes on the main television channels and the results were published in Kultura.

Trust in the leading TV channels (in %)

	March 1999	October 1999	February 2000
ORT	30.4	31.3	31.8
RTR	20.8	18.7	26.3
NTV	37.7	38.8	40.4
TV6	8.9	5.7	5.7
TVC	4.0	3.9	3.7

"Itogy" with Dorenko (Sundays) - 15.4%

"Nikolai Svanidze" - 5.7%

Most active viewers, NTV - people living in the cities (42.6%). Of these, those who trust NTV the most are: men - 43.1%, women - 38.3%, workers - 40.9%, people working in the service industries - 45.8%, businessmen - 49%, students - 43.6%, those doing military service - 55.4%. Thus, those who are under 60 and have a higher education tend to trust NTV the most.

The first channel is the preferred channel of the older generation (34.3% trust ORT the most) and the retired - 35.2%, those living in villages - 40.7% and the poor - 31.5%. ORT is more popular than NTV only amongst those living in villages (9% more popular). For other groups the percentage difference is no more than 3%.

71.1% of the respondents are able to watch NTV.

92.8% of the respondents are able to watch ORT.

89.0% of the respondents are able to watch RTR.

In Chechnya only 7.2% trust the media to be objective - 15% of the Chechen respondents say that the Russian media is not objective. 46.8% think that the media is sometimes objective and sometimes biased."

Kommersant, 18.3.2000, p. 2
" Media lose subsidies again." Boris Boiko.

"The Russian press is once again under threat. As was the case two years ago, the authorities are trying to deprive the print media of their subsidies, which make them

accessible to the mass reader...Publishers will be forced to pay customs fees on the import of printed material to Russia, and also to pay commercial tariffs for post, telegraph and telephone. This contradicts the International Florence Convention of customs free import of products of a cultural, scientific and educational character. This Convention was signed by Russia in 1994."

Kommersant, 15.3.2000, p. 2
"War against terrorists and journalists." Nikolai Gulko

The chairman of the Presidential Commission on Countermeasures against Political Extremism and Minister of Justice, Yuri Chaika, announced that the Commission as well as his Ministry would use the "potential of newspapers and television companies in the struggle against...political extremism and aggressive nationalism".

The first deputy minister on the Press and Mass Media, Mikhail Seslavinsky, said that the authorities had already reached certain results as far as doing away with political extremism was concerned. In 1999, 12 media companies were given official warnings for instigating racial and national tension. One newspaper, *Shturmovik*, was closed down. This year, the newspaper *Uralskaya Zhizn* was given a warning. Seslavinsky announced that some 50 media companies, which had propagated extremist views, were being constantly monitored by the Ministry. Seslavinsky made it clear that in addition to the Law on the Media, there is also the Law on the Struggle against Terrorism, according to which materials on Chechnya are being judged. According to the Minister, "the federal authorities will view the access of Chechen commanders on air in the Russian media as an act of facilitating terrorism".

According to the author of the article, if one reads the law carefully one might as well stop covering the war in Chechnya completely, as one is bound to fall victim to one of the articles of the law "On the Struggle against Terrorism" (one of the articles, for instance, prohibits the spreading of threats in any form and by any means). Gulko then discusses Babitsky's case, arguing that so far no accusation against him for assisting the terrorists has been made. "The civil servants understand that to police the work of journalists in Chechnya to the full absurdity [of the law] is not worthwhile".

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18.3.2000, p. 12
"State Journalist. Nikolai Svanidze considers that fate has smiled on him."

In this interview, Svanidze admits that he supported Unity during the elections to the Duma and that he was happy with the result of the elections.

"I have never in the course of my professional life in television taken a position with which I did not agree myself."

He is in favour of hitting hard at the Chechens, though he says he considers himself to be a "true Westerner" in the sense that he supports the Western traditions of liberalism, democracy and the market.

"There is a dependence on the official position [at ORT], but this dependence suits me much better than the dependence on the interests of the private pocket. I could not, as some of my colleagues have, turn 180 degrees [at the orders of the owner] and praise things which they were criticising the day or the other way around...It is difficult for me to discuss in what way I differ, for instance, from Kiselev".

